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# THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

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# THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

APRIL, 1939

## NOTES ON THE *DIEGESEIS* OF CALLIMACHUS (PAP. MIL. 18).

A NEW and more complete text of the famous *Diegeais*, first published by Norsa and Vitelli in 1934, is now available in *Papiri della R. Università di Milano*, Volume Primo (Milan, 1937), edited by Achille Vogliano. Among other additions the editor has succeeded in placing a new fragment (= Fr. A) at the top of the column, entitled by him Col. Z, which precedes Col. I of the previous edition, and further in elucidating a fuller text from the upper part of Col. I itself. In both cases the fresh material, though fragmentary, is interesting and important.

I.—The new text in Col. Z contains the beginning of the *diegesis* of the *Cydippe* (the usual *lemma* must have been cited at the foot of the previous column, cp. Col. II for the same procedure), and is printed thus by Vogliano:—

	ἵς παρθένου ἐκ
	Κυδέ]ππης μήλω καλ-
λίστῳ ἐπιγράψας· μὰ τῇ]ν Ἀρτεμιν Ἀκον-	
τίῳ γαμοῦμαι	]σεν· ἡ δὲ ἡδε-
5 το τῷ δώρῳ	]νετο· ὡς δεγε
	]ηθει [. . .]εν [. . .]ρω
	]· γαμ[

Vogliano's supplements in 3-4 are of course based on the version of the oath given by Aristaenetus (*Epist.* 10). Since for metrical reasons these words cannot have been taken from the text of Callimachus, the editor is doubtless right in inferring a common source in prose for the *Diegetes* and Aristaenetus. In view of this we may reasonably draw on Aristaenetus for further supplements, and I venture to suggest the following:—

	Ἀκόντιος Κείος ἐρασθεῖ]ς παρθένου ἐκ
	τῆς Νάξου ὀνόματι Κυδέ]ππης μήλω καλ
λίστῳ ἐπιγράψας· μὰ τῇ]ν Ἀρτεμιν Ἀκον	
τίῳ γαμοῦμαι· διεκύλι]σεν· ἡ δὲ [[ηδε]]	
5 τῷ δώρῳ περιχαρῆς ἐγέ]νετο· ὡς δὲ γε	
γραμμένα ἀναγνοῦσα ἐλελ]ηθει [λέξ]εν [ἐρ]ρω	
τικὴν ἐκφωνήσασα, τὸ] γαμ[οῦμαι, ἀπέρρ	
ῶσεν αἰδουμένη.]	

2. μῆλω Pap.

4. λάθρα διεκύλισας πρὸ τῶν τῆς θεραπείνης ποδῶν. Aristaen. This *θεράπαινα* (= the *nutrix* of Ovid, *Her.* XXI) apparently plays no part in the account of Callimachus, as summarized by the *Diegetes*. [[ηδε]] I accept the suggestion of Maas (ap. Vogliano) that these letters are due to dittography, cp. Col. VI. 35 τὸν δὲ [[τονδε]]. There are no hyphens in the text of the papyrus, and the reading *ἡδετο* makes the completion of ]νετο difficult.

5-8. ἡ δὲ κόρη κομισαμένη καὶ τοῖς ὄμμασι περιθέουσα τὴν γραφὴν ἀνεγίνωσκεν ἔχουσιν ἔδε· μὰ τὴν Ἀρτεμιν, Ἀκοντίῳ γαμοῦμαι. ἔτι <δὲ> διερχομένη τὸν ὄρκον εἰ καὶ ἀκούσιον τε καὶ νόθον [τὸν] ἐρωτικὸν λόγον, ἀπέρριψεν αἰδουμένη, καὶ ἡμίφωνον καταλέλοιπε λέξιν τὴν ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ κειμένην αὐτὴ διαμνημονεύουσιν γάμον. Aristaen.

5-6. ? <τὰ> γεγραμμένα.

6. For the misspelling *ἔρωτικὴν* cp. Col. V. 25 Παννελλαδος and Vogliano's note *ad. loc.*

II.—In Col. I Vogliano has established two new *lemmata* and their *diegesis*. I am concerned with the first of the two, which is printed thus by Vogliano:—

Εἴπ' ἄγε μοι . . . [.] . . . α[. . . . .]	[.] . [.] . λαταί ἦνις·
Φ]ησὶν ἐν Ἑλιδι εἰ	] . . . . ςτ[. . γ]αμου-
μένας παρθ[ένους	] . . ρ [.] . ον π[έ-
πλους ἐχούσας σ[	] . [ . . . . ]ον[
. . ], δόρυ δὲ ἐν[	
. δε φησιν αἰ[	
ἄγδρα καθωπ[	

2-3. γ[αμουμένας Maas.

'Si parla di una costumanza dell' Elide' is the comment of Vogliano (p. 114). We may go further and say that Callimachus was explaining a pre-nuptial rite and that the clue to his treatment is furnished by Fr. 383 Schn. = Schol. Iliad 2. 629 and 11. 700. The Scholiasts relate that after Heracles had cleaned out Augeias' stables, Augeias refused to pay him, and when Augeias' son Phyleus, appointed to arbitrate, decided against his father, Augeias drove him from the country. Heracles marched against Elis, sacked it, and installed Phyleus as king. The scholiast on Il. 11. 700 continues:—ὅλιγανδρίας δὲ οὐσης διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ συνεφθάρθαι, Ἑρακλῆς συγκατέκλινε τὰς τῶν τετελευτηκότων γυναῖκας τῷ στρατῷ, οὕτως τε πολλῶν γεννηθέντων ἔθηκε τῷ Διὶ τὸν Ὀλυμπιακὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ αὐτὸς πρῶτος τῶν ἀγώνων ἦψατο. ἡ ἱστορία παρὰ Καλλιμάχῳ. I suggest that at Elis it was customary for a bride-to-be to be visited before marriage by an armed warrior, and that Callimachus explained the rite by reference to Heracles' action described above. I would therefore restore the *diegesis* as follows:—

Φ]ησὶν ἐν Ἑλιδι εἰ[θος κατακλίνει]ν τ[ὰς γ]αμου  
μένας παρθ[ένους τῇ νυκτὶ τῇ πρ]ῶ[γ]άμ]ον π[έ-  
πλους ἐχούσας σ[ ] . [ . . . . ]ον[  
. . ], δόρυ δὲ ἐν[χειρί· κατεσκευασμέναις δὲ  
ᾧ]δὲ φησιν ἄ<ν>[ταῖς προσελθόντα  
ἄγδρα καθωπ[λισμένον συνείναι.

For the *lemma* I propose

Εἴπ' ἄγε μοι . . . [.] . . . α[. . . . . πίμπ]λαται ἦνις.

The meaning will be 'Age dic mihi <cur> femina impleatur'. For πίμπλασθαι = 'be made pregnant' L. and S.<sup>9</sup> cite Arist. *H.A.* 576<sup>b</sup> 29 and 578<sup>b</sup> 32. Cp. also Hesych. *πλείην· ἔγκυνον*. The word ἦνις or ἦνις occurs five times in Homer as a fem. adj. qualifying βοῦς—acc. plur.—(Il. 6. 94, 275, 309), or βοῦν (Il. 10. 292, Od. 3. 382). Apollonius Rhodius uses it once and in the genitive, 4. 174 βοῦς ἦνιος. The ancient view (E. M. 432. 2, Hesychius), apparently followed by most modern scholars, connects the word with ἔνος, so that its meaning is 'yearling', but I suggest that Callimachus—and perhaps Apollonius—interpreted it as = *θηλεία* in contrast with the Homeric βοῦς ἄρσενας (Il. 7. 314-5, 20. 495, Od. 19. 420). A comparison of the phrase βόας ἄρσενας εὐρυμετώπους (Il. 20. 495) with βοῦν ἦνιν εὐρυμέτωπον (Il. 10. 292, Od. 3. 382) might easily lead to such an 'interpretation'. Compare too the Latin *boves feminae*. The imperatives are of course addressed to a Muse, but it is hard to say what intervenes between μοι and πίμπλαται. After the former [τίνος ἦρ]α = 'why', cp. Anth. Plan. 4. 299, Call. Fr. 41, would yield the required sense, but hardly suits the traces, though these are admittedly very uncertain. Before πίμπλαται the supplement

ἐν Ἡλίδι suggests itself, but may be too long, unless Callimachus or the Diegetes wrote *πίπλαται* (Schneider gives *πίμπλαται* in Fr. 360). For the following line I suggest *exempli gratia*

ἄνδρὸς ὑπ' αἰχμητοῦ νυκτὶ γάμον προτέρη.

Why the bride should hold a spear I cannot explain, but cp. Tacitus, *Germ.* 18. 3. In addition to Fr. 383, Fr. 198 and Fr. 322, as combined by Schneider, no doubt belong to this elegy, and so probably do Fr. 216 and Fr. anon. 134. For further assignments see Schneider II, pp. 64-6. Owing to the lacuna in Col. Z we cannot be sure whether another elegy was summarized between the *Cydlippe* and the Elis story or whether the *diegesis* of the former was abnormally long and occupied the whole space, running over to the top of Col. I. In any case Fr. 9. 79 Pfeiffer, *ἔστι γε Πισαίου Ζηνὸς ὅπρις π. . . ἰθὺν*,<sup>1</sup> from the end of the *Cydlippe*, is likely to refer to the Elis elegy, in view of the scholiast's statement in Fr. 383.

I append suggestions on two more passages which have provoked considerable discussion since the first publication of the *Diegesis*.

III.—Col. III. 34 sqq. In this elegy Callimachus told how a hunter after killing a boar refused to make the usual dedication to Artemis, and instead hung the head on a poplar in his own honour, with the result that the head fell on him as he slept and killed him.<sup>2</sup> The earlier part of the *diegesis* has been much emended and sometimes rather drastically. But it seems possible to produce sense without any radical changes. Vogliano prints *Κυνηγὸς Ἀλωῖος*<sup>3</sup> ἐλὼν κάπρον ἐπέειπεν ὦ δέον Ἀρτέμιδι ἀνατιθεῖναι τοὺς ἡγουμένους ἐκείνης καὶ ἑαυτῷ ἀνήρτησε τὴν κεφαλὴν κτλ. The crux of the difficulty lies in the phrase τοὺς ἡγουμένους ἐκείνης. As they stand, these words might perhaps mean 'those who lead Artemis in the chase', i.e. are not led by her, cp. Isocr. 198a ἡγούμενος τῶν ἡδοῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀγόμενος ὑπ' αὐτῶν. We must then emend ὦ δέον to οὐ δέον (sc. εἶναι) or ὡς οὐ δέον (sc. ἐστί). A possible alternative is to read τοὺς ἡγουμένους ἐκείνην = 'those who believe in Artemis' existence', cp. the phrases θεοὺς, δαίμονας ἡγείσθαι, though L. and S. do not cite an example with the object in the singular. All that is then necessary is to change ὦ δέον to ὡς δέον<sup>4</sup> (sc. ἐστί). Whichever of these two views be adopted, τοὺς ἡγουμένους must be taken as the subject of ἀνατιθεῖναι, which is then used absolutely.

IV.—Col. VI. 22 sqq. In this *Iambus* Callimachus told how Zeus punished the animals by transferring their speech to men. Vogliano prints the first sentence of the *diegesis* as follows:—

τᾶλ-

Ἀ[α] [ῥω]ια <ὦ>μοφώνει ἀν[θ]ρώποις μέχρι, <μετὰ τὴν Κρόνον>  
κατάλυσιν, γηρῶς ἐπ[ρε]σβευσεν ὁ κύ-  
κνος πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, καὶ ἀλώπηξ τὸν  
Δία ἐτόλμησεν μὴ δικαίως ἀρχεῖν φά-  
ναι.

Vogliano's insertion of μετὰ τὴν Κρόνον, which he defends by a reference to Philodemus, *περὶ εὐσεβείας* 45, 10, where the phrase ἡ Κρόνον κατάλυσις occurs (cp. Philippson, *Hermes* 55 (1920), 256), is very attractive, but γηρῶς remains unintelligible. I suggest γηρῶ <ντο>ς qualifying Κρόνον. The first line of this *Iambus*, given by the papyrus as

Ἦν κε[ίν]ος ο[ύ]νιαντός, ᾧ τό τε [πτ]ηνόν,

<sup>1</sup> Pfeiffer now reads *ἔστι* *sc.*

<sup>2</sup> Ἀλώιος Körte: Ἀλαῖος Norsa-Vitelli: Ἀλῆιος

<sup>3</sup> For the story cp. Diod. 4. 22. 3 and Ovid, *Ib.* 503-6 with scholia.

Pfeiffer.

<sup>4</sup> Pohlenz, *Philol.* XC. 121. 3.



68 NOTES ON THE *DIEGESEIS* OF CALLIMACHUS (PAP. MIL. 18)

was known already from Fr. 87, which continues

καὶ τοὺν θαλάσση καὶ τὸ τετράπουν οὕτως  
ἐφθέγγεθ' ὥς ὁ πηλὸς ὁ Προμηθεύς.

The last fourteen lines of it are preserved in P. Oxy. 1011 = Fr. 9. 160-173 Pfeiffer (cp. now Lobel, *Hermes* 69 (1934), 171). Lines 160-1 contain a reference to Kronos

τάπ'ι Κρόνον τε καὶ ἔτι τὰ πρὸ τῆς 'Ρείης  
λ[έγ]ουσα (sc. the ἀλώπηξ of the *diegesis*),

but this in itself would not justify the qualification of Kronos by the Diegetes as γηρῶν. However in the twenty or so lines missing after 159 there would be room for a more explicit reference. Thus after 1.3 (see above) Callimachus may have continued

Κρόνος τότε ἦρχε· τὸν Κρόνον δὲ γηρῶντα  
Ζεὺς ἐξέωσεν . . .

EXETER COLLEGE, OXFORD.

E. A. BARBER.

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TWO DIFFICULTIES IN PINDAR, *PYTH.* V.

THE following lines (15 *sqq.*) are a famous crux :

τὸ μὲν ὅτι βασιλεὺς  
ἔσσι μεγαλῶν πολίων  
ἔχει συγγενῆς  
ὀφθαλμὸς αἰδοῦτάτων γέρας  
τεῦ τοῦτο μειγνύμενον φρενί.

The reading is that of all MSS., save for the necessary correction αἰδοῦτάτων for αἰδοῖστάτων, which will not scan. I have purposely left it without punctuation. The core of the difficulty of course is the word ὀφθαλμός. Farnell, it seems to me, has made it abundantly clear that this cannot be literal, for, apart from the oddity of the epithet συγγενῆς in such a context, to take it as meaning the actual physical eye of Arkesilas (or anyone else) involves giving εἶχει the impossible meaning 'sees'. But the metaphorical meaning is not much easier. A person or group of persons can be the 'eye', that is to say the most precious part, of something, as the Emmenidai were the 'eye of Sicily', *Ol.* ii, 10, Amphiaraios the 'eye' of Adrastus' army, *Ol.* vi, 16, the eldest or only son, or even the presence of the master, the 'eye' of the house (Aesch., *Choeph.*, 934, *Pers.*, 168-9), a child the 'eye'—we should perhaps say 'light'—of his mother's life, Eurip., *Andr.*, 406, and perhaps, for the interpretation is not too certain, a chosen band of Athenians the 'eye' of Theseus' land, Aesch., *Eumen.*, 1025. In these instances we may I think acquiesce in Groeneboom's remark on *Pers.*, *loc. cit.*, that 'eye' is used to signify the most precious or noble part of something, its glory (*dat iets het kostelijkste, het edelste, de glorie van dit of dat is*). Or it may be used, very like φάος, to mean help or salvation, as Soph., *O.T.*, 987, *Trach.*, 203, where respectively the news of Polybos' death and the tidings of Herakles' safety seem to bring deliverance from all anxiety. This latter use occurs in the ode under discussion, 57, where the Battiadai are the 'brightest eye' to strangers, in other words their enlightened government leaves visitors to Kyrene with nothing to fear. The significant fact, to my mind, about these metaphors is not, as Farnell says (p. 171 of his commentary, which gives the above examples), that ὀφθαλμός or ὄμμα is almost never the subject of the sentence—abstract and metaphorical words seldom are in Greek—but that in the first use it always has a genitive with it; no one is ever an 'eye' but always an 'eye of' something. Helped out with a genitive, the word may even have a subjective meaning (in the philosophical, not the grammatical sense); it may be, not only that which actually is most valuable, but that which someone most values. Thus in Eur., *Phoen.*, 802, Kithairon is the ὄμμα of the huntress Artemis, the very apple of her eye, the place which she prizes above all others. So in Latin, as Groeneboom reminds us, Cicero's country houses are to him the *ocelli Italiae*, the spots in all Italy which he most prizes and loves, *ad Att.*, xvi, 6, 2; whence it is that in Latin, though I think not in Greek, *ocellus* passes into lovers' language to mean 'darling', as Plautus, *Trin.*, 245, cf. *Pseud.*, 179. We may therefore take it that ὀφθαλμός is used pretty freely to mean the most valuable or most prized part or feature or possession of someone or some place, its glory; provided always that we have a genitive, or its equivalent at least, to tell us what person or place is meant. Have we one here?

All editions, so far as I know, deny that we have by their punctuation, for they

put a comma after *πολίων*. This, it seems to me, is doubly unsatisfactory, for the above reason and because Arkesilas was not king of several great cities, but of one, Kyrene, and there seems to be no particular reason for using a rhetorical plural, especially as the singular would scan; *πόλιος* is as legitimate an ending for the line here (giving *syllaba anceps*) as *ἀναδεξάμενοι*, | *Ἀπολλον* in 78, with its hiatus. I would therefore punctuate

τὸ μὲν ὅτι βασιλεὺς  
ἔσσι· μεγαλῶν πόλιων κτέ.

Now, I think, the sense becomes comparatively clear and easy. 'First, thou art a king; the native-born glory (treasure, most valuable thing) of great cities hath this most reverend office, and well it fits thy temper'. I.e., Arkesilas is a true king, son of a great native house ('precious thing born with the city itself') and kingly in mind as in rank. The context serves as a comment on the metaphor; since he is talking of kings, what precious thing, or glory, could have the office in question save the prince or his house? To make it less obscure, Pindar adds *συγγενής*, which is exactly true of Arkesilas' family, for his ancestor Battos founded the city, and so the royal line and the state over which it ruled may be said to have come into being together; there were descendants of Euphemos before (*Pyth.* iv, 20 *sqq.*, 43 *sqq.*), but they did not call themselves Battiadai.

Lines 78 *sqq.* are easy enough to construe; the difficulty is to interpret them. Who are the 'we' who have received the festival of the Karneia from the Aigeidai who went to Sparta and venerate Kyrene when they celebrate it? Certainly not the Thebans, for, as Farnell rightly says, there is no indication that they kept the Karneia or any other Dorian festival. But his own rendering seems to me intolerable. A couple of lines earlier, Pindar, in his own person, says that 'my fathers' were Aigeidai who went to Thera and thence of course to Kyrene. To suppose that 'we' now means 'we, the Kyreneans who make up the chorus', or 'we, the citizens of Kyrene in general', is surely to pass the utmost limits of Pindaric freedom in transitions. And I can see no need for any but the natural interpretation, that, as 'my fathers' is 'the fathers of me, Pindar the Aigeid', so 'we' are the Aigeidai. I can see no objection to supposing that in commemoration of their kinsmen's emigration to Lakadaimon, Thera and Kyrene, the Theban branch of the clan kept the great festival of these and other Dorian settlements as part of their *sacra domestica*, or *gentilicia*. If they did so, they certainly had very good reasons for honouring Kyrene (the goddess), for it was in her city that the emigrants had found prosperity. And this furnishes Pindar also with good grounds for mentioning his own family connections; he would remind the king that he and his are being praised (and, incidentally, in the great Fourth Pythian, asked to restore Damophilos) not by a stranger but by a relative of one of the leading clans in his own state.

H. J. ROSE.

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## THE DISORDERLY MOTION IN THE *TIMAIOS*.

So much has been written on this vexed issue,<sup>1</sup> that one hesitates to reopen it. Yet one has no other choice when one finds scholars accepting as generally agreed a view which rests on altogether insufficient evidence. I propose, therefore, to examine the main grounds on which recent authorities interpret the disorderly motion of *Tm* 30a, 52d-53b, and 69b as a mythical symbol. They are four:

- I. That the *Timaios* is a myth;
- II. The testimony of the Academy;
- III. That motion could not antecede the creation of time;
- IV. That motion could not antecede the creation of soul.

### I.

In what sense is the *Timaios* a myth? A comparison with the atomists suggests itself at once. The *Timaios* corrects their views in their own universe of discourse. Empedocles' cosmology starts with the four *μίσματα*.<sup>2</sup> Plato disagrees: 'These are products, not *archai*. I cannot give certain knowledge of the true *arche* or *archai*. But I can give an account which is a good deal more probable than any atomist's.'<sup>3</sup> So when he fulfils this promise, going back of the four 'elements' to describe in 52d-53b the winnowing movement out of which they were formed, what he gives us is not more mythological than Empedocles' mingling of the elements in the original harmony of love,<sup>4</sup> than the primordial *ἡρεμία* of Anaxagoras' *ἡμιομερῆ*,<sup>5</sup> or Leukippos' and Demokritos' world-forming *δίνη*.<sup>6</sup>

Thus the *Timaios* is unique among Plato's myths. It is a mistake to put it on a level with the eschatological myths of the *Gorgias*, *Phaidon*, *Republic* x, and *Phaidros*.<sup>7</sup> The *Timaios* offers no gentle disavowal of the scientific scrupulousness of the account by the literary devices employed in every one of these others.<sup>8</sup> The speaker is the

<sup>1</sup> For references to opposing authorities in the last century see Zeller, *Plato and the Older Academy* (English transl., London, 1876, p. 364, n. 5). Some post-war authorities who take the view that the pre-existing chaos must not be taken literally:

Wilamowitz, *Platon*, Vol. i, 1917, pp. 597-8.

C. Ritter, *Platon*, Vol. ii, 1923, pp. 415-7.

W. Theiler, *Zur Geschichte der teleologischen Naturbetrachtung*, 1924, section on Plato.

A. E. Taylor, *Plato*, 1926, pp. 442 ff., and *Commentary on the Timaeus*, 1928, pp. 66-69 et passim.

P. Frutiger, *Les Mythes de Platon*, 1930, passim.

Léon Robin, *Platon*, 1935, p. 191.

G. M. A. Grube, *Plato's Thought*, 1935, pp. 168 ff.

F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, 1937, pp. 37, 176, 203 et passim.

<sup>2</sup> Diels B. 6, where, significantly enough, these physical substances are given the names of divinities. Conversely, the anthropomorphic elements, Love and Strife, are conceived as corporeal forces. See Cyril Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus*, p. 31; and Cornford, in

chapter xv of vol. iv of *Cambridge Ancient History*: 'In Empedocles Love and Strife belong at once to the world of mythical imagery and to the world of scientific concepts.' This ambivalence of myth and science, very different from didactic metaphor or allegory, is the proper mood of the *Timaios*. It was used unconsciously by Empedocles, consciously by Plato. Cf. *μῦθος* in *Sophist*. 242c-3.

<sup>3</sup> Summarizing in paraphrase *Tm* 48b 1-d 4.

<sup>4</sup> Cyril Bailey, *op. cit.*, pp. 31, 32.

<sup>5</sup> Aristotle, *Phys.* 250b 25, 26.

<sup>6</sup> Diogenes Laertius, ix, 31, 32; Aristotle, *Phys.* 196a 24.

<sup>7</sup> Frutiger, *op. cit.*, classes all these together as 'parascientific' myths.

<sup>8</sup> In the *Gorgias* the story begins with *ὁσπερ γὰρ Ὀυμπὸς λέγει* (523a); Homer's witness is called in again in 525e. The story contains such figures and places as the Isles of the Blessed and Tartaros; Minos, Rhadamanthos, Aiaikos; Tantalos, Sisyphos, Tityos.

In the *Phaidon*: *λέγεται δὲ οὕτως* . . . (107d); . . . *ὡς ἐγὼ ὑπὸ τινος πέπεισμαι* (108c); *λέγεται* . . .

ἀστρονομικώτατος Timaios (27a), who, in Socrates' estimation, has reached the highest summit of all philosophy (20a). The sober, systematic, prosaic tone of his discourse contrasts sharply with Kritias' earlier reminiscences. This all but irrelevant introduction sets the fanciful myth over against the scientific myth. It is stuffed with mythological material: Atlantis, the deluge, Phaethon's flight, and the genealogy of Phoroneus, Niobe, Deukalion and Pyrrha which even the Egyptian priest declares to be mythology (23b). None of this sort of thing comes into Timaios' story; and its omission has the force in conscious restraint in view of the wealth of poetic allusions suggested by his grandiose theme.<sup>1</sup> When the creation of the stars forces him to say something about the popular gods, he is dry, hasty, ironical.<sup>2</sup> He accepts the traditional accounts in a mood that suggests Hume's, 'Our most holy religion is founded on Faith.'<sup>3</sup> Sacred mythology of this sort he treats elsewhere with the deepest respect.<sup>4</sup> He has no use for it here. The topography of the under-world, described in such detail in the *Phaidon*, is left unmentioned. The chthonian deities, whose worship is an integral part of the state-cult,<sup>5</sup> pass unnoticed. Nor is there any place here for the mediating *daimonic* entities, who figure invariably in Plato's supernatural hierarchy<sup>6</sup> and are conspicuous in the cosmology of the *Epinomis* (984e, 985a).

Why should the cosmology of the *Timaios* exclude figures whose reality is vouched for by the law of the state? Because they fall below its standard of scientific probability.<sup>7</sup> Commentators often pick the expression εἰκότα μῦθον out of Timaios' epistemological introduction (29b-d), and use it as though the emphasis were on μῦθον instead of εἰκότα. This is certainly wrong. Εἰκός is the important word. It is used thrice explicitly (29c 2, 8; 29d 2), and once implicitly (29b εἰκόνος . . . συγγενεύς). Of these four, it is used thrice as an adjective of λόγος, once of μῦθος. In the seventeen echoes of this introduction throughout the rest of the dialogue, μῦθος is used thrice,<sup>8</sup> while εἰκός, εἰκότως, etc., are used sixteen times.<sup>9</sup> Εἰκότα λόγον is used eight times; εἰκότα μῦθον twice. And it is a pretty commentary on the 'mythological' connotations of εἰκότα μῦθον that it is used both times of a purely scientific opinion: 59c, of the composition of metals, and 68d, of colour-mixture.

A myth is a story; whether the story is mythology or natural history depends on what kind of story it is. Διαμυθολογοῦμεν, εἴτε εἰκός οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μή says Socrates in the *Phaidon* (70b) of no less a matter than reincarnation.<sup>10</sup> But there is no such ambiguity in the *Timaios*: here only the εἰκός is tolerated. And what εἰκός means in

(110b); καὶ χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπάδειν ἑαυτῷ . . . (114d). The detailed geography is clearly mythological.

In the myth of Er we have clearly an other-worldly experience; and in the *Phaidros* a literary exercise: παλινψδία, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἡραγασμένη ποιητικοῖς τισιν διὰ Φαῖδρον εἰρησθαι (257a).

<sup>1</sup> Except in verbs describing the activity of the Demiurge, where he is forced into anthropomorphism, Timaios indulges rarely in poetic metaphors. The κρατήρ of 46d is the only important one; and there it occurs with the scientist's characteristic carelessness for literary detail: he thinks he has used it before (ἐπὶ τὸν πρότερον κρατήρα) when he actually has not. Expressions which he knows to be poetic Timaios expressly qualifies as similes: ἐμβιβσάσας ὥς ἐς δόχημα (41e); this is a vestige of the imaginative figure of the *Phaidros*, where it had been used without qualification: Ζεὺς, εὐαῶνων πτηνὸν ἄρμα (246e); θεῶν δόχηματα ἰσορρόπως εὐήρημα

(247b); there the mood is mythology, and to qualify would be pedantry.

<sup>2</sup> About irony: see especially Taylor's *Commentary* on 40d 6-e 2.

<sup>3</sup> *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, x. ii. 100.

<sup>4</sup> I.e. that he accepts the forms of traditional worship, and wishes to preserve them intact, without the slightest alteration (*Laws* v 738b, c; cf. also *Rep.* iv 427b, c, and *Laws* iv 716c-718b, v 759a-760a; viii 828a-d).

<sup>5</sup> I.e. *Laws* iv 717a, viii 828c, xii 958d.

<sup>6</sup> *Rep.* iii 392a, iv 427b; *Laws* iv 717b, v 734d, vii 818c, x 910a.

<sup>7</sup> ἄνευ τε εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων λέγουσιν (40e).

<sup>8</sup> 59c, 68d, 69c.

<sup>9</sup> 30b, 34c, 44d, 48c, 49f, 53d, 55d, 56a, 56d, 57d, 59c, 68d, 72d, 90e.

<sup>10</sup> Further qualified immediately by the preface, παλαιὸς . . . λόγος οὐ μεμνημένα . . . (70c).

this context is carefully defined: the metaphysical contrast of the eternal forms and their perishing copy determines the epistemological contrast of certainty and probability.<sup>1</sup> Thus 'the element of falsity lies, not in the mode of exposition, but in the object described, which is only a fleeting image of the real.'<sup>2</sup> All of what we hopefully call 'science,' Plato relegates to verisimilitude. But verisimilitude is not fiction, for the visible cosmos is not fictitious. If within the dream-world of the senses<sup>3</sup> we draw pretty definite lines between the reality of people we see and hear and, say, Hesiod's γηγευῖς (our sanity depends on it), so scientific probability must be kept clear from didactic fictions. So the presumption must be that every element in the *Timaios* is probable, and none fanciful, unless we are given further instructions or hints to the contrary. Of the latter there are none for the pre-existing chaos. In their absence we are so far driven to accept it as a serious, though only probable, hypothesis of the origin of the material world.

## II.

It is not then Plato, but Xenokrates who supplies us with the suggestion that, as Aristotle put it in *de Caelo* 279b 32-280a 1, the expressions about the generation of the world are a kind of diagram, given διδασκαλίας χάριν. This passage of the *de Caelo* is 'a plain allusion to the interpretation of the *Timaios* given by Xenokrates.'<sup>4</sup> In none of our sources is it said that Plato thus construed the *Timaios*; or even that Xenokrates contended that Plato thus construed it. All we hear is that Xenokrates and Krantor, or 'Xenokrates and the Platonists,' supplied this interpretation.<sup>5</sup> Of course, we have Xenokrates' teaching at second, or rather at *nth*, hand. It may be that Xenokrates did make this very claim. But this is not in our evidence. Xenokrates is, therefore, of little help at this point. For the rest, there are excellent reasons why an apologist and systematizer of Plato's thought should wish to put just that construction upon this troublesome doctrine of the *Timaios*. For the same reasons the Academy would conserve it. Yet their minds could not have been altogether easy about it, or we could hardly have had Plutarch, Atticus, and ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν,<sup>6</sup> reverting centuries later to the literal interpretation. So I cannot put as much weight on the 'all but unanimous testimony of the Academy'<sup>7</sup> as Professor Taylor seems to do.

On the other hand, we have Aristotle, who knows Xenokrates' interpretation and also knows something of Plato's oral teaching. So far from attributing this interpretation to Plato, his references to the *Timaios* imply the very opposite.<sup>8</sup> There can be

<sup>1</sup> The account is 'akin' to the 'image' it describes: εἰκόνας εἰκότας (sc. λόγους) 20c.

<sup>2</sup> F. M. Cornford, *Cambridge Ancient History*, Vol. vi, Chap. xi, p. 330.

<sup>3</sup> *Tm* 52b, c: ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς θειρώξεως. . .

<sup>4</sup> A. E. Taylor, *Commentary*, p. 69. So much is clear from the Greek commentaries, listed by Heinze, *Xenokrates*, pp. 179-180:

Simpl.: δοκεῖ μὲν πρὸς Ξενοκράτην μάλιστα καὶ τοὺς Πλατωνικοὺς ὁ λόγος. . .

Schol. cod. Coisl. 166: τοῦτο πρὸς Ξενοκράτην εἶσθαι ἀπολογούμενον ὑπὲρ Πλάτωνος. . .

Schol. cod. Reg. 1853: ὁ Ξενοκράτης καὶ ὁ Σπείσιππος ἐπιχειροῦντες βοηθεῖσαι τῷ Πλάτῳ λέγον. . .

and from Plutarch, *de animae procreatione in Timaeo*, 1013a, where the reference is Xenokrates, Krantor, and their followers.

<sup>5</sup> It is true that we have this interpretation applied to Plato's doctrine without reference to

the mediation of Xenokrates in Theophrastos, *Phys. Opin.* Fr. 11 (quoted in Taylor's *Commentary*, p. 69, n. 1). But neither does Theophrastos say that this is Plato's own teaching about the *Timaios*. He merely records this interpretation as a possible one.

<sup>6</sup> Proklos, quoted by Taylor, *Commentary*, p. 68.

<sup>7</sup> Taylor, *Commentary*, p. 69.

<sup>8</sup> I.e. *de Caelo* 280a 29, *Phys.* 251b 14, *Met.* 1072a 2. A reference to the *Timaios* in *de Anima* 406b 26 ff. is interesting, even though it does not relate to the pre-existing chaos: τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος φυσιολογεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν κινεῖν τὸ σῶμα. That is how Aristotle thinks of the *Timaios*: φυσιολογεῖ. This is important, when one remembers how φυσιολόγημα suggests the most emphatic opposition to μυθολόγημα. E.g. Epicurus ii, 87, 8. . . ἐκ παντὸς ἐκπίπτει φυσιολογήματος, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν μῦθον καταρρεῖ. Same contrast in Epic. K.D. xii. One ought to think twice before ridiculing Aristotle for taking



no question here of 'mere polemical "scores" got by pressing the mere words of a sentence.'<sup>1</sup> His references are too detailed and too serious for that. He tells us that—

(a) In teaching the generation of time Plato stood alone against the unanimous opinion of previous thinkers;<sup>2</sup> while

(b) he (Aristotle) was the first to teach the beginninglessness of the *ouvanos*;<sup>3</sup> that

(c) Plato, with Leukippos, taught the everlastingness of motion;<sup>4</sup> yet

(d) Plato held that the world and the soul were generated.<sup>5</sup>

Of these statements *a* and *b* or *b* and *c* might be, and *a* and *c* or *c* and *d* would almost certainly be taken as mutually inconsistent. To see that they are not, implies conscientious recording and thoughtful distinctions. To be sure, every reference to Plato is the prelude to a crushing refutation. But crushing refutation would be singularly inept against mythology. There can be no question here either of ignorance or carelessness. If we are to discount Aristotle's testimony we must charge him with deliberate misrepresentation. It is hard to believe that Aristotle, with all the limitations of his subtle and unimaginative mind, was capable of quite that.

### III.

We now come to the more difficult part of the discussion: to the contradictions in which Plato would seem to involve himself on a literal interpretation of the pre-existing chaos. Here we must make sure of the canon of criticism on which we are to proceed. Shall we assume at the start that Plato's philosophy is immune from contradiction? This would be sheer wish-thinking. Every great thinker has sought consistency, and none has perfectly attained it, except in the minds of slavish disciples who know the answers so well that they never think of the problems. One thing only we can reasonably assume about a great philosopher: that he is never carelessly or needlessly inconsistent. In the present instance Plato himself has warned us of rough sailing ahead. This is physics, not metaphysics; his physics must have a fringe of inconsistency and inexactness (29c 6), at the risk of belying the metaphysics. In fact Plato has much too cheap an insurance against misadventures in the *Timaios*. He can always say, 'I told you so. What can you expect of the image of an image that is in constant flux?' We cannot treat him quite so leniently. To meet his inconsistencies with easy-going tolerance would be as shallow as to hide or explain them away. We must insist on the question: Where is the source of the inconsistency? Is it a mere accident of the physics, or can it be traced back to a weakness in the metaphysics? And of the pre-existing chaos we must ask further: Is it the cause of metaphysical inconsistency, or its symptom? If the latter, then to remove it as mythology would be needless exegetic surgery.

Let us begin with the most formidable of these inconsistencies:

'No sane man could be meant to be understood literally in maintaining at once that time and the world began together (38b 6), and also that there was a state of things, which he proceeds to describe, *before* there was any world.'<sup>6</sup>

But was the contradiction as obvious to Plato as it is to Professor Taylor? And was it avoidable?

seriously the *Timaios*' doctrine of the soul, as does Frutiger, *op. cit.*, p. 202. Plato, who believes, with all other Greek philosophers, that sensation involves a physiological process, must explain how the soul is 'shaken' and 'moved' in sensation (*Phileb.* 33d, 34a). The theory of the *Timaios* that the soul is a pattern of circular motion is a serious attempt to provide such an explanation. Aristotle is quite right in objecting

that this implies a spatial conception of the soul. His objection would hold just as much against the *Philebos* as against the 'mythical' *Timaios*.

<sup>1</sup> Taylor, *Commentary*, p. 69.

<sup>2</sup> *Phys.* 251b 14-18.

<sup>3</sup> *de Caelo* 279b 12, 13.

<sup>4</sup> *Met.* 1071b 31-33.

<sup>5</sup> *de Caelo* 280a 29, 30; *Met.* 1072a 12.

<sup>6</sup> Taylor, *Commentary*, p. 69.

Aristotle was a 'sane man.' He records both of these Platonic doctrines: that motion is everlasting (*Met.* 1071b 31-33), while time is not (*Phys.* 251b 14-18). He interprets the latter literally. Yet he sees no immediate contradiction between the two. He does indeed hold that 'all change and all that is in motion is in time' (*Phys.* 222b 30, 31), and that time has no beginning (*Phys.* 251b 14-28), but he finds it necessary to establish these propositions independently.<sup>1</sup> They are not immediate logical inferences from the self-contradictoriness of 'before the beginning of time.' To convict him of inconsistency Aristotle has to go farther afield and bring in the additional premiss that Plato, who 'sometimes' attributes the cause of motion to the soul, could not consistently make the generated soul cause of beginningless motion.<sup>2</sup> Why is it, one wonders, that Aristotle should resort to such a roundabout argument, weakened as it is by the 'sometimes' in the first premiss, when he could offer the simple and fatal objection that 'before time' is nonsense, since 'before' presupposes time?<sup>3</sup>

The answer is in the 'tradition running throughout the whole of Greek thought, which always associated Time with circular movement.'<sup>4</sup> Aristotle justified this belief by arguing:

(a) Time is the number of motion (*Phys.* 223a 33);

(b) there is only one time (*Phys.* 223b 2-12); therefore,

(c) time must be measured by one determinate motion (*Phys.* 223b 12-18);

(d) this must be the motion whose number is 'most knowable' and that is uniform (*ὁμαλῆς*) circular motion (*Phys.* 223b 18-21).

Note the implications of this argument: What would happen if you eliminated the uniform circular motion of the heavenly sphere? According to Aristotle there would be no other uniform motion.<sup>5</sup> Without uniform motion time cannot be numbered, and if it cannot be numbered is it still time? A number that cannot be numbered would be a contradiction in terms. Thus, if Aristotle adhered strictly to this assumption that time is the measure of a determinate motion, he should have been hard put to it to show any inconsistency whatever in Plato's doctrine that motion is eternal while time is not. So long as there is only irregular motion, there would be no time in this strict sense of the word. It is only when the regular motion of the heavenly bodies comes into being that time begins.<sup>6</sup> This is in fact the hypothesis of the *Timaios*.

On this hypothesis we should have to reject the validity of the argument of *Phys.* 222b 30-223a 15 (summarized below, n. 1), which attempts to establish that time is coeval with motion. For the first premiss in that argument is that *θᾶττον* and *βραδύτερον* is predicable of every motion (222b 31, 32); and to define *θᾶττον*

<sup>1</sup> He proves the first as follows:

- (i) *θᾶττον* or *βραδύτερον* is predicable of every motion;
- (ii) *θᾶττον* implies the idea of *πρότερον*;
- (iii) *πρότερον* implies distance from 'now';
- (iv) 'now' implies time (*τὰ νῦν ἐν χρόνῳ*) (*Phys.* 222b 31-223a 8).

He proves the second:

- (i) time can neither be nor be conceived apart from 'now';
- (ii) any 'now' is a *μεσότης* between past and future;
- (iii) any past is a 'now';
- (iv) therefore, any past has a past (*Phys.* 251b 19-26).

<sup>2</sup> *Met.* 1072a 1, 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Phys.* 223a 4-8; 251b 10, 11.

<sup>4</sup> F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, p. 103, q.v.

<sup>5</sup> He holds that rectilinear motion is not uniform, 'since (according to him) when it is *κατὰ φύσιν* it becomes faster as bodies near their proper place, and when it is *παρὰ φύσιν* it becomes slower as the impressed force becomes exhausted. The circular motion of the heavenly bodies is the only change which by its nature proceeds uniformly.' Ross, *Aristotle's Physics*, p. 612. Hence his doctrine that *ὁμαλῆ* (sc. *κίνησις*) *ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τὴν κύκλῳ μόνην*, *Phys.* 265b 11.

<sup>6</sup> And we could add: If it should ever happen that the heavenly revolutions should cease, so would time. Cf. Marlowe's *Dr. Faustus*.

Stand still, ye ever-moving spheres of heaven,  
That time may cease, and midnight never come  
This is good Aristotelian (and Platonic) doctrine

Aristotle employs the idea of uniform (*ὁμαλήν*) motion,<sup>1</sup> which is contrary to the hypothesis of the *Timaios*. So Aristotle could not—and does not—use the argument of *Phys.* 222b 31-223a 8 against the *Timaios*. To dislodge Plato he has to fall back on another argument: that of *Phys.* 251b 19-26. Here his logic is sound. But he is no longer using the same concept of time as before; he is not working with the cyclical time of *Phys.* 223b 12-224a 2, but with the more general concept of a 'now' which is always a *μεσότης* between past and present.

This excursus on Aristotle enables us to understand—

(a) Plato's concept of cyclical time;

(b) how such a concept seemed compatible with the supposition of a disorderly motion going on in the absence of time.

*b* needs no further argument. It is a simple inference from the belief that time essentially implies periodic motion; no periodic motion, no time. *a* requires further comment. The doctrine of time in the *Timaios* is a stronger version of the cyclical time of *Phys.* 223b 12-224a 2. If Aristotle takes the heavenly revolutions as a necessary condition of time, the *Timaios* seems to identify them with time.<sup>2</sup> It not only tells us that sun, moon, and the other five planets were *ὅσα εἶδει συναπεργάζεσθαι χρόνον* (38e),<sup>3</sup> and were made *ἵνα γεννηθῇ χρόνος* (38c), but even that the 'wandering' of the planets is time.<sup>4</sup> Nights, days, months, and years are 'parts' (*μέρη χρόνου*, 37e), and 'was' and 'shall be' (the most general categories of temporal succession) are 'species' (*εἶδη*, 37e 4, 38a 8) of cyclical time (*κυκλούμενον*, 38a 8).

Now time so conceived is not the contrary of timeless eternity, but an approximation to it: its likeness (*εἰκόνα*, 37d 6), its imitation (38a 8). Time is a finished product, the end result of a raw material which the Demiurge works over with the definite purpose of making it as much like eternity as he possibly can.<sup>5</sup> What is this raw material? Plato tells us in 52d 3: it is *γένεσις*. This distinction between raw *γένεσις* and created *χρόνος* is the key to the whole account. It shows that it was just as necessary for Plato to hold that the Demiurge did not create the first, as that he did create the second. It is the nature of the Demiurge to make his work more like the eternal model, not less like it. So the one thing he could not possibly do is to bring the factor of change and decay, of 'perpetual perishing,' into existence. That is a necessary condition for his work. Given that, he can proceed to inform it with periodic motion. Since he did not create it, it must antecede creation. It must exist not as a bare nothing, but as change, though disordered change: *κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως*.

But it is not utterly disordered change. Wholly devoid of form it would be, on Platonic standards, wholly devoid of Being; i.e. nothing at all. But obviously it is not that. It is something. This must puzzle Plato, who thinks of *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον* as two distinct entities, requiring the imposition of the one upon the other through

<sup>1</sup> *Phys.* 222b 33-223a 2: *λέγω δὲ ὅταν κινεῖσθαι τὸ πρότερον μεταβάλλον εἰς τὸ ὑποκείμενον κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ διάστημα καὶ ὁμαλῆς κίνησιν κινούμενον*.

<sup>2</sup> I say 'the *Timaios*,' rather than 'Plato,' in view of *Parm.* 151e-157b, to which Professor Cornford has called my attention. There time is conceived in the more general terms of before and after—*τοῦ ποτὲ . . . καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν*, 155d. There Plato is thinking of a different aspect of the problem: he is contrasting *χρόνος* as the *spread* of either motion or rest with the durationless *ἐξαίφνης* (156c-e), while in the *Timaios* he is contrasting *χρόνος* as periodic *form* with the formlessness of random process. What the Demiurge creates in the *Timaios* is temporal form, not temporal spread. We must not con-

fuse the two. Contrast, for example, *Parm.* 151e, 7, 8, where *τὸ εἶναι* implies *χρόνον τὸν παρόντα*, with *Tm* 37e-38b, where *τὸ ἐστιν* implies a state to which *χρόνος* does not apply.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. 41e 5 and 42d 5: *ὄργανα χρόνων, ὄργανα χρόνον* of moon and other stars.

<sup>4</sup> 39d: *χρόνων ὅντα τὰς τοῦτων πλάνας*. Cf. Aristotle's statement in *Phys.* 218a 34, *οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν τοῦ δλου κίνησιν εἶναι φασί* (sc. *τὸν χρόνον*), where *οἱ μὲν* are identified with Plato by Eudemos, Theophrastus, and Alexander (*Simpl.* 700. 18; reference given in Ross's *Aristotle's Physics*, ad loc.). To combat this view Aristotle has to fall back on rather weak arguments in *Phys.* 218b 1-5.

<sup>5</sup> 38b, c; also 37c, d.



the mediation of a third ordering entity.<sup>1</sup> The theme of the *Tímaios* is this informing of formless change by the Demiurge. If this dominating idea were false, the *Tímaios* would be not only mythology, but nonsense as well. Yet how conceive of *γένεσις* which lacks being altogether? The more *γένεσις* is denuded of stable *οὐσία*, the more it will be true that it is *γένεσις*: *ἔστι γένεσις*, which sounds like a contradiction in terms. This is the deep-lying difficulty that is mirrored in the problem of pre-temporal motion. Plato could not have been entirely unaware of it. In the *Sophist* he faced squarely an analogous logical difficulty, and showed that *ἔστι μὴ ὄν* involves no contradiction. But the metaphysical problem he never cleared up in the same way.<sup>2</sup> And it is doubtful if he could, without recasting his whole philosophy to end the ontological dichotomy of *τὸ ὄν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον* from *τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ἀεί, ὄν δὲ οὐδέποτε* (27d-28a).

Short of such a drastic remedy Plato had to compromise and say: the chaos is disorderly, but not altogether so; it contains 'some traces'<sup>3</sup> of order. This is a makeshift. Even as a metaphor it is self-contradictory, for 'traces' could only be a result, not an anticipation. Yet it is the best that Plato could do in the case of spatial order. And, I submit, it is the best he can do in the case of temporal order. He would have to say: just as the pre-existing chaos had traces of geometric pattern, so it had traces of arithmetic periodicity; just as these traces justify us in speaking of *ὑγραινομένην* and *πυρουμένην* before the formal creation of water and fire, so they might permit us to speak of a vague, indefinite priority and succession in the temporal passage which is as yet destitute of chronological order.

This is, of course, a most unsatisfactory expedient. But the cause of the trouble, I repeat, is not the disorderly motion as such. It is the idea of *γένεσις*. *Γένεσις*, it now turns out, is not the protean state which Plato believes it to be, formless till it be 'likened' to the model by the charitable intervention of the Demiurge. On the contrary, quite apart from any order impressed upon it by the Creator, it has a precise, inalienable order of its own: an order of before and after, inherent in the mere fact of passage. I do not see how Plato could face *this* difficulty without rewriting not only the part of the *Tímaios* which deals with the disorderly motion, but much more of the *Tímaios*, and a good many parts of other dialogues as well.

## IV.

We have the final perplexity: According to the well-known teaching of *Laws* x, all motion is caused by soul. The disorderly motion would then imply an irrational world-soul. But no such soul is mentioned in the *Tímaios*. Since this is offered as an argument against the pre-existent chaos, a fair way of meet-

<sup>1</sup> This idea is not peculiar to the *Tímaios*. E.g. *Phil.* 30c: *ἀπειρον . . . ἐν τῷ παντί πολὺ, καὶ πέραν ἱκανόν, καὶ τις ἐπ' αὐτοῖς αἰτία*. Notice the force of *ἐπ' αὐτοῖς*. Notice also how distinct is *αἰτία* from *πέραν*: *πρὸς τρισὶ καὶ τέττατον . . . γένος* (26e), *τὴν αἰτίαν ὡς ἱκανῶς ἕτερον ἐκείνων δεδηλωμένον* (27b).

<sup>2</sup> I cannot agree with Brochard's bold attempt to identify matter with the Other of the *Tímaios* and thus with the non-being of the *Sophist*. (Brochard et Dauriac, *Le Devenir dans la Philosophie de Platon*, Cong. Int. de Phil., 1902.) This is hardly the place to argue the matter out. But his assumption that the *κοινωνία* of Being, Same, Other, Motion, and Rest in the *Sophist* covers the relation of forms to material things is effectively answered in Cornford's *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 297. Robin's thesis that 'la

distinction de l'intelligible et du sensible se fonde sur la pureté ou l'exactitude plus ou moins grandes des relations qui les constituent, et que ce n'est, par conséquent, qu'une différence de degré' (*La Physique de Platon*, Rev. Phil., Vol. 86, 1918, second half, p. 398), is attractive, but, I think, much too Leibnizian an interpretation of Plato. The difficulty with it appears in such a harmless little phrase as 'à la complexité infinies et perpétuellement instables' (p. 410), which Robin uses to describe sensible things. Why 'instables'? Does mere increase of complexity cause instability? Why should it? To establish his thesis Robin should be able to explain how Plato's doctrine of process can be reduced to a doctrine of increasing complexity of formal relations.

<sup>3</sup> 53b 2: *ἰσχυρὰ . . . ἄττα*.

ing it is to ask: Just what does it mean for the contrary hypothesis (i.e. that chaos is only the residual disorder ever present in the world)? Professor Cornford answers:

'Since no bodily changes can occur without the self-motion of the soul, the other factor present in this chaos must be irrational motions of the World Soul, considered in abstraction from the ordered revolutions of Reason. The disorderly moving mass must be conceived as animated by soul not yet reduced to order, but in a condition analogous in some ways to that of the infant soul described above (43a ff.).' (*Plato's Cosmology*, p. 205.)

Yet—

(a) Of 'irrational motions of the World Soul' we know nothing in the *Timaios*. On the contrary, we are told at its creation: *Θεὸν ἀρχὴν ἤρξατο ἀπαύστου καὶ ἔμφρονος βίου πρὸς τὸν σύμπαντα χρόνον* (36e).

(b) The analogy with the infant-soul, apposite as it is,<sup>1</sup> is unfortunate for Professor Cornford's hypothesis: It does not tell us how an irrational soul originates irrational motions, but how irrational motions throw out of order the infant's soul. There is nothing the matter with the rationality of its soul. The trouble is with the 'flowing and ebbing tide of the body' (43a, Cornford's translation), and the violent motions that break upon it from the outside.<sup>2</sup> As Professor Cornford himself comments on this passage: 'Contrast the World Soul, which, as soon as it was joined with its body, began an "intelligent life" (36e), not being exposed to external assaults' (*Op. cit.*, 149, n. 5). That is surely the difference. There are no external assaults to throw the motions of the world soul out of gear.<sup>3</sup> And, unlike the infant, it is free from the six 'wandering motions.'<sup>4</sup> What else could induce disorder upon it? The only other possible factor mentioned in the *Timaios* is bad breeding (86e), which, of course, would be absurd for the world soul.

More important than any specific conclusions that we might draw from this argument is the general way in which we put the problem when we look at it through the eyes of the *Timaios*. We have just been asking, What induces disorder in the soul? But how ask this if you assume that all motion is caused by soul? It is strictly meaningless for you, except in so far as it might suggest that disorder in one soul might be explained through disorder in some other soul. Any other kind of disorder would be irrelevant; for, on this hypothesis, there is no disorder not caused by soul. I do not see how anyone can make head or tail of the *Timaios* on this assumption. For instead of tracing back all chaos to some spiritual source, the *Timaios* invariably assumes the opposite. This apparent contrast between *Laws* x and the *Timaios* is striking, but not inexplicable. It derives from the totally different basic problems to which the two treatises are severally addressed:

*Laws* x is simply and purely an exercise in apologetics. It must establish the existence of the gods. It does not raise any issue which will not assist in the proof of this conclusion, so urgent for religion, so essential for the State. The argument turns on one question: Is soul prior to body? This question too is stripped to fighting-weight. It is not encumbered with the additional problem: What kind of soul—good or bad? Experience can decide this.<sup>5</sup> Only when he has proved to his

<sup>1</sup> The ἀτάκτως καὶ ἀλόγως of the infant's disorder reminds one most forcefully of πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως (30a) and ἀλόγως καὶ ἀμέτρως (53a) of the world-chaos.

<sup>2</sup> Note the force of τὰ τῶν προσπιπτόντων παθήματα (43b), πυρὶ προσκρούσει τὸ σῶμα . . . διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἱ κινήσεις ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν φερόμεναι προσπίπτουσι (43c), . . . σφοδρῶς σείονται τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς περιόδους (43d). Note the repetition of ἐξωθεν 44a 1, 5.

<sup>3</sup> For the very good reason that there is no-

thing outside it. The world was made one to exclude violent incursions upon it ἐξωθεν, which προσπίπτοντα ἀκαίρως λύει καὶ νόσους γῆρας τε ἐπάγοντα φθίνειν ποιεῖ (33a). For νόσους as disorder of reason see 86b, d; 88a, b.

<sup>4</sup> It has only the motion τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα ὁδῶν (34a vs. 43b).

<sup>5</sup> 898c. The whole of 896d to 898b is nothing more than an elaborate propounding of the question: 'If soul is cause of everything, good and bad, and order implies a good soul, whereas

satisfaction that 'all things are full of gods' (899b), does he feel free to broach the problem of evil. Even there his object is not to explain the origin of evil, but to provide religious comfort for the troubled soul, through the assurance of the universal plan in which all things work together for good.<sup>1</sup> Individual souls have in them 'a cause of change' (904c); but this operates only within the framework of the universal plan already assumed. It explains the just punishment of injustice, not the occurrence of injustice itself. The ominous words *κατὰ τὴν τῆς εἰμαρμένης τάξιν καὶ νόμον* do slip in (904c). But what is this *εἰμαρμένη*? Is it the will of the 'king' or its limiting condition? The question is not raised in the *Laws*. But the *Timaios* cannot avoid it.

The *Timaios* is no manual of political theology. It is 'esoteric' philosophy: the private discourse of like-minded philosophers (20a), so much more leisurely and tentative than the defensive vehemence of *Laws* x. It can thus open up the really tough questions of theodicy, without fear of unsettling the faith of the simple or exposing vulnerable flanks to atheistic opponents. It comes soon to the creation of the soul, which the *Laws* had assumed,<sup>2</sup> but prudently refrained from presenting as a problem. To us, with our Hebrew-Christian heritage, the doctrine of creation suggests at once the doctrine of the fall. But Plato is just as much a scientific, as a religious, thinker. He stands in a line of physiological psychologists, who have discovered that elementary cognition involves physical contact with the material world. So two difficulties must be solved at once:

(a) How the creature of a perfect creator is so imperfect; and

(b) how an immaterial soul can be affected by material things in sensation.

Plato's solution is that the soul does not consist of material particles, but of a pattern of motion.<sup>3</sup> It can move, and it can be moved. Because it can be moved it is subject to sensation, desire, pleasure and pain, and passions of every sort.<sup>4</sup> And for the same reason it is prone to disease and disorder.<sup>5</sup> Thus the cause of evil is disorderly motion. To exculpate God of responsibility for evil it is no longer

disorder implies an evil soul, consider the *συνάμας* and decide: Does it suggest the best soul or its contrary? Therefore, it is a mistake to quote any part of this passage in support of the view that Plato believed in an evil world-soul.

<sup>1</sup> *πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῦ θλον παντ' ἐστὶ συντεταγμένα* (903b ff.). It is the organic principle ('the part exists for the sake of the whole'), the same in the order of the universe as in the order of the state. Cf. *Rep.* 420d 4, 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Laws* x 892a, c; 896a; 904a; xii 967d.

<sup>3</sup> Soul has no part in fire, air, water, earth, the constituents of the world of 'second' causes, though it does partake of the *περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένη μεριστή οὐσία* (35a). That the soul is a motion is plain from the account of its creation. It consists of the revolving circles of the Same and the Other. A mental event is always a motion for Plato:

*αὶ τοῦ παντός διανοήσεις καὶ περιφοραὶ* (90c, d). *τὰς . . . ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ διεφθαρμένους περιόδους ἐξορθοῦντα* (90d).

*στρεφομένη, θεῖαν ἀρχὴν ἤρξατο ἀπαύστου καὶ ἔμφρονος βίου* (36e).

*ἡ τῆς μῆδης καὶ φρονιμωτάτης κικλήσκου περιόδους* (39c).

*ἵνα τὰς ἐν οὐρανῷ τοῦ νοῦ κατιδόντες περιόδους χρησάμεθα ἐπὶ τὰς περιφορὰς τὰς τῆς παρ' ἡμῶν διανοήσεως* (47b).

Those who 'don't use their heads': *διὰ το*

*μηκέτι τὰς ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ χρῆσθαι περιόδους* (91e).

<sup>4</sup> *ὅποτε δὴ σώμασιν ἐμφυτευθεῖεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ τὸ μὲν προσίει, τὸ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν ἴθεν follow sensation, eros and the passions* (42a). In 69c, d again pleasure, passions, sensation come to the immortal soul with the subsidiary mortal soul which, in turn, comes with the mortal body: . . . *θητόν σῶμα αὐτῇ* (i.e. *τῇ ἀθανάτῃ ψυχῇ*) *περιεόρνευσαν* . . . *ἄλλο τε εἶδος ἐν αὐτῷ* (i.e. *τῷ σώματι*) *ψυχῆς προσωκοδόμουν τὸ θνητόν*. Sensation occurs when *διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἱ κινήσεις ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν φερόμεναι προσπίπτουσιν* (43c), whence Plato derives *αἰσθησις* (is it from *αἰσσω*, which Cornford thinks the more probable of those given by Proclus? Or from *αἰσθαινω* suggested by J. I. Beare in *Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition*, 1906?). See also 45d 1, 2 and 64b 4-6, and cf. with *Philebos*, where sensation is a 'tremor' of soul and body (33d), and note its formal definition of sensation in 34a. (*σεισμός* is the word used in the myth of the *Politiikos* of the chaotic disorder of the counter-spin: 273a 3, 6; and in the *Timaios* of the primitive chaos: 52e, 53a.)

<sup>5</sup> *νοσοῦσαν καὶ ἀφρονα ἰσχυρὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν* (86d). Further 87a: phlegms and humours blend their vapours with the motion of the soul: *τὴν ἀφ' αὐτῶν ἀτμίδα τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς φορᾷ συμμειζαντες*. Notice the force of *προσπίπτει* in 87a 5, and cf. with use of same word in 33a 4, 5 and 43b 7 and 43c 5.

enough to say, αἰτία ἐλομένην. When you find a physical cause for irrational choice,<sup>1</sup> you must exculpate God of the disorderly motion that has caused it. And you cannot stop short of the primitive chaos. This ultimate cause of evil must exist, uncaused by God, and (short of reopening the problem all over again) uncaused by soul.

That is why we may dispense with Plutarch's well-meaning hypothesis of the primordial evil soul.<sup>2</sup> Apart from his forced interpretation of *Laws* 896d,<sup>3</sup> Plutarch's mainstay is the myth of the *Politikos*. Now when we examine the context of his quotations, it becomes plain that the cause of the 'counter-revolution' in the myth is not soul, but body:

Ξ. . . . τοῦτο δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν ἵεναι διὰ τοῦδ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔμφυτον γέγονε.

Ν.Σ. Διὰ τὸ ποῖον δὴ;

Ξ. Τὸ κατὰ ταῦτ' αἰὶν ὡσαύτως ἔχειν αἰεὶ καὶ ταῦτ' εἶναι τοῖς πάντων θειοτάτοις προσήκει μόνους, σώματος δὲ φύσις οὐ ταύτης τῆς τάξεως (269d).

That is the trouble with the *ouvanos*, the speaker proceeds: κεκοινωνηκέ γε καὶ σώματος (269d, e). Plutarch's strongest text is 272e 5, 6. But εἰμαρμένη is plainly enough the ἀνάγκη of the *Timaios*,<sup>4</sup> the realm of secondary causes;<sup>5</sup> σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία may only mean that the drag of the primitive disorder is now felt, deep in its nature, as a rebellious urge.<sup>6</sup> How can we then escape the plain words, ἀ φροπος of the gradual fading of the Creator's influence upon the creature: τοῦτων δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ σωματοειδὲς τῆς συγκράσεως αἴτιον, . . . ὅτι πολλῆς ἦν μετέχον ἀταξίας πρὶν εἰς τὸν νῦν κόσμον ἀφικέσθαι (273b)? So far from substantiating Plutarch's hypothesis, the myth of the *Politikos* corroborates the doctrine of the *Timaios* and the *Phaidon* that the soul's partnership with the body is the source of its aberrations;<sup>7</sup> though its chief value for an account of the origin of evil is the explicit way in which it traces it all back to the primitive disorder: παρὰ δὲ τῆς ἔμπροσθεν ἕξεως, ὅσα χαλεπὰ καὶ ἀδίκ' ἐν οὐρανῷ γίνεσθαι, ταῦτα ἐξ ἐκείνης αὐτὸς τε (sc. ὁ οὐρανός) ἔχει καὶ τοῖς ζῴοις ἐναπεργάζεται (273c).

The *Timaios* completes the picture. It mentions circumstances in the creation of the soul which account for its susceptibility to irrational motion: the δύσμεικτος Other, and the περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένη . . . οὐσία, 35a. Motion is inherent in this γιγνομένη οὐσία which is one of the soul's ingredients. One could hardly attribute the origin of this motion to soul without circularity. On the contrary, the *Timaios*' mechanical explanation of all motion makes it quite unnecessary to postulate a bad soul to set the primitive chaos in motion: κίνησιν δὲ εἰς ἀνωμαλότητα αἰεὶ τιθώμεν (57e).<sup>8</sup> Chaos

<sup>1</sup> E.g. in 86c, d, where we are given a definite physiological cause for ελεῖν ἀκαίρως.

<sup>2</sup> In *de animae procreatione in Timaeo*.

<sup>3</sup> This is presumably the reference of ἐν δὲ τοῖς Νόμοις ἀντικρὺς ψυχῇν ἀτακτὸν εἰρηκε καὶ κακοποιόν, *ibid.*, 1014c. *Per contra*, see above, n. 5, p. 8; Taylor's *Commentary*, p. 116; and Robin's *Platon*, pp. 226-7.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. ἐξ ἀνάγκης *Polit.*, 269d 2, 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Tm* 46e. Plutarch himself puts no stock on εἰμαρμένη but refers to it as ἀνάγκη. Clearly εἰμαρμένη in *Polit.* 272e cannot be the will of the 'captain', for he has just let go of the helm; it is the disorder he had kept under control which is now asserting itself. That the realm of secondary causes includes a necessary element of disorder when separated from the overlordship of nous is clear from *Tm* 46e 5.

<sup>6</sup> The same applies to 273b 1, 2: the 'instruc-

tion' was not given to a primitive bad soul, but to the god-made soul that marked the end of chaos and the beginning of cosmos.

<sup>7</sup> For the *Timaios* see above, nn. 4 and 5, p. 9. For the *Phaidon* see especially 66a-d. The soul of the philosopher must be 'released' from the 'fetters' of the body (67d; cf. *Rep.* 515c); it must be 'purified' from the 'contamination' of the body (*Phaid.* 67c 5 and *Tm* 69d 6; cf. *Symp.* 211e 1, 2 and *Rep.* 611c 3). The body is a tomb (*Phaidr.* 250c; *Gorg.* 493a).

<sup>8</sup> Cornford comments in a footnote: 'Obviously the mover cannot be the soul, which belongs to a higher order of existence. It could not be spoken of as either heterogeneous and unequal, or homogeneous and equal, with the moved.' *Op. cit.*, p. 240. Cf. also 58c 2-4 and 57a 2-4.



contains, by definition, the minimum of ὁμαλότης, ὁμοιότης.<sup>1</sup> It must, therefore, and for purely mechanical reasons, be in constant motion.<sup>2</sup> When the creator steps in to reduce the indefinite heterogeneity of the chaos to the definite homogeneity of the five regular polygons, the question arises whether we may not get too much likeness, in which case motion would cease altogether. The Demiurge solves this neatly by making the sizes of the atomic triangles infinitely various (57d). Thus he never has to think of starting motion, but only to keep it going. Likewise, when he creates the 'body' of the universe: there is no question of pushing it off to a start, but only of subtracting from it the six 'wandering' motions.<sup>3</sup>

Is it then possible to reconcile this teaching of the *Timaios* with *Laws* x? Remembering the special limitations of the task to which *Laws* x is devoted, we need not find that its teaching, taken as a whole, contradicts the cosmology of the *Timaios*. The crucial tenet of *Laws* x, the priority of soul over all material motions, is not strange to the *Timaios*: 34b, c. Yet once *Timaios* has given it fulsome acknowledgement, he makes no specific use of it. Because the soul is 'older', the soul must 'rule'. Chronological priority is hardly more than a vindication of ontological priority, in line with a deep-rooted ethical and political dogma that the older must rule the younger.<sup>4</sup> To press it further would be embarrassing in view of the *Timaios*' doctrine of time.

Why then does *Laws* x make so much of this very temporal priority which seems hardly more than a pious formality in the *Timaios*? Precisely because it has been contradicted by the atheistic materialists. It is they who make, alas, only too good sense of the temporal priority of matter. To refute them Plato must meet them on their own ground. And so he does, retaining the ambiguity of ἀρχή and ἀρχεῖ,<sup>5</sup> and arguing its cosmic primogeniture.<sup>6</sup> In the course of this argument he propounds the bare possibility that primary causation might rest with the evil soul. But this is forthwith declared to be contrary to fact, and the speaker can go on to complete the case against the atheists, without digressing to explain how primary causation through the evil soul is, in fact, inexplicable save through collision with material, secondary causes. That is why Aristotle, years later, writes that Plato 'sometimes' declares the soul the *arche* of motion (*Met.* 1071a 1). The expression is a compromise between the apparent contradiction of *Laws* x and the *Timaios*; a contradiction which he must hold to be only apparent, else he would not have scrupled to make capital out of it in his usual polemic.

On this interpretation the proposition that the soul is πρῶτον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς αἴτιον (*Laws* 891e) merely denotes the supremacy of the soul's teleological action within the created universe. Its polemic resources are fully exploited in *Laws* x. But it is not offered as a substitute for the cosmologic teaching of the *Timaios*. Only here, where Plato gives us a complete picture of the relations of teleology to mechanism, can we find an intelligible meaning of the 'firstness' of the soul: Soul

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the phrase of *Pol.* 273d, εὐ τὸν τῆς ἀνομωτήτος ἀπειρον ὄντα πόντον to which the world would revert if it persisted in its 'counter-revolution.'

<sup>2</sup> This is not in contradiction with *Phaidr.* 245d, εὖ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσαν τε γῆν εἰς ἐν συμπεσοῦσαν στήναι. The disastrous standstill envisaged in the *Phaidros* concerns the created heavens and earth, which do have a soul, and could not move without it.

<sup>3</sup> 34a: τὰς δὲ ἐξ ἀπάσας κινήσεις ἀφείλεν καὶ ἀπλανὲς ἀπηργάσατο ἐκείνων.

<sup>4</sup> See *Rep.* iii 412c for the axiomatic belief that the old must rule. The whole of the *Laws* is dominated by this idea.

<sup>5</sup> E.g. 896c: ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν, σῶμα δὲ δεύτερον τε καὶ ὕστερον ψυχῆς ἀρχοῦσθαι, ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν, whence it follows in 896d: ψυχὴν δὲ διοικοῦσαν καὶ ἐνοικοῦσαν ἐν ἅπασιν . . . καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν διοικεῖν. Again 895b: ἀρχὴν . . . καὶ πρῶτην . . . ἀναγκαίως εἶναι πρεσβυτάτην καὶ κρατίστην. The double-edged meaning of precedence is always assumed, never argued. E.g. 892a: ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστὶ (simple assertion of precedence, immediately broken into temporal priority) σωμάτων ἐμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη (and ontological supremacy) καὶ μεταβολῆς τε αὐτῶν καὶ μετακοσμήσεως ἀπάσης ἀρχεῖ παντὸς μάλλον.

<sup>6</sup> *Laws* 892c: ἐν πρώτοις γεγεννημένη.



belongs with the 'first', good, intelligent, divine causes—not in the realm of necessity, but of purpose (46e, 68e). The 'worse' motions are externally impressed; the 'best' are self-initiated (89a). Soul is inherently of the 'best'; though it is not immune from assaults by the 'worse'.

This is a serious qualification of the apparent meaning of the doctrine that soul is ἀρχὴ κινήσεως (*Laws* 896b; *Phaidros* 245c).<sup>1</sup> Are we mutilating the *Laws* to force conformity with the *Timaios*? I think not. We are merely to make sense of the statement taken by itself. Forget the *Timaios* altogether for the moment. How much could Plato mean when he says that the soul is the cause of all becoming and perishing? At its face-value this asserts that the soul is itself the cause of the instability of becoming; that apart from soul reality would be untroubled by transience.<sup>2</sup> But this is grotesquely unPlatonic. When Plato does ask himself, 'Is soul more akin to being or becoming?', he can only answer, 'It is in every way more like being' (*Phaidon* 79e). The one thing he cannot mean in the *Laws* is that soul is the source of Heracleitean flux. Γένεσις must be presupposed. It must be 'there', before soul can supervene to 'rule' it. But if it is 'there', it must involve motion of some sort; not teleological motion in the absence of soul, but disorderly mechanical motion.<sup>3</sup> Thus, quite independently of the description of the disorderly motion in the *Timaios*, we should be forced to supply something like it in order to make sense of the doctrine of *Laws* x that soul is the first cause of becoming.

Does this clear up all the difficulties of the disorderly motion? Hardly. How does the Demiurge act upon the disorderly motion?<sup>4</sup> Indeed how does any 'first' cause act upon a 'second' one? Aristotle's complaint that Plato gives no explanation of the soul's κοινωνία with the body it inhabits (*de An.* 407b 12-19) can be pushed further: How is it that material impact upon the soul can and does take place,<sup>5</sup> even though the soul is not a material body? And, conversely, how is it that the immaterial soul acts and 'masters' the discordant motions of the body?<sup>6</sup> How does one pattern of motion act upon another pattern of motion, though one is composed of material particles and the other is not?

It is no accident that Plato has avoided such questions. They point to deep-

<sup>1</sup> I am leaving out of this discussion the additional complication that in the *Phaidros* the idea of the soul as ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ κινήσεως serves at once to prove that the soul is ungenerated: εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀρχῇ γίνονται, οὐκ ἂν ἐτι ἀρχῇ γίνοντο (245d). In the *Laws* the meaning of the premiss must have changed, else the conclusion could not have been contradicted, as it is in the frequent references of the *Laws* to the soul as generated (see above, n. 2, p. 79). 'Αρχή is a 'weasel-word' in Plato. It may mean any, or all, of (i) beginning, (ii) source, (iii) cause, (iv) ruling principle, (v) ruling power. It should be noted that the mythological interpretation of the pre-existing chaos and of its associated doctrine of creation could take the chronological 'firstness' of the soul no more literally; cf. Plutarch: εἰ γὰρ ἀγέννητος ὁ κόσμος ἐστίν, οἴχεται τῷ Πλάτωνα τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν εἶσαν ἐξάγειν μεταβολῆς καὶ κινήσεως πάσης. *de an. proc. in Tim.* 1013 f.

<sup>2</sup> Note that the hypothesis of the universal standstill (*Laws* 895a, b), against which Plato's argument of the soul as first mover is so effective, is enemy territory. It was they (οἱ πλείστοι τῶν τουούτων), not Plato, who 'dare' affirm it. Likewise in the *Phaidros* the supposition of all motion

of heaven and earth coming to an absolute stop is the apodosis of a *per impossibile* hypothesis.

<sup>3</sup> We must never forget that Plato thinks of mechanism as disorderly, except in so far as it is teleologically ordered: e.g. *Tim* 46e, where the 'second' causes, unmistakably identified with mechanical causes in 46e 1, 2, are said to be *βασιμονωθεῖσαι φρονήσεως τὸ τυχὸν ἐκαστοτε ἐξεργάζονται*. That mechanism nevertheless does contain an order of its own is part of the contradiction in Plato's thinking noted above, p. 77.

<sup>4</sup> An easy solution is to animate the chaos; then the Demiurge would only need to 'persuade' its bad soul, and this would seem to make better sense of such expressions as 48a 2, 4, or 56c 5. But this is only postponing the difficulty. If the Demiurge persuades the evil soul, the reformed soul would then have to persuade its disorderly body—and the difficulty turns up again. At some point final cause must meet efficient cause. To insert intermediary souls only puts off the inevitable encounter of soul with body.

<sup>5</sup> See above, nn. 2 and 3, p. 78.

<sup>6</sup> *Tim* 42b 2.

lying difficulties or, at least, obscurities in his categories of material reality. But their further discussion lies beyond the limits of this paper. Our task is done if it be reasonably clear that such difficulties cannot be escaped by the all-too-easy device of relegating the disorderly motion to the status of a mythical symbol.

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## THE ANCESTRAL LAWS OF CLEISTHENES.

WHEN Pythodorus in 411 B.C. moved in the Athenian Assembly his decree that Commissioners should be elected to draft measures for the security of the State, Cleitophon added a rider instructing the Commissioners *προαναζητῆσαι καὶ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους οὓς Κλεισθένης ἔθηκεν ὅτε καθίστη τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ὅπως ἂν ἀκούσαντες καὶ τούτων βουλευσύνται τὸ ἄριστον*.<sup>1</sup> The instruction appears to have struck Aristotle as paradoxical and inept, for he has appended an explanation of Cleitophon's reasons which is also a criticism: *ὥς οὐ δημοτικὴν ἀλλὰ παραπλησίαν οὔσαν τὴν Κλεισθένης πολιτείαν τῇ Σόλωνος*. Indeed one would never imagine that the constitution of Cleisthenes as described by Aristotle (21) could have been seriously suggested as a model or a repertory of precedents for legislators intent, like Cleitophon's friends, on restoring the *πάτριος πολιτεία*, which it obviously disestablished; and the conjunction of *τοὺς πατρίους νόμους* with *ὅτε καθίστη τὴν δημοκρατίαν* might seem to make the proposal a challenge or a mockery. Aristotle had already (22. 1, cf. 41. 2) given his opinion that by Cleisthenes' innovations *δημοτικώτερα πολὺ τῆς Σόλωνος ἐγένετο ἡ πολιτεία*. He recognized democratic features in Solon's laws,<sup>2</sup> but they lay in the redress of social wrongs or in the method of administering justice rather than in the organization of the government; he regarded Solon's political changes, not as the establishment of democracy proper, but as a reform, conservative rather than revolutionary, of existent institutions.<sup>3</sup> His comment on the rider implies that he would not have corrected Cleitophon if he had referred the Commissioners to Solon's ancestral laws, but to refer them to Cleisthenes' must, he thought, be ignorance, irony, or idiosyncrasy. Before we endorse this censure, or have recourse to Mr. Wade-Gery's fine-spun theory,<sup>4</sup> that the purpose of the amendment was to direct the attention of the Commissioners, not to the substance of Cleisthenes' constitution, but to the procedure whereby it was enacted, let us try to take Cleitophon at his word and see whether he may not be nearer to the truth than Aristotle.

Cleitophon was an associate of Theramenes and a member of the middle party.<sup>5</sup> Their motto was the *πάτριος πολιτεία*, and their interest in it had no doubt led them to study its history and devolution more deeply than did most of their contemporaries. While, like many reformers, they sought inspiration from a past remote enough to have acquired a romantic appeal, they had practical aims and did not propose to resuscitate the institutions of the patriarchal period without any of the large modifications afterwards introduced. Cleitophon formulates his amendment to the decree accurately and with the consciousness of superior knowledge; the *πάτριος νόμοι* of Cleisthenes were not the same as the ancestral constitution of the age before Solon; nor were they the familiar laws commonly quoted as Cleisthenes'; they had to be hunted up by research; they were the laws which he made when he was instituting the democracy.

Herodotus<sup>6</sup> narrates the conversion of Cleisthenes to the cause of the people. It

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, *Constitution of the Athenians* 29. 3. I will abbreviate my references to that treatise by writing simply Ar. with the numbers of the chapters and sections.

<sup>2</sup> 9. 1, cf. 2. 2, 28. 2, 41. 2, *Pol.* 1273b-1274a.

<sup>3</sup> 7. 3, 8. 3-4, *Pol.* 1. c. (where *δημοκρατίας* is immediately qualified by *τὴν πατρίαν*). By insisting on it that Solon was *τῶν μέσων* and a shining

example of *μετριότης* (cc. 5, 6, 9, 11, 12, *Pol.* 1296a) Aristotle seems to claim him as an exponent of the reformed *πάτριος πολιτεία* which was the ideal of Theramenes and his middle party. Cleisthenes, *στοχαζόμενος τοῦ πλήθους*, overshot it.

<sup>4</sup> *C.Q.* XXVII, 1933, pp. 20-24.

<sup>5</sup> Ar. 34. 3; cf. Aristoph. *Ran.* 967.

<sup>6</sup> V. 66, 69; cf. Ar. 20.

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was not immediately on his restoration to Athens by Cleomenes; the fall of Hippias is followed by a struggle for power between Cleisthenes and Isagoras which is a domestic quarrel among the nobles wherein the people has no share nor say. When Cleisthenes, unable to maintain his supremacy, 'takes the people into partnership', he brings in a new factor from outside the ring, τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον πρότερον ἀπωσμένον τότε πάντων† ([ἐ]παν[άγ]ων?) πρὸς τὴν ἑωυτοῦ μοῖραν προσεθήκατο.

How came the people to be ἀπωσμένος? Aristotle<sup>1</sup> glibly tells us that συνέβη τοῖς μὲν Σόλωνος νόμοις ἀφανίσαι τὴν τυραννίδα διὰ τὸ μὴ χρῆσθαι, καινοὺς δ' ἄλλους θεῖναι τὸν Κλεισθένη. That was no doubt the answer generally accepted in his day,<sup>2</sup> but is it satisfactory? It is quite inconsistent with the testimony of Herodotus and Thucydides to the constitutional character of the government of the Tyrants. Peisistratus, says Herodotus (I. 59), ἦρχε Ἀθηναίων, οὔτε τιμὰς τὰς εἰούσας συνταράξας οὔτε θέρμια μεταλλάξας, ἐπὶ τε τοῖσι κατεστρώσι ἔνεμε τὴν πόλιν κοσμέων καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ. Thucydides (VI. 54) writes of Athens under the liberal and efficient administration of the Peisistratidae τὰ δὲ ἄλλα αὐτῇ ἢ πόλις τοῖς πρὶν κειμένοις νόμοις ἐχρήτο, πλὴν καθ' ὅσον αἰεὶ τινα ἐπεμέλοντο σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς εἶναι. Aristotle himself endorses these judgments: Πεισίστρατος δὲ λαβὼν τὴν ἀρχὴν διώκει τὰ κοινὰ πολιτικῶς μᾶλλον ἢ τυραννικῶς (14. 3, cf. 16. 2); ἐβούλετο πάντα διοικεῖν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους (16. 8); ὁ Ἰππίας τῇ φύσει πολιτικὸς καὶ ἐμφρων ἐπιστάται τῆς ἀρχῆς (18. 1). Challenged to prove his charge, he would presumably have fallen back on the change wrought in Hippias by the assassination of Hipparchus.<sup>3</sup> But (1) in spite of the tendency, which Thucydides combats but not entirely shakes off, to invest the deed with the aspect of a popular revolt, it remains probable that, as the assassination was an act of private revenge, so Hippias retaliated upon hostile individuals and coteries, not upon his loyal subjects at large, and made personal enemies rather than political opponents; (2) obviously the last four years alone of Hippias' administration cannot warrant the contention that the Tyranny obliterated the laws of Solon by desuetude; (3) narrowed to the four years only, the allegation provokes the suspicion that it is special pleading in a bad case, a facile subterfuge, for to the Greek mind Tyranny almost connoted the abrogation of law and constitution.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand the witness of the historians (even Herodotus ὁ μισοτύραννος), vindicating Peisistratus and his sons against the current prejudice, is emphatic, deliberate, and convincing. Their sounder evidence refutes Aristotle's explanation and justifies us in recognizing in the Tyrants the upholders, not the suppressors, of the reformed constitution.

But if we acquit the Tyrants of the effacement of Solon's laws, to whom are we to impute their annulment? Obviously and without hesitation, to the Spartans and the Alcmaeonidae, that is to say in the singular number, to Cleomenes and Cleisthenes. In Spartan eyes Solon's drastic measures, social and political, must have seemed perilous precedents and subversive of all εὐνομία. The Tyrants had not only confirmed the revolution but also formed alliances, defensive indeed, but defensive against Spartan aggrandisement, and Hippias was seeking support from the Persian king,<sup>5</sup> that opposite power whose aid or protection was already being solicited by every ambitious or apprehensive malcontent in Greece. The exiled Alcmaeonidae, 'moving heaven and earth against the Peisistratidae', applied the influence and funds which they had acquired at Delphi through the rebuilding of the temple to urge the Spartans to expel Hippias and reinstate them at Athens. We may surmise that Cleomenes, whose record shows no reverence for the oracle nor antipathy to

<sup>1</sup> 22. 1; cf. 15. 4, 16. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Isocr. VII. 16, ἐκείνην τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἣν Σόλων μὲν ὁ δημοτικώτατος γενόμενος ἐνομοθέτησε, Κλεισθένης δ' ὁ τοὺς τυράννους ἐκβαλὼν καὶ τὸν δῆμον καταγαγὼν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατέστησεν.

<sup>3</sup> 19. 1, 16. 7 (where the period of harsher

control seems to be wantonly stretched to include the whole reign of the Peisistratidae) Hdt. V. 55, 62, VI. 123; Thuc. VI. 53, 59.

<sup>4</sup> E.g. Hdt. III. 80, νομαὶά κινεῖ πάτρια; Xen. Mem. IV. vi. 12; Plato, Polit. 301 sqq.

<sup>5</sup> Thuc. VI. 59.

Tyranny,<sup>1</sup> was, if not the prime instigator of the plot, their zealous accomplice. At all events, here was the opportunity to eradicate those pernicious growths and to plant at Athens an oligarchy subservient to Spartan interests. We may be quite sure that the suppliant Alcmaeonidae were restored upon terms dictated by Cleomenes, and there can be no doubt what those terms must have been; Athens was to revert to her ancestral constitution and enter the Spartan league.<sup>2</sup>

This interpretation is not of course the guise under which the facts are presented in the garbled tradition reproduced by our authorities, but (1) it accords much better with the evidence on the government of Peisistratus and his sons; (2) it is corroborated by the fixed policy of the Spartans, who were no more disposed to entrust the maintenance of their interests abroad to the suffrages of 'the inconstant Demos' than to the will of irresponsible despots;<sup>3</sup> their regular practice was to prescribe to neighbouring States taken into their alliance a constitution *κατὰ τὰ πάτρια*, of the predemocratic type;<sup>4</sup> is it credible that they left the laws of Solon unrescinded on the statute-book at Athens? (3) it furnishes a really satisfactory reason for Isagoras' appeal to Cleomenes, and Cleomenes' response to it, when Cleisthenes tampered with the constitution—Cleomenes intervenes to enforce the constitutional provision in the treaty with Sparta, just as Lysander intervened in 404 to carry the constitution of Dracontides—whereas the story palmed off on us (Hdt. V. 70; Ar. 20) seeks to substitute for this weighty reason of State a private intrigue between Isagoras and Cleomenes and a scandalous libel on Isagoras' wife; (4) the contrary version itself becomes on inspection an indirect argument in its favour.

For there can be little doubt that the explanation put forward by Aristotle of the eclipse of the democracy owes its origin and validity to the tradition, of which Herodotus is the chief sponsor, with regard to the internal history of Athens between the Tyranny and the repulse of Xerxes, and the most cursory examination shows that this tradition is saturated with the influence of the Alcmaeonidae, which repeatedly and shamelessly colours, conceals, or distorts the truth. Those unscrupulous opportunists had much to disavow and to redeem, but they had at their service, particularly during the plastic period of Pericles' ascendancy, efficient agencies, literary as well as political, to shape their case, and they were fortunate in securing the advocacy of Herodotus, whose narrative of the rise of democratic Athens moulded the popular history<sup>5</sup> no less absolutely than Macaulay's presentation has fashioned the current conceptions of the English revolution. Herodotus holds a brief for the Alcmaeonidae whenever their conduct is in question; consciously or not, he reflects their self-congratulation, their malice, their exculpations.<sup>6</sup> In their vindication of their political record their relations with the Spartans and the Peisistratidae are the criterion of their loyalty to the democracy and to the national cause of Hellas, and the expulsion of Hippias brings them to a crucial test. Here the account given by Herodotus is significant both in its reticence and in its demonstrativeness. He is dumbly silent on the constitutional character of the government

<sup>1</sup> Hdt. VI. 66, V. 74, 90-1.

<sup>2</sup> A short-lived alliance of course, for it must have been dissolved when Cleomenes was evicted from the Acropolis and Cleisthenes put Athens under the protection of Persia. 'Η γενομένη ἐπὶ τῷ Μήδῳ ἐνυμαχία (Thuc. I. 102) is a later treaty, due perhaps to Miltiades.

<sup>3</sup> Thuc. VIII. 70, τῷ ἀπείστῳ δήμῳ. Cf. Hdt. III. 81, in the mouth of Megabyzus, καὶ τοὶ τυράννου ἔβριον φεύγοντας ἀνδρας ἐς δῆμον ἀκολάστον ἔβριον πεσεῖν ἐστὶ οὐδαμῶς ἀνασχετόν.

<sup>4</sup> Thuc. I. 19, οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ἔχοντες φόρου τοὺς ἐνυμαχοῦντι ἡγοῦντο, κατ' ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ σφίσις ἀπὸ τοῦ μόνου ἐπιτηδείως ὅπως πολυτεύσουσι θεραπεύοντες.

I. 76, 144; Xen. *Hell.* III. iv. 2; Ar. *Pol.* 1296a. The treaties with Argos in 418 (Thuc. V. 77, 79) and Athens in 404 (Ar. 34; Diod. XIV. 3; Xen. *Hell.* II. iii. 25; cf. Thuc. VIII. 70, Xen. *l.c.* 45) are the classic examples.

<sup>5</sup> It is enough to refer to Aristotle's use of Herodotus.

<sup>6</sup> Self-congratulation, V. 62, VI. 125, 131 (cf. Ar. 20. 4); malice, V. 70 (cf. Ar. 20. 1), against Isagoras; VII. 144, VIII. 5, 57-8, 109-10, 112 against Themistocles; exculpations, V. 71 (Cyloneian executions), V. 73 (homage to the Persian king), V. 97, VI. 21 (attitude to the Ionian revolt), VI. 121-3 (treachery at Marathon).



which succeeded the Tyranny, or drowns it in acclamations of the recovered freedom; the crude antithesis of *ἐλευθερία* and *τυραννίς* dulls the edge of inquiry; he assumes, in spite of his testimonial to Peisistratus, that the rights of the people had perished at his usurpation and sprang to life again at the deposition of Hippias; the damaging admission is lightly passed over that between the exit of the oppressor and the entry of another pretender, Isagoras, from the Right wing there was an interval during which the *δῆμος* remained *ἀπωσμένος*; king Cleomenes and the Spartans are treated as the mere retinue of the exiles; they are dismissed when the negotiations for the surrender begin and are marched off the scene; the Alcmaeonidae get the whole glory of the 'liberation'.<sup>1</sup> This superficial account with its paradoxical *dénouement* is already in bad company and excites distrust; the facts are not in dispute, but their presentation betrays the prompting of the Alcmaeonidae, and Herodotus was as easily persuaded of a Tyrant's unrighteousness as an Orangeman of a Popish plot. We cannot banish the thought that Cleisthenes, notwithstanding his services, never attained to the rank of a popular hero; the Athenian people never took him to its heart, but obstinately preferred to sing the praises of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. Had he a past to live down? is he not in danger of conviction of 'misprision of treason' for conspiracy with Cleomenes against the democracy? and is not somebody trying to shift the guilt on to the Tyrants and Isagoras? Did the degradation of the Demos date from the establishment of the Tyranny or from its fall?

The arguments hitherto adduced, drawn from valid, but general, historical premises, make a *prima facie* case for inferring that the pre-Solonian constitution (or something like it) was restored at Athens with the Alcmaeonidae, but they do not amount to positive proof; the particular facts which, to my mind, conclusively confirm that inference will emerge in the following investigation.

The *πάτριος πολιτεία* was described by Aristotle in the lost early chapters of his *Constitution of the Athenians*, and the substance of his description has been preserved by lexicographers and scholiasts,<sup>2</sup> who quote portions of it in his own words. By his account it is a very remarkable constitution, designed on a scheme so artificial that one might almost be tempted to impute it to the theorists of the last decades of the fifth century and relegate it to the shelf whereon Draco's reposes. The citizens are distributed into four Tribes corresponding to the four seasons of the year; the four Tribes are divided into twelve Phratries or Trittyes, three to each Tribe, corresponding to the twelve months; each Phratry consists of thirty *γένη* corresponding to the thirty days of the month or, in sum, to the 360 days of a year so reckoned; and each *γένος* is composed of thirty heads of households (*ἄνδρες*), that is to say, comprises thirty families represented on the roll of citizens by their thirty headmen.<sup>3</sup>

Aristotle asks us to accept this scheme as the ancestral constitution introduced at the coming of Ion, for in his retrospect of the successive constitutions of the Athenians (41. 2) he refers the institution of the four Tribes to Ion and his fellow *σύνοικοι*, the Ionian immigrants who took possession of Attica in the reign of Erechtheus. As a general statement this attribution is certainly right, for the four Tribes and the social organization that goes with them are indubitably Ionic,<sup>4</sup> but to apply it, as Aristotle appears to have done, to include the particular constitution described by him, is quite absurd. The scheme is thoroughly artificial; the *cadres* of the constitution, the categories *φυλαί*, *φρατρίαι*, *γένη*, are natural enough, being normal forms of organization to be found or paralleled in many Greek and other societies, but it is obvious that this mathematical scheme could never have grown up

<sup>1</sup> The liberation is the *Leit-motif* all through. Hdt. V. 55, 62, 65, 66, 78, 91, VI. 123.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. Lex. Dem. Patm. p. 152 (Sakkel.) s.v. *γενήματα*; Schol. Plat. *Phileb.* 30d, *Asiarch.* 371d; Suid. s.v.; Harpocr. s.v.; and other references. Kenyon gives a useful conspectus of the passages

in his Berlin edition of Aristotle's *Resp. Athen.*

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Xen. *Mem.* III. vi. 14, quoted below, p. 92.

<sup>4</sup> Hdt. V. 66, 69; cf. Busolt, *G.G.* p. 279, Bilabel, *Ion. Kolon.* p. 256, Hiller v. Gaertringen, *Miletos* in R.E. pp. 1589, 1595.

spontaneously, nor survived for more than a very few years unless administered by a government, such as Plato contemplated in his *Republic*, exercising control of the birth-rate and power to determine the status of every member of the community; evidently the original organs of the State have been deliberately remodelled and reduced to a symmetrical pattern adjusted to a peculiar calendar. The constitution is far from primitive and must be the product of a comparatively late period; it is inspired by doctrinaire ideas and implies a highly developed political system; clearly the fundamental principle is equal rights for all the citizens and their rotation in office on a Council of State; in every year each Tribe is to have its season, each Phratry its month, each γένος its day, and once in his life each *paterfamilias* is to have his own day, on which he might expect to become Chairman and President of the Republic; for I take the thirty γεννήται to be evenly distributed over the thirty years, from his thirtieth to his sixtieth, during which the fully qualified citizen was enrolled on the catalogue of the hoplite army.<sup>1</sup>

Now this constitution, on internal evidence, cannot be earlier than the sixth century, nor, for historical reasons, can it have been enacted after 508, when Cleisthenes carried his great Reform Bill. I make bold to say that, unless it is a mere project or theoretical draft, a paper constitution, it must be ascribed to Cleisthenes himself, who must have introduced it, subject to Spartan sanction, after his reinstatement at Athens by Cleomenes. Several indications converge to this conclusion. (1) If I am right in explaining the thirty γεννήται by the years of the κατάλογος τῶν ὅπλα παρεχομένων, the scheme implies the organization of a hoplite army on the new model inaugurated, as is generally held, by the Spartans about the beginning of the sixth century. The Athenians are not likely to have forestalled them, nor is there any trace of such organization in Solon's measures, nor under the Tyrants, who preferred to rely on foreign auxiliaries, mostly cavalry. On the other hand one would naturally expect of Cleisthenes, acting under the direction of Cleomenes, a reconstruction which was at once military and political, and might see in the subsequent victories over the Boeotians and the Chalcidians, which Herodotus attributes entirely to the 'liberation', the fruits of his former work.<sup>2</sup> (2) The Council which the scheme postulates has no relation to the Areopagus, and there is no evidence of a second Council before Solon's;<sup>3</sup> Solon's has been doubted or denied, but although its composition may be disputed its existence is attested by traces of Solon's verses embedded in Plutarch's account,<sup>4</sup> and the allusion goes to prove that Solon claimed it as an innovation. The Council of the scheme is therefore presumably later than Solon's reforms and, if the Tyrants made no change in Solon's laws, later than the Tyranny. (3) The calendar of 360 days, which determines the construction of the scheme, may seem archaic, but is much more probably to be explained as an expedient to avoid the awkward problem of intercalation and absolve the Council from the anomalies of the lunar year and give, as far as possible, equal monthly prytanies to the Phratries. It agrees with neither the lunar nor the solar year, but it was the nearest compromise that the legislator could get, and he could dispose of the residual five or six days of the solar year by some such method as was employed in the Bouleutic calendar of the fifth century. In fact this calendar of the scheme may, with allowance for its summary statement and the difference in the prytanies, be pronounced to be actually that Bouleutic calendar itself, which Meritt<sup>5</sup> has without hesitation credited to Cleisthenes.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *C.Q.* XXXII, 1938, pp. 165-6.

<sup>2</sup> The reorganization of the Spartan military system had similar results (*Hdt.* I. 65-8), and the victories of the armies of the French Republic after the Revolution furnish a modern parallel.

<sup>3</sup> *Plut. Sol.* 19; *Ar.* 8. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Kathleen Freeman, *The Work and Life of Solon*, p. 79; H. T. Wade-Gery, *C.Q.* XXVII, 1933, p. 24.

<sup>5</sup> *The Athenian Calendar*, pp. 72, 123-4.

Plutarch (*Sol.* 25), in a passage which defies rational analysis, gives us to understand that

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Traditional in form, undemocratic, with a franchise limited by a hoplite census, this constitution satisfied Spartan requirements. It is not a genuine restoration of such a polity as we can suppose to have existed before Solon, but a revised edition of it; the original institutions have been systematized, the aristocracy of the ancient time has been regimented, the tribal society has been organized (with, we may suspect, the incorporation of ambitious recruits from outside the ranks of the nobles) on the model of oligarchies of the newer type. But, however renovated and transmuted, it no doubt purported to be the old *πάτριος πολιτεία*, and the ruling class claimed to be the lineal heirs of the Eupatridae who 'came over with the Conqueror'; so that Herodotus (V. 69) can say, not far wrongly, that Cleisthenes, when after his conversion to democracy and triumphal recall he set aside the four Tribes, was showing his contempt for the Ionians. At all events Aristotle has accepted the reconstruction for what it professed to be and believed that it was veritably the ancestral constitution of the age of Ion. Presumably it was so described or so represented by the authority from whom he derived it, or, having come upon some document or record of it without any indication of the date and circumstances of its enactment, he has misapprehended it in the wrong historical context.

But further, Aristotle has understood from the evidence before him that the constitution included the Plebeians, the Georgi and the Demiurgi, and, so far as he thought worth while to mention, no others, for he has ignored the very existence of Eupatridae. His statement has been a stumbling block to most students, especially to those who agree with me in holding that the Ionian immigrants formed the Order of the Eupatridae.<sup>1</sup> Some critics (e.g. Philippi, Gilbert, Wilamowitz) have proposed to interpolate *εὐπατρίδας καὶ* (or the like) into the passages which tell us that τὸ πλῆθος was distributed *εἰς γεωργοὺς καὶ δημιουργοὺς* and that it was these who were organized in the four Tribes and their subdivisions; but the unanimous consensus of the excerptors forbids this expedient, and the word *πλῆθος* (in the sense of *plebs*) favours the limitation. A simple suggestion solves the difficulty: Aristotle has combined with the account of the Tribal constitution a record of a later admission of the Plebeians to that constitution, hitherto the heritage of the Eupatridae alone; his source, whether documentary or literary, had no need to expound the prerogative of the Eupatridae; that went without saying; and the Act which enfranchised the Plebeians would assume it as already implicit in the constitution and never mention the Eupatridae; so Aristotle, we may suppose, unwarned of the tacit implication, omitted them, and assigned the constitution, inadvertently, I think, rather than intentionally, to the Georgi and the Demiurgi, the only beneficiaries expressly named.

But the solution is incomplete, for what can have led Aristotle to link so closely together the admission of the Plebs to the Tribal system and this particular constitution, which he placed at the very beginning of Attic history, long before the dawn of democracy, and must have recognized, if he had examined it with attention, to be

Solon wished to rectify the inequality of the months, which was caused by the moon completing its circuit half a day before the sun finished the 30th day of the month, so that the lunar calendar had to adopt in practice a system of alternate months of 29 and 30 days. No reason is suggested why Solon, who was reputed to be the author or patron of the Athenian lunar calendar (Diog. Laert. I. 59; cf. Hdt. I. 32, Aristoph. *Nub.* 626, Ar. 43. 2), wanted to make the months equal. Did Plutarch's source ascribe to Solon the calendar of 360 days, which is more appropriate to Cleisthenes, and has Plutarch, misapprehending the reference to that

calendar, slipped into an explanation of the lunar calendar generally attributed to Solon? His explanation is defective, but is better applicable to the latter than to the former.

<sup>1</sup> Without denying of course that, just as there are Peers outside the Peerage of the Realm, so there may have been in Attica, even from the days of Ion, *γένη* (e.g. the *γένος* of the Hesychidae) outside the ranks of the Eupatridae; priestly or princely kin of the pre-Ionian society may well have kept their coherence and their dignities outside the political system, and the word *γένος* cannot, except in formal legal documents, be restricted to that system.

thoroughly oligarchic in character? His strange conjunction of the two enactments can hardly be explained except on the hypothesis that he found them already firmly connected in history, interrelated, one should demand, in time and in matter, standing in juxtaposition on the statute-book, or treated together by the authority whom he followed. Well, this condition is straightway fulfilled if the two enactments are attributed to Cleisthenes. The question, when the Plebeians were first admitted to the Tribes, has of course been much debated, but whatever may have been their status during the Tyranny and under Solon's constitution and even earlier, it is enough for the present purpose to note that, if it be granted that the *πάτριος πολιτεία* had been restored in its pristine exclusiveness on the fall of Hippias and the *δῆμος* was, as Herodotus says, *ἀπωσμένος*, then Cleisthenes, when he took the people into partnership, had, if not to admit them for the first time, at all events to readmit them; he had in fact to reform, not Solon's democratic constitution, but his own oligarchic reconstruction.

Aristotle fully recognizes that the primary purpose of Cleisthenes in his reforms was to admit new citizens, and that these new citizens were τὸ πλῆθος. This is the plain meaning of his phrases ἀποδιδούς τῷ πλήθει τὴν πολιτείαν (20. 1),<sup>1</sup> ἀναμείξαι βουλόμενος, ὅπως μετὰσχῶσι πλείους τῆς πολιτείας (21. 2), ἀναμίγεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος (21. 3), ἵνα μὴ . . . ἐξελέγχωσιν τοὺς νεοπολίτας (21. 4). Most significant of all is the notice in the *Politics* (1275b) ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἔχει ἀπορίαν, ὅσοι μετέσχον, μεταβολῆς γενομένης, πολιτείας, οἷον Ἀθήνησιν ἐποίησε Κλεισθένης μετὰ τὴν τυράννων ἐκβολήν· πολλοὺς γὰρ ἐφύλετευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους.<sup>2</sup> The last words have, I believe, preserved the opprobrious terms applied by the Eupatridae to the νεοπολίται; ξένοι are the δημιουργοί a population consisting partly of descendants of the pre-Hellenic natives of Attica, partly of settlers from abroad attracted by the development of trade and industry; δούλοι are the γεωργοί, the cultivators reduced to serfdom by the Ionians and emancipated by Solon. In these passages Aristotle is no doubt thinking of the later legislation of Cleisthenes, but his statements will obviously hold good of a measure passed by Cleisthenes when he first took the δῆμος into partnership.

Moreover, hoodwinked by the misrepresentations of the Alcmaeonidae, neither Aristotle nor Herodotus has any clear perception of such a measure, whereby Cleisthenes enfranchised the Plebs, before his expulsion by Cleomenes (as might be expected, it was erased from the tradition with the oligarchic constitution which provoked it, or was absorbed into Cleisthenes' subsequent reforms); but both writers, while confusing the two democratic legislations, have preserved traces of the truth. Aristotle's μετὰ τὴν τυράννων ἐκβολήν is vague and indecisive, for it might refer to either occasion, but his ἀποδιδούς τῷ πλήθει τὴν πολιτείαν, although it does not commit him to more than an offer by Cleisthenes, is coupled with ἡττώμενος ταῖς ἐταιρείαις ὁ Κλεισθένης προσηγάγετο τὸν δῆμον. Herodotus<sup>3</sup> places the later reforms, whereby Cleisthenes changed the number of the Tribes, at the earlier date. Aristotle's date for these, ἔτει τετάρτῳ μετὰ τὴν τυράννων κατάλυσιν, ἐπὶ Ἰσαγόρου ἄρχοντος, rules out Herodotus' order of the events, but leaves his own ἀποδιδούς τῷ πλήθει τὴν πολιτείαν unexplained. He has, it appears, lost or mislaid two or three years between the end of the Tyranny and the battle of Marathon,<sup>4</sup> and his mistake may, I suggest, be due

<sup>1</sup> Cf. 4. 2, ἀπεδίδωτο μὲν ἡ πολιτεία τοῖς ὅπλοις παρεχομένοις, where the MS text can be read ἀπεδίδωτο just as well as ἀπεδέδοτο and the imperfect accords better with the imperfects which follow.

<sup>2</sup> The MSS append the word μετοίκους, and some scholars endeavour to give a meaning to δούλους μετοίκους, but there can be little doubt that μετοίκους is an intrusive gloss on ξένους.

<sup>3</sup> V. 66, ἐσσύμενος δὲ ὁ Κλεισθένης τὸν δῆμον

προσεταίριζεται. μετὰ δὲ τετραφύλους ἰόντας Ἀθηναίους δεκαφύλους ἐποίησε. 69, ὡς γὰρ δὴ τὸν Ἀθ. δῆμον . . . προσεθήκατο, τὰς φυλάς μετωνόμασε κ.τ.λ. The parallel passage I. 65, ὡς γὰρ ἐπετρέπευσεν τάχιστα, μετέστησε τὰ νόμιμα πάντα . . . μετὰ δὲ τὰ ἐς πόλεμον ἔχοντα . . . ἔστησε Λυκούργος, shows that μετὰ is not an adverb, but a preposition to be added to ἐποίησε.

<sup>4</sup> 22. 2, where he appears to put the Bouleutic oath and the election of the στρατηγοί in the year

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to his confusion of Cleisthenes' enactments, and to his belief that his third was his first, last, and only, constitution and was promulgated almost immediately after the deposition of Hippias.

At all events there is positive evidence to show that Cleisthenes not only offered, but actually carried through, the admission of the Plebeians to the constitution before his expulsion by Cleomenes, and that the constitution to which he admitted them was not his later constitution of the ten Tribes but the ancestral constitution as restored on the fall of the Tyrant. This evidence emerges from the countermove of Isagoras.

We may be sure that from the beginning of his struggle with Cleisthenes *περὶ δυνάμιος* Isagoras made use of the curse under which the Alcmaeonidae had lain since the massacre of the Cyloneians, and with effect, for the *πάτριος πολιτεία* gave no advantage to the Alcmaeonidae above the other noble houses, many of whom had been at feud with them ever since and deeply resented the elevation of their accursed rivals. Isagoras was winning on the suffrages of the Eupatridae, but Cleisthenes, finding his position untenable between the disgruntled Patricians and the disfranchised Plebeians, made terms with the latter, gave them a share in the constitution, and on the new register 'was far superior to his antagonists'. Isagoras then appealed to Cleomenes. I have already rejected the insinuation that the Spartan king was guided by mere private intrigue with Isagoras and his wife—her honour may surely be vindicated against the imputations of the Alcmaeonidae and of those who write history on the principle of *cherchez la femme*; I now refuse to believe that the irreligious Cleomenes was actuated by abhorrence of the accursed, whom he had so recently put into power; clearly his motive was the need of enforcing the provision in the treaty which enjoined the ancestral constitution. But the version propagated by the Alcmaeonidae obviously could not allow that interpretation, and Isagoras had served their exculpation by furnishing a fine opportunity of throwing inquiry on to a false trail; the curse of Cylon has entirely diverted the attention of Herodotus from the real reason for Cleomenes' intervention and his indiscriminate purge. He tells how Cleomenes demanded by an envoy or herald the expulsion of Cleisthenes and the accursed, and, although Cleisthenes withdrew from Athens, οὐδὲν ἦσσαν παρῆν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ὁ Κλεομένης οὐ σὺν μεγάλῃ χειρὶ, ἀπικόμενος δὲ ἀγῆλατ' ἐπτακόσια ἐπίστια Ἀθηναίων, τὰ οἱ ὑπέθετο ὁ Ἰσαγόρης. He is evidently shocked by the high-handed injustice which included the mass of the proscribed in the curse, and if he had been publishing his book today he might have printed 'ἀγῆλατ' in inverted commas, but he sees no further significance in the act.

But even if we accept as simply as Herodotus the alleged extension of the curse to include the ἐπτακόσια ἐπίστια, is that the whole truth? What were they? Herodotus has a way of using his own (or his native Ionian?) political terminology for Attic official names (e.g. ὑπεράκριοι, I. 59, φύλαρχοι, V. 69, στρατάρχης, VIII. 44);<sup>1</sup> I believe that ἐπίστια is his word for some term employed in Cleisthenes' democratic enlargement of the schematic *πάτριος πολιτεία* to denote a category, parallel to the *γένη*, which was to contain the Plebeian νεοπολίται. Aristotle's rendering (20. 3) is οἰκίαι; that is translation, not exegesis, but it reminds one of the Δεκελειῶν οἶκος in the 'Decree of the Demotionidae'.<sup>2</sup> The 700 are very plainly a round number for 720, the double of 360, the number of the *γένη* in the schematic constitution; evidently the three Orders, Eupatridae, Georgi, and Demiurgi, were to be represented by equal numbers in the

of Hermocreon, in the fifth year after Cleisthenes' legislation, and in the twelfth before Marathon; but (1) the year 504/3 is occupied by Acestorides, and (2) it cannot be the twelfth before Marathon, whether we place the battle in 490/89 or in 491/0.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. J. L. Myres, *Cleisthenes in Herodotus in Mélanges Glotz*, II. pp. 557-66.

<sup>2</sup> *I.G.* II<sup>a</sup>. 1237; *Ditt. Syll.* 3 921; Wilamowitz, *Ar. u. Ath.* II. p. 266; Kahrstedt, *Staatsgeb.* pp. 233-5. Cf. *I.G.* XII. v. 1. 540.

revised scheme. This inference is certified by the total number of citizens given by Herodotus (V. 97) on the occasion of Aristagoras' visit to Athens a few years later; the three myriads, 30,000, are a round number for  $360 \times 30 \times 3 = 32,400$ ; and the same proportion is implied in the passage where Aristotle (24) reckons up the maintenance provided by the imperial State organized by Aristides for the whole *dēmos*, 'more than two myriads of men', again a round number for the two Plebeian Orders, 21,600.<sup>1</sup> Cleisthenes' scheme was ephemeral, but his arithmetic became canonical.

It is an absurd proposition that Cleomenes οὐ σὺν μεγάλῃ χειρὶ expelled from Attica 20,000 Athenians, two-thirds of the citizens. How many *δημοτικοὶ* would have been left to besiege him and Isagoras on the Acropolis? I do not believe that the expulsion was physical, but that deletion from the roll of citizens has been misinterpreted in that sense. Aristotle (13. 5) records that the Athenians μετὰ τὴν τυράννων κατάλυσιν ἐποίησαν διαψηφισμόν, ὥς πολλῶν κοινωνούντων τῆς πολιτείας οὐ προσήκον. He adduces this evidence to confirm his statement that there joined Peisistratus' faction οἱ τε ἀφηρημένοι τὰ χρεῖα διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν, καὶ οἱ τῷ γένει μὴ καθαροὶ διὰ τὸν φόβον· and these classes are in fact the same as the δοῦλοι (the serfs relieved by Solon of their 'debts' but destitute of capital to work their recovered land) and the ξῖνοι (the remnant of the dispossessed aboriginal population and the more recent immigrants who formed the industrial and commercial class), the Georgi and the Demiurgi, whom Cleisthenes admitted to the Tribes. The time of the disfranchisement, 'after the dissolution of the Tyranny', is as vague as that given in the *Politics* for the enfranchisement, but it must be put either at the fall of Hippias or at the purge carried out by Cleomenes. The haziness of Aristotle's notions on the course of events blots out any preference which his words might attach to the former alternative, whereas a comparison of the circumstances decisively favours the latter; the *πάτριος πολιτεία* was rebuilt on a site cleared to the ground; Cleomenes and Isagoras were evicting the riff-raff admitted by Cleisthenes to that house of privilege; the *διαψηφισμός* applies obviously much better to this expulsion of intruders than to the exclusion of outsiders who, whatever their previous status, had never been citizens of the reconstructed State. I understand therefore that the banishment of the 700 ἐπίστια was no more than their expunction from the roll of citizens.

It is plain that the schematic constitution and the enfranchisement of the Plebs were distinct enactments, for (1) the history of the revolution and the counter-revolution proves the separation; (2) the scheme is designed for only one of the three Orders, one-third of the people, and for homogeneous peers, i.e. for the Eupatridae alone; had it been intended to include the Plebeians, it would have been differently drawn; (3) it implies a hoplite census, which excludes the fourth τέλος; (4) the Spartans would not have sanctioned too democratic a franchise. But what was the relation between the two measures? Did the Bill of Enfranchisement take the form of a fresh detailed constitution? or did it employ the method of reference, and by the enactment of one or two short clauses extend the existing statute to include the new citizens? or did it contain modifications of the constitution and, while making only summary reference to most of its provisions, set forth these modifications at some length? Our further discussions will favour an answer in accordance with the third method.

Certain phrases recurrent in the abridgments of Aristotle's description of the

<sup>1</sup> Xenophon (*Mem.* III. vi. 14) represents Socrates as saying in an argument with Glaucón ἐπεὶ ἡ μὲν πόλις ἐκ πλείονων ἢ μυρίων οἰκιστῶν συνέστηκε. The statement does not apply to the Athens of his time, but Socrates in aristocratic company is no doubt talking archaistically (or

neoteristically) and counts no citizens beyond 'the upper ten thousand'. The reactionaries of 411 went farther and reduced the 'ancestral' number of 10,800 by half, to 5,400, a number universally rounded to 'the 5,000'.

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constitution might even suggest that the two measures were combined in one statute. The arithmetical *τριτὴς* side by side with the agnatic *φρατρία*, and the repeated explanation, that the *γεννήται* were not true blood-kin but owed their membership in their *γένος* to some statute or other,<sup>1</sup> might be taken to imply that Plebeians were being incorporated with the Eupatridae. But the artificial construction must have involved drastic rearrangement of the natural groups within the privileged Order itself, and after eighty years of *κακονομία* the legislator had a much freer hand; the Eupatridae had to conform to the calendar and suffer redistribution, more here, less there, accretions or exclusions, as the scheme required.

Problems concerning the number of the Councillors might raise a question whether the second statute did not make a change in the Council. The scheme postulates a Council of 360, but nowhere else do we find any trace of a Council of 360; Solon, if Aristotle (8. 4, cf. 21. 3) and Plutarch (*Sol.* 19) may be trusted, had instituted a Council of 400; the Theramenist reformers regarded 400 as *κατὰ τὰ πάτρια* (Ar. 31. 1), and a Council of 400 is ascribed to Draco.<sup>2</sup> Aristotle (21. 3) says definitely that Cleisthenes in 508 *τὴν βουλὴν πεντακοσίους ἀντὶ τετρακοσίων κατέστησεν*, but this is not additional evidence, for he thinks that he was altering Solon's Council. Accepting it as highly probable that the scheme provided a Council of 400, 100 from each Tribe, I solve the contradiction by supposing that the 'ordinary' members were 360, but were supplemented by Executive officers, either those specified by Aristotle (7. 3) as magistrates under Solon's constitution, or (as I am inclined to surmise) four seasonally rotary Tens of *στρατηγοί*, such as the Theramenists seem to have intended in their *πάτριος πολιτεία*.<sup>3</sup> But what is to be made of the statement of Herodotus (V. 72) that Cleomenes after expelling the accursed tried to dissolve the Council and replace it by 300 adherents of Isagoras?<sup>4</sup> The natural inference would be (particularly from the words *τὰς ἀρχάς*) that the Council consisted of 300, and that Cleisthenes had in his second statute substituted for his former Council of 360 + 40, 100 from each Tribe, a Council of 300, presumably 100 from each Order; but I cannot believe that, when he was increasing the number of citizens, he diminished the number of the Councillors, and ignored in so important a point the Tribal organization which he was carefully observing in the number of new citizens admitted, nor that Isagoras proposed to ratify such a change. On the other hand it is a strained interpretation to call 300 a round number for 360. But there are so many other possibilities and doubtful factors in the problem that no certain solution can be reached.

If we may assume that he avoided such a violent break with tradition, Cleisthenes had to meet a grave difficulty. His 'ancestral' constitution was designed for the Eupatridae only, but he was now trebling the number of the citizens; was he to treble also the Councillors and the magistrates? or was he to leave them unchanged? The former course would have created a Council too large for the efficient transaction of business and perhaps too sharply divided into discordant sections, and would have put the Eupatridae in a permanent minority, which at this stage of his conversion to

<sup>1</sup> νόμος τινὶ ἔχοντες κοινωνίαν. I cannot accept νόμος τινὶ as equivalent to νόμος tout court, in the sense of 'conventionally'.

<sup>2</sup> Ar. 4. 3, where I accept B. Lakon's emendation.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. C.Q. XXXII, 1938, pp. 162-3, 166. They must, I think, have had some precedent in their Cleisthenic model; and the way in which Aristotle (22. 2) first mentions τοὺς στρατηγοὺς seems to imply that they already existed.

<sup>4</sup> Are they to be identified with the 300 who passed sentence on the accursed (Plut. *Sol.* 12; cf. Ar. 1)? The suggestion that the first trial of

the accursed, whatever be its date, has been contaminated with the proceedings taken against them by Isagoras has been widely accepted, and is supported by the *demotikon* attached to the name of their accuser, Myron of Phlya. The *demotikon* does not prove that Cleisthenes had already enacted his final constitution, for he may have used the demes in building his *ἐκκλησία*, or it may have been derived from the counter-proceedings which must have rescinded the verdict after his return, but it is certainly more probable in the last decade of the sixth century than earlier.

democracy he probably did not intend, for it would go far beyond his concession to the *dēmos* of an equal share in power.<sup>1</sup> The second, which he must in fact have adopted, demanded another method of 'representation' or of circulation of the *ἀρχαί*, for the old system of rotation could no longer be applied. Here was an urgent reason for introducing the method of *πρόκρισις* and *κλήρωσις*. It would solve the problem of the distribution of the 'places' among the increased number of claimants, and would help to reconcile those of them (especially of the privileged Order) who were crowded out. Did Cleisthenes introduce *κλήρωσις ἐκ προκρίτων* on this occasion? and if so, was it his own expedient, or borrowed from Solon? Before the recovery of Aristotle's *Constitution of the Athenians* the institution of sortition was very generally attributed to Cleisthenes. In that treatise (8. 1) Aristotle ascribes *κλήρωσις ἐκ προκρίτων* to Solon, but in the *Politics* (1273b-74a), which I regard as more authoritative for the opinions of the Master himself, he states that Solon made no change in the appointment of the officials by election.<sup>2</sup> I need not go into the tangled arguments which surround these contradictions, for I have a bold suggestion to make which cuts the knot.

Wilamowitz (*Ar. u. Ath.* I. p. 50), reviewing Aristotle's chapters on Solon's constitution, observes with his usual insight, 'so hat Aristoteles nur schreiben können, weil er eine darstellung zu grunde legte, die von Drakon nichts wusste (so wenig wie die plutarchische biographie Solons) und die altattische verfassung überhaupt erst unter Solon darstellte. . . . Aristoteles hat dieses material zum teil für seine schilderung der früheren zeit verwandt'. I find this underlying material in that same record which, as inferred above, brought to Aristotle's notice both Cleisthenes' 'ancestral constitution' and the statute whereby he admitted the Plebeian Orders to that scheme. Aristotle, we have seen, made use of the former to describe the constitution introduced by Ion and his men; he has, I believe, made use of the latter for his account of Solon's.

Several considerations may render this audacious suggestion less incredible than it appears.

(1) It would be strange that Aristotle should have appropriated the first part of this coherent material, and even a fact (the admission of the Georgi and Demiurgi) which must have originally been derived from the second, but have made no further use of the second part; one might expect to find the rest, dislocated but preserved, somewhere in his treatise.

(2) Aristotle was quite unaware of any legislation by Cleisthenes except his last Reform Bill; if he came upon constitutional statutes recorded without express dates but assigned to the period before 508, he could only refer them to an earlier lawgiver, to Solon for choice, or a still earlier.

(3) His account of Solon's institutions is studded with back references to those which preceded Solon's, and these references strike the reader as uncalled for in the context. 'Draco's' constitution might, if the reference to it stood alone, justify the *καθάπερ δειγματο καὶ πρότερον* (7. 3) said of Solon's distribution of the body politic into the *τέλη*; but what can have provoked *φυλαὶ δ' ἦσαν δ' καθάπερ πρότερον* (8. 3)? If the four Tribes had persisted intact ever since the age of Ion, why insist upon their retention? why mention them? What are we to make of the pluperfect tenses applied to the *τριτῆς* and *ναυκραταί* (8. 3)? What purpose is served by repeating (8. 4) the details already given (3. 6) about the *νομοφυλακία* of the Areopagus, when that Council continues *ὥσπερ ὑπῆρχεν καὶ πρότερον ἐπίσκοπος οὕσα τῆς πολιτείας*? and

<sup>1</sup> Προσεταιρίζεται τὸν δῆμον. I surmise that he adopted the principle applied, if we can trust Aristotle (13. 2), in the election of the ten Archons to succeed Damasias, and that in every ten *πρόκριτοι* five were to be Eupatridae, three

Georgi, and two Demiurgi (cf. Cavaignac, *Rev. Phil.* XLVIII, 1924, ii. pp. 144-8); but this conjecture belongs to another inquiry.

<sup>2</sup> I am not convinced that in the context *αἵρεσις* will be satisfied by *πρόκρισις*.

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does not τὸ γὰρ ἀρχαῖον (8. 2) sound too strong for the interval between Solon and the time when the Areopagus assigned the ἀρχαί? On the contrary these references would be pertinent and in their natural place in an Act which supplemented or amended a statute recently passed to reinstate the πατριος πολιτεία, or in a *précis* of such correlated legislation.

(4) A comparison of Plutarch's *Life of Solon* with the correspondent section of Aristotle's *Constitution of the Athenians* shows that in the main both are drawn from the same original source, but that Plutarch's version is independent of Aristotle's.<sup>1</sup> Now, Plutarch recognizes in general the same features in Solon's constitution as Aristotle, although he does not insist upon the prior existence of any of them, except that of the Areopagus, which he demonstrates by a quite independent argument; but he omits several: the φυλαί (but for a casual reference in connection with the Council), the τριττῖνες and ναυκραρίαι, the distribution of the ἀρχαί to the τέλη, and the κλήρωσις ἐκ προκρίτων. Has Plutarch or Aristotle rendered more faithfully their common source's data? If Plutarch, has Aristotle inserted matter derived from another source? from (let me say) the record of Cleisthenes' short-lived legislation? If Aristotle, has some authority (Androtion?) intermediate between Plutarch and the original (for we cannot attribute so much to Plutarch himself) deliberately omitted these items because he saw that they were never meant to be attributed to Solon? A complete answer, if attainable, might be valuable for a criticism of the evidence on Solon's reform, but I am here concerned less with Solon than with Cleisthenes, and I concentrate upon one point only. I can think of other reasons why Plutarch might have omitted the other items, but not for his omission of the κλήρωσις ἐκ προκρίτων; and, whichever of the two alternative hypotheses be preferred, the case for ascribing that device to Solon becomes weaker, and its ascription to Cleisthenes more probable.

(5) I submit that, rightly interpreted, Aristotle's account implies that 'Solon's' κλήρωσις ἐκ προκρίτων presupposes the schematic constitution of Cleisthenes. He says of it (8. 1) τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς ἐποίησε κληρωτὰς ἐκ προκρίτων, οὓς ἐκάστη προκρίνειε τῶν φυλῶν. προύκρινεν δ' εἰς τοὺς ἐννέα ἄρχοντας ἐκάστη δέκα, καὶ τούτων ἐκλήρουν· ὅθεν ἔτι διαμένει ταῖς φυλαῖς τὸ δέκα κληροῦν ἐκάστην, εἰτ' ἐκ τούτων κυμαίνουσιν. But from a later notice (22. 5) we learn that the Athenians, ἐπὶ Τελεσίνου ἄρχοντος, ἐκνέμεισαν τοὺς ἐννέα ἄρχοντας κατὰ φυλὰς ἐκ τῶν προκριθέντων ὑπὸ τῶν δημοτῶν πεντακοσίων.<sup>2</sup> Kenyon very justly felt that a reduction of the πρόκριτοι from 500 in the year 487 to 100 in the fourth century was extremely improbable, and he proposed to substitute 100 for 500 in c. 22; but it is the other number, the 100 inferred from Aristotle's words in c. 8, that creates the difficulty. The number of 500 πρόκριτοι, whatever may have been its *raison d'être* early in the fifth century, could no longer satisfy democratic principles after the admission of (in practice) the whole of the people to the Archonship (Ar. 7. 4), because the rotation of 500 nominations among 30,000 citizens would require 60 years instead of 30. In the parallel case of the 500 places on the Council the difficulty was solved by allowing every citizen to claim two nominations in the 30 years of his civic life; but that resource involved as a consequence the allowance of two turns of office on the Council, if the lot so fell (βουλεύσαι δὲς, Ar. 62. 3, cf. 31. 3), and the Archonship could not be held twice. The remedy was simple, to raise the number of πρόκριτοι from 500 to 1,000; and this is, I argue, the number in Aristotle's mind in c. 8; he has, to be sure, written loosely or copied his source care-

<sup>1</sup> Wilamowitz, *Ar. u. Ath.* I. pp. 299-303; Adcock, *Klio*. XII, 1912, pp. 1-16; Ledl, *Stud.* z. alt. ath. Verfass. pp. 14-17.

<sup>2</sup> The continuation, τότε μετὰ τὴν τυραννίδα πρῶτον· οἱ δὲ πρότεροι πάντες ἦσαν αἰρετοί, does not affect my arguments. Cleisthenes, I hold, in-

stituted κλήρωσις ἐκ προκρίτων in his first democratic statute, but dropped it in his second; Aristotle referred the first to Solon, and the promulgation of the second to the date of the deposition of Hippias.

lessly, but he means that each of the ten Tribes presented ten candidates for *each* of the ten places (the nine Archons' and their Secretary's). This solution will apply to the 'Solonian' procedure; each of the four Tribes *προέκρινεν* ten candidates for *each* of the nine Archonships, that is to say, 90 for the whole college; and  $90 \times 4 = 360$ , the number of the *γένη* (and the Council) in Cleisthenes' scheme. The orthodox interpretation, that each Tribe presented ten candidates for the whole college, here fails again, for 40 *πρόκριτοι* are incommensurate with the nine places to be filled.

(6) *Κλήρωσις ἐκ προκρίτων* can hardly have been a single separate measure, or have been picked out for sole mention from the wider constitutional system to which it would naturally belong. If Aristotle has transferred it from Cleisthenes to Solon, we may be sure that he transferred with it the context in which he found it. And if he ascribed to Solon the whole of Cleisthenes' schematic *πάτριος πολιτεία*, modified only by his concessions to the *δῆμος*, we can well understand why he regarded Solon's constitution as much less democratic and more ancestral than Cleisthenes' later constitution of the year 508.

To sum up, I conclude from the foregoing series of arguments that Cleisthenes, who clearly had a genius for the task, produced no less than three successive constitutions. First, under Spartan auspices he resuscitated the ancestral constitution and re-established it in a new schematic form. If we knew more of Solon's work, and Peisistratus', we should understand Cleisthenes' better, but I suspect that the Tribal State was virtually dead when he took it in hand. Second, unable to maintain his ascendancy against his Patrician rivals and the discarded Plebeians, he went shares with the latter and admitted them to the Tribal system and his new reconstruction of the *πάτριος πολιτεία*. It was a revolutionary measure and a breach of Cleomenes' terms. Isagoras could invoke, to rescind it, not only religious sanctions (more than the curse alone) in defence of traditional privilege, but also the outraged Spartans in vindication of their treaty. Third, recalled by the uprising of his adherents, Cleisthenes carried his definitive Reform Bill, which disestablished the ancestral constitution and consummated the democracy. Evidently he had learnt by experience, for he no longer attempted to force the *νεοπολίται* into the old Tribal system, but enrolled them in a new organization which imitated, but politically superseded, that ancient model.

When Cleitophon referred the Commissioners to 'the ancestral laws which Cleisthenes enacted when he was instituting the democracy', to which of the three statutes did he refer them? Assuredly not to the third, which was obviously the death-warrant of the *πάτριος πολιτεία* and can hardly pretend to represent even Cimon's ideal, when he wished to revive *τὴν ἐπὶ Κλεισθέωνος ἀριστοκρατίαν* (Plut. *Cim.* 15). The first offered, intact, the scheme devised by Cleisthenes for the ancestral constitution, and I have indicated elsewhere<sup>1</sup> how closely the reactionaries copied it in 411 and 404. But this first edition was, if not 'a pattern in heaven', impracticable in many points a century after its enactment, and Cleitophon has precisely defined his meaning by the words *ὅτε καθίστη τὴν δημοκρατίαν*, which clearly betoken the second statute. Moreover the legislators of 411 and 404 make use of *πρόκρισις* and of *κλήρωσις* in their laws, and probably of *κλήρωσις ἐκ προκρίτων*, at least in the process of their enactment (Ar. 30. 2, 3, 4, 5, 31. 1, 35. 1). But after all, the second statute was only a modification of the first, and was passed within a couple of years of it. It no doubt re-enacted most of the provisions of the first, probably by the method of reference; and the general public, we may assume, was no more careful than Herodotus and Aristotle (and Thucydides, VIII. 68) in distinguishing between the end of the Tyranny and the beginning of the established democracy. So Cleitophon probably intended that the Commissioners should consult both the first and the

<sup>1</sup> *The Constitution of Dracontides*, C.Q. XXXII, 1938, pp. 153-166.

second statute, and perhaps he took an ironical pleasure in the popular formula wherewith he dated them.

I do not claim that my thesis is demonstrated by direct evidence, chapter and verse—that cannot be expected when one undertakes to controvert the accounts given by our main historical authorities, but I think that I have made a strong case for Cleitophon against Aristotle's censure. Cleitophon indeed, if I am right about Aristotle's mistakes, might retort upon him in his own words, ὡς οὐ δημοτικὴν ἀλλὰ παραπλησίαν οὔσαν τὴν Κλεισθένους πολιτείαν τῇ Σόλωνος, simply by transposing the names.

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## A PRELIMINARY SKELETON LIST OF THE MANUSCRIPTS OF EURIPIDES.

THE vast majority of the extant mss of Euripides consists of 'Byzantine' mss of the 'school triad', *Hec.*, *Or.*, *Phoen.* The value of this mass of material for textual criticism is problematical: it has been declared to be *nil* by numerous modern scholars, and this is no doubt a natural reaction against the excessive importance attached to certain of the 'Byzantine' mss by the scholars of the earlier part of last century, men like Porson and Dindorf, who, however, did not collate their mss with a view to such things as *Leitfehler*. In fact, until our knowledge of this class of mss is far more thorough than it is at present, it would be premature to pass judgement on it as a whole.

It is known that some mss of Euripides existed in the fifteenth century (e.g. in Filelfo's library)<sup>1</sup> which have since been lost. Perhaps the same may be said of the codex Orsini gr. 29<sup>2</sup> and of the mss alleged to have been used by Stephanus.<sup>3</sup> It is to be hoped that these may all turn up again; but even if they do not, it is quite possible that some of the 'Byzantines' were copied from them or from other lost mss and might help us towards a reconstruction.

These 'Byzantine' mss are not all alike by any means, and the words 'recentiores codici' used in, say, Wecklein's critical apparatus should be quoted with reserve in this respect.<sup>4</sup>

Though commonly called 'Byzantine', from the probability that the selection of the 'school triad' was the work of a Byzantine scholar of the late xiii<sup>th</sup> or early xiv<sup>th</sup> century, many mss of this class date from the late xv<sup>th</sup> and early xvi<sup>th</sup> centuries, and so some are Italian and some no doubt Cretan in origin.<sup>5</sup> There were mss of Euripides in Crete in the early xv<sup>th</sup> century, apparently of sufficient importance to enable Arsenius to mention them in the same breath as those in Florence and Venice.<sup>6</sup>

In C.Q. xxxii, p. 200 it was stated that an attempt was being made to compile a reasonably complete list of 'Byzantine' mss of Euripides. It has since seemed more logical to include all Euripidean mss in the list, whether 'Byzantine' or not, and the first step towards such a list appears below. This is merely a skeleton list because its purpose is not to give a description of each ms but only to register its existence and its whereabouts and to facilitate future reference. It is published in the hope that additions and corrections will be forthcoming. There must be a considerable number of Euripidean mss in public (and perhaps especially in private) libraries which are not on this list: some that are on the list are no doubt wrongly or incompletely noted. Any amplifications or corrections will be most gratefully acknowledged. Additions to the list should include, where possible, a summary description of the ms, as these are being recorded on the card-index from which it is

<sup>1</sup> Cp. A. Calderini, 'Intorno alla Biblioteca e alla cultura di Filelfo', in *Studj It.*, I, p. 309.

<sup>2</sup> P. de Nolhac, *La Bibliothèque de F. Orsini*, p. 121.

<sup>3</sup> For information concerning the ms used by Isaac Voss (No. 52 in the list given below) cp. R. Prinz in *Jahrb. Cl. Phil.* (1869), p. 761 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Cp. C.Q. xxxii, p. 200, note 1.

<sup>5</sup> Cp. J. Enoch Powell, 'The Cretan MSS of

Thucydides', in C.Q. xxxii, p. 108, and C. Galla-votti, 'I codici planudei di Teocrito', in *Studj It.*, 1934, p. 289 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Cp. his prefatory letter to the ed. pr. of the Scholia to Euripides (1534): τὰ εἰς ἐπὶ τὰ τραγω-  
δίας τοῦ Εὐριπίδου σποράδην εὐρισκόμενα σχόλια, ἃ  
ἔγγε οἷα τις μέλισσα ἐνίστα' αἰς ἀνέτυχον βίβλους τῶν  
παλαιῶν, ἐν τε Μίνωος πόλει καὶ Ῥαδαμάνθους,  
'Ενετήγοι τε καὶ Φλωρεντίᾳ.

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hoped in due course to construct a summary catalogue. From such a catalogue the work of collating the new material and recollating the old<sup>1</sup> could be apportioned.

## GREAT BRITAIN.

*Cambridge University Library.*

1. Mm. 1. 11 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)
2. Nn. 3. 13 Hec. Or. Hec. (715-end) (xv)
3. Nn. 3. 14 Hec. Or. (called El.) Phoen. (xiv)
- Ibid. Hec. Or. (xv)

*Corpus Christi College, Cambridge.*

4. No. 403 Hec. Or. (called El.) Phoen. (xv)

*Bodleian Library, Oxford.*

5. Barocc. 34 Phoen. (xv)
6. Barocc. 37 Hec. (xvi)
7. Barocc. 37, 3 Phoen. ('recens')
8. Barocc. 74 Schol. to Hec. Or. Phoen. (to v. 1569) (?)
9. Barocc. 120 Hec. Or. (called El.) Phoen. (xiv or xv)
10. Canon. 86 (5) Hec. Or. (xiv)
11. D'Or. 16950, 72 (Auct. X. 1. 3. 13) Hec. Or. (anno 1441)
12. D'Or. 16951, 73 (Auct. X. 1. 3. 14) Hec. Or. (xiv)
13. Laud. 54 (1) Hec. (to v. 284) Or. (165-end) Phoen. (xv)
14. Misc. 99 (Auct. F. 3. 25) Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv)
15. Misc. 100 (Auct. F. 4. 1.) Hec. Or. Phoen. (to v. 1756) (xv)
16. Misc. 248 (Auct. T. 4. 10) Hipp. Hec. Or. Phoen. (to v. 425) (xv or later)
17. Misc. 249 (Auct. T. 4. 11) Hec. Or. (xv?)

*British Museum Library, London.*

18. Add. 10057 Hec. Or. (xiv-xvi)
19. Arundel 522 Hec. Or. Phoen. (anno 1489)
20. Arundel 540 Hec. Or. (called El.) Phoen. (called Oid.) (xv)
21. Harl. 5724 Hec. (xv)
22. Harl. 5725 Hec. Or. (xv)
23. Harl. 5743 Alc. (1029-end) Rhes. Tro. (xvi)
24. Harl. 6300 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xvi)
25. Sloane 1774 Hipp. (xvi)
26. Sloane 4952 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xvi)

*Library of the Royal Society, London.*

27. No. 7 Hec. Or. Phoen. (?)
28. No. 24 Hec. Or. Phoen. (?)

*Private Library at Old Malthouse, Ashford Hill, nr. Newbury.*

29. unnumb. Hec. Or. (xv)

## ITALY.

*Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Florence.*

30. pl. 7, 15 Sententiae ex Eur. (xi)
31. pl. 31, 1 Rhes. Iph. T. Iph. Aul. Bacch. (called Pentheus) Suppl. Cycl.  
Heracl. Herc. F. Hel. Ion. El. (xv)

<sup>1</sup> Cp. C.Q. xxxii, p. 199, notes 1 and 2.

32. pl. 31, 5 Phoen. (xiv)
33. pl. 31, 6 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)
34. pl. 31, 9 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)
35. pl. 31, 10 Hec. Or. Med. Phoen. Alc. Andr. Hipp. Rhes. (end missing) (xiv)
36. pl. 31, 15 Hipp. Med. Alc. Andr. (xiv)
37. pl. 31, 17 Hec. Or. (anno 1431)
38. pl. 31, 18 Hec. Or. (1-1666) Phoen. (460-end) (xv)
39. pl. 31, 21 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)
40. pl. 31, 25 Hec. Or. (xvi)
41. pl. 31, 34 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)
42. pl. 32, 2 Suppl. Bacch. (called Pentheus, 1-754) Cycl. Heracl. Herc. F. Hel. Rhes. Ion, Iph. T. Iph. Aul. Hipp. (called Phaedra) Med. Alc. Andr. El. Hec. Or. (called El.) Phoen. (xiv)
43. pl. 32, 21 Hec. (xvi)
44. pl. 32, 33 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv)
45. pl. 91, 6 Schol. to Hipp. Alc. Med. Andr. (xv)
46. Conv. Soppr. 11 (A.F. 2886) Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv)
47. Conv. Soppr. 66 (A.F. 2715) Hec. Or. (1-1681)
48. Conv. Soppr. 71 (A.F. 2817) Hec. Or. Phoen. (1-1687) (xiv)
49. Conv. Soppr. 98 (A.F. 2872) Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv)
50. Conv. Soppr. 164. Scholia to Hec. (xv)
51. Conv. Soppr. 172 (A.F. 2664) Heracl. (1003-end) Herc. F. Hel. El. Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv)
52. Conv. Soppr. 226 (N, San Marco) Hec. Or. (hyp. only) Med. (1-262) Phoen. Alc. Andr. Hipp. Rhes. (1-608) (xvi)

*Biblioteca Riccardiana, Florence.*

53. Ricc. 32 (K. II. 19) Iph. T. Hipp. Ion (1-968) Phoen. (193-end) (xvi)
54. Ricc. 61 Phoen. (xvi)
55. Ricc. 77 (K. II. 21) El. (xv-xvi)
56. Ricc. 78 Hec. (fragm.) (xv)

*Biblioteca di San Marco, Venice.*

57. No. 468 Hec. Or. Phoen. Med. (1-42) (xiii or xiv)
58. No. 469 Hec. Or. Phoen. (anno 1413)
59. No. 470 Hec. Or. Phoen. Andr. Hipp. Med. (xv)
60. No. 471 Hec. Or. Phoen. Andr. Hipp. (1-1234) (xi or xii)
61. No. 507 Sententiae ex Hec. Or. Phoen. Hipp. Med. Andr. Alc. Rhes. (xii)
62. No. 515 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv)
63. No. 614 Hec. Or. (xvi)
64. No. 620 Hipp. (beginning missing) (xv)
65. SS. Giov. & Paolo 35 Hec. Or. (xiii)
66. SS. Giov. & Paolo 36 Hec. Or. Med. Andr. (xv)
67. SS. Giov. & Paolo 37 (IX, 10) Hec. Or. Phoen. Hipp. Med. Alc. Andr. (xv)
68. Nanius 283 Hec. Or. (xv)

*Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Milan.*

69. No. 30 (A. 104. sup.) Hec. Or. Phoen. (anno 1423)
70. C. 44. sup. (olim V. 384) Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)
71. No. 345 (F. 74. sup.) (olim T. 294) Hec. Or. Phoen. (1-710) (xiv)
72. No. 1019 (F. 205/I. inf.) Rhes. (856-884) Andr. (1-102) (xii-xiii)
73. No. 557 (N. 161. sup.) Or. (anno. 1571)

# A PRELIMINARY SKELETON LIST OF MSS OF EURIPIDES 101

## *Biblioteca Nazionale, Naples.*

74. II. F. 9 (Borb. 165) Hec. Or. Phoen. Tro. (xiv-xv)
75. II. F. 37 (Borb. 194) Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)
76. II. F. 38 (Borb. 195) Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)
77. II. F. 39 (Borb. 196) Hec. Or. (xv)
78. II. F. 40 (Borb. 197) Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)
79. II. F. 41 (Borb. 198) Hec. Or. Andr. (xv) Hipp. Phoen. (xvi)
80. II. F. 42 (Borb. 199) Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv-xv)

## *Biblioteca Universitaria, Bologna.*

81. No. 8 (x. 1766) Hec. Iph. Aul. (xvi)
82. No. 2612 (olim 109) Hec. (xv)

## *Biblioteca Governativa, Cremona.*

83. No. 130 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv-xv)

## *Biblioteca Marucelliana, Florence.*

84. Gr. A. 109 Hipp. (1-57)

## *Biblioteca Governativa, Lucca.*

85. No. 1424 (Cod. Lucch. 136) Hec. Or. (called El.) (xv)

## *Biblioteca ed Archivio Gonzaga, Mantua.*

86. A. III. 20 Hec. Or. Phoen. (anno 1496)

## *Biblioteca Estense, Modena.*

87. No. 92 (iii. C. 13) Schol. to Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv or xvi)
88. No. 93 (iii. C. 14) Schol. to Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)
89. No. 99 (iii. C. 20) Hec. Or. Phoen. (1-1755) (xiv-xv)

## *Biblioteca del Marchese Campori, Modena.*

90. No. 71473 'Euripidis Tragoediae' (xv)

## *Biblioteca Universitaria, Padua.*

91. 4. Sem. 138 Hec. Or. (xiv)

## *Biblioteca Palatina, Fondo Parmense, Parma.*

92. HH. IX. 23 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv)

## *Biblioteca Comunale, Perugia.*

93. G. 84 (20 vel 495) Hec. Or. (called El.) Phoen. (anno 1474)

## *Biblioteca Nazionale, Turin.*

94. No. 112 (C. V. 3) Andr. (xvi)
95. No. 228 (B. VI. 7 Dind., B. VI. 13 Schw.) Or. Phoen. (xv)

## *Biblioteca comunale Bertoliana, Vicenza.*

96. No. 330 (3. 8. 18) Hec. (xv)

## FRANCE.

## *Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.*

97. Gr. 1087 Or. (fragm.) (xiv)
98. Gr. 2077 Hec. Or. (xv)
99. Gr. 2598 Hec. Or. (anno 1467)
100. Gr. 2648 Hec. (xv)

101. Gr. 2712 Hec. Or. Phoen. Andr. Med. Hipp. (xiii)
102. Gr. 2713 Hec. Or. Phoen. Hipp. Med. Alc. Andr. (1-956, 1211-1235, 1250-1271) (xii)
103. Gr. 2714 Herc. F. El. Or. (xvi)
104. Gr. 2755 Hec. (xv)
105. Gr. 2794 Or. (beginning and end missing) (xiv)
106. Gr. 2795 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)
107. Gr. 2797 Phoen. (xvi)
108. Gr. 2800 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv-xv)
109. Gr. 2801 Hec. Or.-Phoen. (xv)
110. Gr. 2802 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv-xv)
111. Gr. 2803 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)
112. Gr. 2804 Hec. (166-end) Or. Phoen. (xv)
113. Gr. 2805 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)
114. Gr. 2806 Hec. Or. Phoen. (hyp. only) (xv)
115. Gr. 2807 Hec. Or. (xv-xvi)
116. Gr. 2808 Hec. Or. (xv-xvi)
117. Gr. 2809 Hec. Or. (xv)
118. Gr. 2810 Hec. Or. (anno 1509)
119. Gr. 2811 Hec. Or. (xvi)
120. Gr. 2812 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)
121. Gr. 2812A Or. (xvi)
122. Gr. 2813 Hec. (xvi)
123. Gr. 2814 Hec. (xvi)
124. Gr. 2815 Hec. Or. Phoen. (hyp. only) (xv)
125. Gr. 2816 Med. (xvi)
126. Gr. 2817 Suppl. Cycl. Heracl. Herc. F. Rhes. Ion, Iph. T. Iph. Aul. Bacch. (called Pentheus, end missing) (xvi)
127. Gr. 2818 Hipp. Med. Andr. Alc. and Scholia to Hec. Or. Phoen. Hipp. (xv)
128. Gr. 2819 Scholia to Hec. Or. Phoen. (xvi)
129. Gr. 2820 Hec. Or. (xiv)
130. Gr. 2823 Hec. Or. (xvi)
131. Gr. 2828 Hec. (xvi)
132. Gr. 2887 Cycl. Heracl. Herc. F. Hel. Rhes. Ion, Iph. T. Iph. Aul. (xvi)
133. Gr. 2888 Hipp. Med. Alc. Andr. El. Hec. Or. Phoen. (end missing) (xv)
134. Gr. 2902 Hec. (xv-xvi)
135. Gr. 3026 Hec. (part only) (xvi)
136. Coisl. 169 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv-xv)
137. Suppl. Gr. 72 Med. (xviii)
138. Suppl. Gr. 97 Hec. Or. (xvi)
139. Suppl. Gr. 353 Phoen. (xviii)
140. Suppl. Gr. 375 Andr. Med. (xviii)
141. Suppl. Gr. 376 Ion, Rhes. (xviii)
142. Suppl. Gr. 377 Hec. Hipp. (xviii)
143. Suppl. Gr. 378 Phoen. (xviii)
144. Suppl. Gr. 379 Or. (xviii)
145. Suppl. Gr. 390 Med. Hec. Or. Andr. Suppl. Iph. Aul. Rhes. Bacch. (called Pentheus) (xviii)
146. Suppl. Gr. 393 Hec. (784-1297) Or. (1-772 and 905-1053) Phoen. (923-1080) (xv)
147. Suppl. Gr. 684 Hec. (xv)
148. Suppl. Gr. 762 Hec. (xviii)
149. ex library of the Jesuit College at Agen, I, 164 Hec. (1035-1050 missing) (xvi)



# A PRELIMINARY SKELETON LIST OF MSS OF EURIPIDES 103

## *Bibliothèque de Ste. Geneviève, Paris.*

150. No. 3400 (olim B. 1 et T. 2) Hec. Or. (xiv)

## *Humanistic Library of the town of Selestat, Selestat.*

151. ex library of Beatus Rhenanus. Hec. (?)

## *Bibliothèque de la Ville de Reims, Reims.*

152. No. 79 (ex Abbaye de St. Remi, J. 733/732) Hec. (beginning missing) Or. Phoen. (273-807 added in xvth cent.) (xiii-xv)

## VATICAN CITY.

### *Biblioteca Vaticana.*

153. Vat. 50 (olim 66) Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv)
154. Vat. 51 (olim 67) Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv)
155. Vat. 52 (olim 63) Hec. Or. Phoen. (anno 1415)
156. Vat. 53 (olim 76) Hec. (247-1249 missing) Or. (xv)
157. Vat. 54 (olim 65) Hec. Or. (xv)
158. Vat. 55 (olim 64) Hec. Or. (called El. at end) (xv)
159. Vat. 56 (olim 761) Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv-xv)
160. Vat. 896 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv)
161. Vat. 909 Hec. Or. Phoen. Med. Hipp. Alc. Andr. Tro. Rhes. (xiii)
162. Vat. 910 Hipp. Med. (1-1017) (?)
163. Vat. 1135 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv)
164. Vat. 1332 Phoen. (1001-end) (xiv)
165. Vat. 1345 Scholia to Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv)
166. Vat. 1363 (olim Orsini gr. 66) 'Euripide' (?)
167. Vat. 1421 Hipp. Med. (1-748) (?)
168. Vat. 2241 (Column. 80) Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv)
169. Pal. Gr. 18 Hec. (1-274) (xviii)
170. Pal. Gr. 42 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv)
171. Pal. Gr. 98 Med. Hec. Or. Phoen. Hipp. Alc. Andr. Tro. Rhes. (?)
172. Pal. Gr. 114 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv)
173. Pal. Gr. 117 'Euripide' (xiv-xv)
174. Pal. Gr. 124 Hyp. to Phoen. Tro. Or. (xiv)
175. Pal. Gr. 151 Hec. Or. (xv)
176. Pal. Gr. 223 Hec. Or. Phoen. (anno 1495)
177. Pal. Gr. 236 Hec. Or. (xv)
178. Pal. Gr. 287 Andr. Med. Suppl. Rhes. Ion, Iph. T. Iph. Aul. Danae (spurious fragm.) Hipp. Alc. Tro. Bacch. Cycl. Heracl. (1-1002) (xiv)
179. Pal. Gr. 319 Hec. (middle part missing) Or. (middle and end fragmentary) (xv-xvi)
180. Pal. Gr. 336 Phoen. Med. Hipp., Scholia to Phoen. Med. Hipp. Andr. Alc. etc. (?)
181. Pal. Gr. 343 Phoen. (63-end) Hipp. (xv-xvi)
182. Pal. Gr. 354 Hec. Or. (anno 1447)
183. Bibl. Ang. 14 (C. 5. 1) Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv)
184. Bibl. Ang. 24 (B. 3. 15) Scholia to Hipp. (xvi)
185. Barberini 90 Schol. to Hipp. Med. Alc. Andr. etc. (?)
186. Barberini 207 (II, 28) Iph. T. (?)
187. Ottobon. 155 Hec. Or. (xvi)
188. Ottobon. 307 Med. Hipp. (hyp. and 46-49 only) (xviii)

189. Ottobon. 339 Scholia to Andr. Hec. (xvi-xvii)  
 190. Ottobon. 346 Hec. Or. (xvi)  
 191. Urb. 140 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiii, but text of Eur. apparently 'a manu posteriore')  
 192. Urb. 142 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)  
 193. Bibl. Vallicell. 1 (A. 25) Hec. (1-327) (xv)

## GERMANY.

*Preussische Staatsbibliothek, Berlin.*

194. Phill. 1479 Phoen. (xvi)  
 195. Phill. 1607 Hec. (1-15) (xv-xvi)

*(Nationalbibliothek), Vienna.*

196. Ness. 119 Hec. Or. Phoen.  
 197. Ness. 143 Hec. Or.  
 198. Ness. 161 'Tragoediae nonnullae'  
 199. Ness. 163 'Fragmenta tragoediarum'  
 200. Ness. 180 Hec. Or. Phoen.  
 201. Ness. 197 Hec. Or. Phoen.  
 202. Ness. 218 Hec.  
 203. Ness. 242 Hec. Or.  
 204. Ness. 302 Hec. Or.

*Bibliotheca Augustana, Augsburg.*

205. Plut. V, n. 45 (Reis. p. 69, n. 45) Hec. (1-789) ('recens')  
 206. Subs. VIII, n. 2 (Reis. p. 35, n. 2) Hec. (1248-end) Or. Phoen.  
 207. Inf. Bibl. Arm. I, n. 48 (Reis. p. 83, n. 48) Hec. Or. Phoen. ('recentiss.')  
 208. Inf. Bibl. Arm. I, n. 68 (Reis. p. 90, n. 68) Or. and Scholia to Hec. ('antiquior')

*Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Munich.*

209. No. 168 Phoen. (1-435) Ion (1298-end) (xvi)  
 210. No. 258 Phoen. Med. Hipp. and Schol. to Andr. Alc. (xvi)  
 211. No. 266 Hec. Or. (xv)  
 212. No. 494 Hec. (1-807) (xv)  
 213. No. 500 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)  
 214. No. 501 Hec. Or. (xiv)  
 215. No. 560 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiii)

*Stadtbibliothek, Breslau.*

216. R. 30 (CXLIH = S. 1. 3. 1) Hec. (900-end) Or. Phoen. (1-1083) (xiv)  
 Phoen. (1084-end) (xv)  
 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv-xvi)

*Landesbibliothek, Darmstadt.*

217. No. 2773 Sententiae ex Hec. Or. Phoen. Andr. Hipp. (xiv-xv)

*Sächsische Landesbibliothek, Dresden.*

218. DA. 22 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)

*Universitätsbibliothek, Heidelberg.*

219. Pal. Gr. 18 (olim Wittenberg) Hec. (1-274) (xiv)

# A PRELIMINARY SKELETON LIST OF MSS OF EURIPIDES 105

*Herzog-August-Bibliothek, Wolfenbüttel.*

220. 4202 (Gudianus 15) Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv) Andr. (xv)

## GREECE.

*National Library, Athens.*

221. No. 1057 Hec. (53-end) Or. (xv)  
 222. No. 1058 Hec. Or. (xv)  
 223. No. 1062 Hec. (xvi)  
 224. No. 1076 Hec. Or. (xvii)  
 225. No. 1121 Hec. (xvii)  
 226. No. 1131 Hec. (xvii)  
 227. No. 1321 Hec. Or. (xvii)

*Mount Athos.*

228. No. 1575 (62) Hec. (beginning missing) (xviii)  
 229. No. 3868 (334) Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)  
 230. No. 4281 (161) Phoen. (1150-end) Hipp. Med. (1-1326) (xiii)  
 231. No. 4305 (185) Hec. (1031-1280) (xv-xvi)  
 232. No. 4314 (194) Hec. Or. (1-756) (xviii)  
 233. No. 4625 (145) Hec. (xviii)  
 234. No. 5481 (1361) Hec. (end missing) (xviii)

*Vatopedi Library, Mt. Athos.*

235. No. 36/7 Sententiae ex Hec. Or. Hipp. Med. Andr. Rhes. (xii)  
 236. No. 671/8 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv)  
 237. No. 738/25 Med. (xvii)

*University Library, Salonica.*

238. ex Hagios Demetrios Hec. (1046-end) Or. Phoen. (with three lacunae) (xvi)

## SWITZERLAND.

*Universitätsbibliothek, Basel.*

239. No. 75 (F. VI. 46) El. (1-486) (xvi)  
 240. (?) Hel. (anno 1557-8)

## BOHEMIA.

*Narodni a universitni knihovna, Prague.*

241. No. 1653 (VIII. B. 36) 'Tragoediae V' (xiv-xv)

## SPAIN.

*Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid.*

242. XVIII Hec. (xv)  
 243. XLVII Hec. Or. ('sive El.') Phoen. (xiv)

*Biblioteca del Escorial (Monasterio de San Lorenzo).*

244. No. 245 Hec. Or. (xvii)  
 245. No. 246 (ψ. IV. 15, Tychs.) Hec. (xvii-xviii)  
 246. No. 247 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xviii)  
 247. No. 248 Scholia to Hec. Or. Phoen.

*Biblioteca Universitaria, Salamanca.*

248. 1-1-18 Hec. Or. Phoen. (anno 1326)  
 249. 1-2-10 Phoen. (xv-xvi)  
 250. 1-2-23 Hec. Or. Phoen. (anno 1423)

*Cathedral Chapter Library, Toledo.*

251. 102-33 (Ruelle, 41) Ion (xvii)

## BELGIUM.

*Bibliothèque Royale, Brussels.*

252. 11278-9 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)  
 253. 4280-83 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)

## NETHERLANDS.

*Universiteitsbibliotheek, Groningen.*

254. No. 205 Scholia to 'IV Trag.'

*Provinciale Bibliotheek van Friesland, Leeuwarden.*

255. 26 (34) Hec. Or. (xvi)

*Bibliotheek der Rijks-Universiteit, Leyden.*

256. 33 (XVIII. 61) E Hec. Or. (called El.) Phoen. (xv)  
 257. 38 Hec. Or. Phoen.  
 258. 61 (Vossianus) Hec. Or. (xv)  
 259. 125 (XVIII Per. O. 18) Hec. Iph. (anno 1500)

## BULGARIA.

*Library of Batshovo.*

260. (?) Hec. (1-154) (anno 1460)

## ROUMANIA.

*Biblioteca Facultatii de Filosofie si Litere, Bucharest.*

261. 699 (316) Hec. (xviii)  
 262. 709 (406) Hec. (xviii)  
 263. 725 (503) Hec. (xviii)  
 264. 728 (519) Hec. (part only) (xviii)

## SWEDEN.

*Kungl. Universitets Bibliotek, Uppsala.*

265. No. 15 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xiv)

## DENMARK.

*Det Kongelige Bibliotek, Copenhagen.*

266. No. 417 Med. Hec. Or. Phoen. Hipp. Alc. Andr. Tro. Rhes. (xv)  
 267. No. 3549 Hec. Or. Phoen. (1-1660) (xiv-xv)  
 268. No. 3550 Hec.

## U.S.S.R.

*Vsesojuznaja Biblioteka imeni V. I. Lenina, Moscow.*

269. ex Holy Synod Library, CCLIX Hec. Or. (xv)  
 270. ex Holy Synod Library, CCXCVIII Hec. (xvii)  
 271. ex Synodal Press Library, No. 5 Hec. (xvi)



# A PRELIMINARY SKELETON LIST OF MSS OF EURIPIDES 107

## PALESTINE.

### *Library of the Greek Patriarchate, Jerusalem.*

- 272. No. 394 Hec. Or. (xvii and xviii)
- 273. No. 469 Hec. (xviii)
- 274. Sab. 36 parts of Hec. Or. Phoen. Andr. Med. Hipp. (x)

## EGYPT.

### *Library of the Monastery of Mt. Sinai.*

- 275. No. 1195 Hec. Or. Phoen. (xv)
- 276. No. 1196 Hec. (774-end) Or. (405-end) Phoen. (fragm.) (xiv)

The contents of a ms have sometimes been incorrectly reported, e.g. No. 117 in the above list is alleged by Vogel-Gardthausen in *Griechischen Schreiber* p. 344 to contain also Hipp. Alc. Andr. Med., whereas these plays constitute the *Alopa ed. pr.* (1494), a copy of which is here bound in with the ms of Hec. Or.

Many mss listed above are already known to be copies of other extant mss. It is doubtful whether the further examination of these would afford any very interesting results: 74 and 171 are copies of 161; 55, 67, 126 and 132 + 133 are copies of 42; 169 is a copy of 219.

Most of the xviiiith-century mss in the Bibliothèque Nationale belonged to Brunck and were probably copies (of other extant mss) which he had himself made so as to collate them later at leisure for his editions (Andr. Or. Med., 1779 and Hec. Phoen. Hipp. Bacch., 1780). Brunck wrote a beautiful hand; I have nineteen folio pages of his neat Greek writing on some blank leaves in his copy of the 1600 Frankfort edition of the Anthology, no doubt a preparation for his *Analecta*.

The text of El. in 103 was of course written after the publication of the *ed. pr.* in 1545.

Attached to No. 136 is a copy of the 1622 Morelli ed. of Med. with ms marginal notes; this bears the separate catalogue number Suppl. Gr. 68.

The dates given in brackets in the above list are usually derived from the catalogues, a certain discretion being used where scholars disagree. Such disagreements are nowadays not liable to extend far, but I am personally inclined to be somewhat sceptical as to the dating given for 65, 191 and 215.

I repeat that I shall be very grateful for any additions and corrections.

J. A. SPRANGER.

PLATO, *PHILEBUS* 66A.

IN *C.Q.* XXXIII. 1 (pp. 28-9) Mr. Hackforth makes an ingenious attempt to defend and explain the text given by B and Eusebius. He takes *πρῶτον* (= τὸ πρῶτον κτήμα) as the subject and *τὴν αἰδιον* as a cognate, or contained, accus. with *ἡρῆσθαι*, and renders 'the first (possession) has been secured for everlasting tenure somewhere in the region of Measure', etc. Apart from the grammatical difficulty involved, I do not feel that the sense thus secured is quite natural or satisfactory. Although I agree that *Diès' τινὰ ἡδιον* is impossible as it stands, I think it points the way to the true reading. *ἡδιον*, so far from being 'inappropriate', seems to me quite in keeping with the playful tone of the passage with its mock-solemn injunction to Protarchus (*πάντη δὲ φήσεις κτλ.*) and its quotation from Orpheus (66c). The *ἡδιον* playfully echoes the *ἡδονή* but with a subtle change of meaning,—'preferable', 'more desirable', as in phrases like *εἰ σοι ἡδιον*. If this be granted, there seems no objection to restoring *κτῆμα ἡδιον ἡρῆσθαι*. I may add that, with *Diès*, I prefer the order of the preceding words given by T and Stobaeus (*ὅποσα τοιαῦτα, χρὴ νομίζειν*) to that adopted by Burnet and Mr. Hackforth.

R. G. BURY.

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## SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS.

### LITERATURE AND GENERAL.

#### Classical Philology. XXXIII. 1. January, 1938.

D. B. Durham, *Parody in Achilles Tatius*: many of the absurdities of A.'s story are due to deliberate parody of the romances. Ortho L. Wilner, *The Technical Device of Direct Description of Character in Roman Comedy*: classifies all the passages in which traits are ascribed to a character by another or by himself; the conclusions drawn are such as might have been guessed a priori. W. C. Helmbold, *The Epigrams of Theocritus*: a detailed discussion of the manuscript tradition of the collection. C. G. Starr, *Rhodes and Pergamum, 201-200 B.C.*: discusses the alliance against Philip in the light of previous relations between the two states. Mary L. Trowbridge, *Folklore in the Scriptores Historiae Augustae*: a classified list of omens, etc. W. H. Alexander, *Word-Order in Sophocles, O.T. 1430-31*: concludes that μάλιστα must be referred to τοῖς ἐν γένει, 'the family above all others'. W. Allen, *The Source of Jugurtha's Influence in the Roman Senate*: the Senate may have been deferring to the authority of the Scipionic group, with which J. had formed connexions at Numantia. J. R. Naiden on *Paneg. Mess.* 40-44: transposes 44 to follow 41. N. Lewis, *Two Papyrus Notes*: (1) corrects Bilabel's restoration of the address of P. Bad. 35; (2) explains the accounting of *B.G.U.* II. 475. J. A. Notopulos on Plato, *Rep.* 532c: explains φαντάσματα θεῶν by Plato's use of θεῖος in 331E; like the poet, the φαντάσματα are only media which 'partake of a derivative divinity'.

#### XXXIII. 2. April, 1938.

C. D. Adams, *Speeches VIII and X of the Demosthenic Corpus*: examines in detail matter common to the two speeches; holds that D. himself revised parts of X (written in 341 but not published) for inclusion in a revised version of VIII some time between 338 and 330: the original X was published after his death. C. W. Mendell, *Horace, Odes I. 14*: the poem is to be taken personally: the *navis* is H.'s own life. G. M. Calhoun, *The Poet and the Muses in Homer*: examines and rejects Murray's argument for the existence of a 'traditional book' from the invocations of the Muses. Walter Allen, *Lucretius' Friendship with Memmius*: M. was L.'s patron—*amicitia* is used under the Republic, as later, for the relationship between a man of letters and his patron—but disappointed his expectations; hence the dedication was left incomplete. W. H. Kirk, *Passive 'Verba Sentiendi' with Declarative Infinitive*: classifies exx. of personal and impersonal constructions with *traditur, dicitur, intelligitur*, etc. D. M. Robathan, *The Missing Folios of the Paris Florilegium 15155*: Vat. Reg. lat. 2120, ff. 11-35, represents ff. 21-38 and 112-122 of the St. Victor MS. of which Paris 15155 contains the rest (except ff. 123-136, which are still missing): collations are given from the new ff. for Prop. (not previously found in a *florilegium*), Tib., *App. Verg.*, Ovid and *Orestes*. Marion Altman, *Ruler Cult in Seneca*: notes S.'s references to emperor-worship and attempts to discover his attitude to it. G. M. Calhoun on Hom. *Od.* 8. 499 argues that θεῶν must be taken with ἀρχεῖν. C. Murley on Cat. 44 holds that C. was not present at Sestius' dinner. H. C. Youtie on P. Rendel Harris 158 reads ἀπ' ὅτεν ἕκα (= ἀπ' ὅτε ἕκα) for Powell's ἀποτε <τέ> νεκα. Aubrey

Diller, *A New Source for the Text of Apollodorus' Bibliotheca*: Monac. gr. 182, a notebook of Politian's, contains excerpts probably taken from R (Par. gr. 2722).

XXXIII. 3. July, 1938.

S. F. Bonner, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the Peripatetic Mean of Style*: traces the Aristotelian doctrine of *μεσότης* in D.'s rhetorical writings and its influence on (1) his views on diction, composition and the *genera dicendi*, and (2) his criticisms of particular authors. G. E. Duckworth, *The Unnamed Characters in the Plays of Plautus*: P. did not always name even his more important characters; there are some forty, of whom at least fifteen have importance for the plot, whose names do not occur in the text. H. Hill, *Equites and Celeres*: the best ancient authorities make the *celerēs* not the early *equites* but a royal bodyguard, though this may have been a section of the *equites*; if so, the *cohors praetoria* was its descendant. H. B. Dunkel, *Was Demosthenes a Panhellenist?*: though D. sometimes uses appeal to Panhellenic sentiment for his own ends, he shows no sign of genuine Panhellenism and his sympathies are always limited by regard for Athenian interests. W. B. Stanford, *Two Homeric Echoes*: (1) Ap. Rhod. 4. 150 echoes *Il.* 14. 16 and may intend a learned pun on *σκώληξ*, used in Aeolic for a *κωφὸν κύμα*; (2) Theoc. 2. 82 *χῶς ἴδον κ.τ.λ.* is a literary echo of *Il.* 14. 294, which itself may be derived from a proverb. W. B. Stanford posits an adj. *λέχειος*, *λέχειος* or *λεχίης* from *λέχος*; in Aesch. *Ag.* 51 he takes *λεχέων* as adj. with *παίδων* and in *Sept.* 293 suggests *λεχέων*. L. Pearson on Soph. *O.T.* 1430-31 defends Jebb against W. H. Alexander in *C.P.* 33. 89. Dorothy Paschall on Plaut. *Cist.* 290 defends *manu* as equivalent to *mala manu*, comparing *Amph.* 605 and *Petr.* 63.

XXXIII. 4. October, 1938.

C. M. Bowra, *Xenophanes, Fragment 1*: analyses the fr. as an example of sympotic elegy and as a document for the social history of its time. A. Neumann, *Die Problematik des 'Homo-Mensura' Satzes*: a critical survey of discussions of the doctrine. K. Scott, *Ruler Cult and Related Problems in the Greek Romances*: a catalogue of material, none of which is of much importance. F. Solmsen, *Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator's Playing on the Feelings*: examines the handling of *πάθη* (1) in *τέχναι* based on analysis of *μόρια λόγων*, (2) in Aristotle's discussion based on analysis of *πίστεις* and Cicero's treatment on similar lines; argues that A.'s conception of rhetoric and of the place of *πάθη* owes much to Plato's *Phaedrus*. R. A. Pack, *Errors as Subjects of Comic Mirth*: draws attention to Cicero, *de Orat.* 2. 237-9 as evidence for an Aristotelian theory of comic *ἀμαρτία*. C. W. Keyes, *A New Papyrus Fragment of the Orestes*: P. Columbia 517A (1st cent. B.C.) contains the beginnings of *Or.* 226-47 and some ends of lines from 204-25: the text does not follow either family of MSS. and shows four variants not found in any MS. (216 *ἀκῶν* for *φρενῶν*, 224 *νόσση*, 231 *αὐτῆς* (?), 240 *εἰ δὲ βλάβην*). J. A. Scott, *An Unnoticed Homeric Phrase in Shakespeare: Coriol. IV. vi. 144* may come from *Il.* iv. 43 in Chapman's translation, published about the same time.

Hermathena. L. (January, 1937.)

The following articles deal with classical subjects. J. Tate, *Tragedy and the Black Bile*. For Aristotle *katharsis*, religious or medical, means the same thing, the pacification or 'settling' of the motions arising from the 'black bile'. The relief consists in causing the soul to beat for a time to a new rhythm; when this has come to a close we enjoy for a period a state of freedom from the natural atrabilious motions. We gain the 'harmless pleasure' of tragedy because we have in the soul motions which can be counteracted to our comfort. *Katharsis* takes place in the

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emotional planes of the 'body-cum-soul'. It is self-adjusting; when we have had enough we cease to react in a pleasurable way. W. H. Porter proposes to punctuate Eur. Rhes. 717-721 as follows: πολλὰ δὲ τὰν | βασιλίδ' ἰστίαν Ἀτρεΐδαν κακῶς | ἔβαξε δῆθεν ἐχθρὸς ὦν στρατηλάταις |—δλοῖτ' ὄλοῖτο πανδίκως—πρὶν ἐπὶ γὰρ Φρυγῶν ποδὸς ἔχνος βαλεῖν, so that the clause introduced by πρὶν becomes dependent on δῆθεν ἐχθρὸς ὦν στρατηλάταις. D. L. Graham suggests κατάχθονος (ὁ λιπαρός, ὁ τρόφιμος, Hesych.) for κατὰ χθονός in Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 617. D. Grene, *The Comic Technique of Aristophanes*. Attic comedy is an 'impure' art form made up of elements of the primitive *Possensspiel* and of the beast masquerade. Grotesque satire is imposed on A. partly by the Greek character. Greek literature did not know how to blend the tragic and the laughable in one figure. G. analyses the three grotesque Aristophanic figures Socrates, Cleon, and Euripides; incidentally controverting the theory of 'fixed types' propounded by W. Suess. G. distinguishes four stages in the development of A.'s technique, the last (*Lysis*, *Eccles.*, *Plut.*) showing that the earlier collection of scenes has become a *play*.

#### LI. (May, 1938.)

The classical articles are as follows: W. S. Maguiness writes on Friends and the Philosophy of Friendship in Horace; F. R. M. Hitchcock has notes and emendations on the Latin writings of St. Patrick. As an aid to the solution of stylistic and textual problems he has made special use of Irenaeus *Adv. Haereses*, which clearly had great influence on St. Patrick's mind and style. W. A. Goligher contributes Part I of an Index to the Speeches of Isaeus. W. B. Stanford wishes to read Eur. Bacchae 1066-7 thus: κυκλῶντο δ' ὥστε τόξον ἢ κυρτὸς τροχὸς | τόνῳ γραφόμενος περὶ φορῶν ἐλικοδρόμων, rendering, 'or like the bent fellow of a wheel when it is being described round the whirling spokes on the nave. τόνος "etymologically meant any twisting instrument and might reasonably be used for the twisting nave of a wheel". φορά means "something that bears or is borne". I suggest that here it = κνήμαι, spokes'. W. F. Trench discusses the place of katharsis in Aristotle's aesthetics, combating the view of J. Tate in the last no. of *Herm.* that κάθαρσις meant the purgation of the black bile which is responsible for certain mental distractions. In contrast, Trench holds that 'the excitation of pity and fear is seen as a good and not an evil in the drama because the end of tragedy is not the extinction of emotion but the superinducing of serenity.' The κάθαρσις is effected 'because the art-form serves towards the freeing of the discordant element from its discordancy, and towards a sort of reconciliation to the universe'; rhythmical form conferred upon the matter of emotional experience excites the soul; and then—because it is *form*—it purges away unhealthy perturbation and induces peace at the last. W. B. Stanford contributes notes on the text of Chariton in reference to the edition by W. E. Blake (Oxford, 1938). L. J. D. Richardson on Virg. *Aen.* ix 386 ff.: iamque imprudens evaserat hostes . . . ut stetit, argues that *imprudens evaserat* is a subcontrary of *prudens evaserat*. The latter—he had escaped by taking thought, and the former—he had escaped without planning it, i.e. unconsciously. *Imprudens* need not imply that Nisus was heedless of Euryalus.

#### LII. (November, 1938.)

The articles on classical subjects are as follows: W. S. Maguiness, *The Eclecticism of Horace*, controverts the view of De Witt (*Class. Phil.* XXX, 4; *A.M.J.* LVIII, 3) that Horace was a serious Epicurean and that in Epicurean studies lies the secret to the understanding of the poet. A detailed examination leads M. to the conclusion that the poet in the last epistle as in the first satire is an eclectic; therein lies the true definition of his character, a definition which is also in keeping with what we know of his character outside the sphere of philosophy. H. W. Parke,

*Notes on Some Delphic Oracles*, deals with certain responses alleged to have been given by the Pythia and seeks to explain their origin. These alleged oracles refer to the 'Golden Men' (Euseb. V, 224c); the Leather Bottle (Paus. I, 20, 7); the Address to Cypselus (Hdt. V, 92); the Oracles on the Messenian War (Paus. IV, 12) and that delivered to Battus, which the scholiast on Pindar, *Pyth.* 4, 10 has taken from Menecles of Barca. L. J. D. Richardson, *An Appeal to the Ear*, argues that the anapaestic dimeter in Clement *Stromateis* V, 675 ἰδε σοι σπένδω κναξίβι τὸ λευκόν furnishes evidence for the pronunciation of ξ as zd. W. A. Goligher publishes the second part of his *Index to the Speeches of Isaeus* (ἄπαις to δωπεά).

**Hermes.** 71, 1936. Heft 1.

R. Harder, *Eine neue Schrift Plotins*. Maintains that the four sections III, 8; V, 8; V, 5; II, 9 are successive parts of a single work, and considers conclusions to which this rearrangement leads.

W. Hoffmann, *Der Kampf zwischen Rom und Tarent im Urteil der antiken Überlieferung*. Examines the extant accounts in search of non-Roman elements in the tradition.

W. Schadewaldt, *Aischylos' Achilleis*. Prints a text restored and emended from P.S.I. 1211, discusses it, and considers its relation to the Achilles trilogy, and in general Aeschylus' debt to Homer.

A. Hausrath, *Zur Arbeitsweise des Phaedrus*. Discusses the aims of Phaedrus and his attitude to his material; treats Ph.'s literary development under three heads—(a) as Student of Rhetoric; (b) as Student of Popular Philosophy; (c) as Independent creator.

O. Schissel, *Antike Stundentafeln*. Discusses the character of the late antique tables for telling the time of day from the length of the human shadow reckoned in foot-lengths, and the principles employed in constructing these tables.

MISZELLEN.—G. Klaffenbach, *Zu einer Inschrift aus Gythium*. Corrects from the oldest extant copy the inscription I.G. V. 1. 1169, and confirms his reading by a reference to the stone, recently discovered to be at Baden-Baden: U. Kahrstedt, *Das athenische Kontingent zum Alexanderezuge*. Argues that it consisted of the year class of 335 according to the arrangement described in Aθ. Πολ. 42, and that this numbered 700–800: B. Snell, *Neue Bakchylides-Lesungen*. Variations from his text (Teubner, 1934) as a result of a new inspection of the papyri: H. J. M. Milne, *The final stanza of Φαίveraί μοι*. Argues from a consideration of the formal structure of the other poems of Bk. I that a fifth stanza is required.

Heft 2.

H. Schaefer, *Die attische Symmachie im zweiten Jahrzehnt ihres Bestehens*. Dates the Erythrae Decree shortly before the battle of the Eurymedon, and draws conclusions from it, the Colophon, and the Chalcis Decrees, as to the development of Athenian control of her allies: on this cf. Highby in *Klio*, Beiheft 36, p. 98 f.

W. Nestle, *Die Horen des Prodikos*. Discusses the reason for the choice of the title and the contents of the work.

B. Keil, *Die Pseudo-Aristideischen Leptineen*. Written c. 1890 and now published with notes by F. Lenz. Discusses the history of the text since the first edition (1785), and finds reasons for denying the attribution to Aristides.

O. Gigon, *Gorgias 'Über das Nichtsein'*. Examines the threefold description of Gorgias as Natural Philosopher, as Eleatic Ontologist, and as Rhetor; argues that, considering G.'s period, we need not take them as three successive stages in his development, but may regard them as all simultaneously forming part of his intellectual activity.

W. Krause, *Zum Aufbau der Bacchanal-Inschrift*. Intervenes in the dispute between E. Fränkel and J. Keil (*Hermes* 67, 369 f., and 68, 306 f.), and suggests a compromise which includes parts of the views of both writers.

MISZELLEN.—A. Körte, *Homer und Menander*. Shows from an epigram I.G. XIV, 1183, that the two were regarded by Aristophanes of Byzantium as the greatest of Greek poets—they can therefore be associated on a double Herm; J. F. Crome's double-Herm law (*Reale Accademia Virgiliana di Mantova* 1935, XIII) is too absolutely stated: F. Münzer, *Aus dem Verwandtenkreise Caesars und Octavians*. Discusses problems relative to various relations of Caesar and Octavian, the sisters of the former, the father and grandfather of the latter: M. Bock, *Die Schlange im Traum der Klytāimēstra*. Argues from monuments and ceramic evidence that this is based on a 'Dorian-Spartan' Hero-belief: F. Zimmermann, *Eine Vermutung zum Chione-Roman*. Emends lines 19-21 of Col. III of the Papyrus, and shows that this implies a different situation in this passage, which must be separated from Coll. I and II by a considerable interval: K. Deichgräber, *Zu Antimachos*. Emends a fragment of the Antimachus Commentary from Hermoupolis, and restores the name Ὀβρις for Artemis (cf. Callimachus, *Hymn to Artemis*, 204).

Heft 3 (presented to A. Körte on his 70th birthday).

H. Berve, *Zum Monumentum Ancyranum*. Discusses the first sentence of Cap. 34, argues that *potitus rerum omnium* refers to the period after Actium, and that *ex mea potestate* refers to the triumphal power, retained in fact—though the title was abandoned—until 28/7 B.C.

F. Klingner, *Über zwei Priapeen der Appendix Vergiliana*. Examines the third and second Priapus-poems, and argues that both are based on Virgil but neither can be his work.

T. B. L. Webster, *Sophocles and Ion of Chios*. Examines the fragments, and finds parallelisms in language, metre, and style.

M. Gelzer, *Die Unterdrückung der Bacchanalien bei Livius*. Suggests that a step forward can be taken in the Quellenforschung of Livy by examining the late annalist's methods of composition. Illustrates this by a consideration of the Bacchanalia incident because here Livy can be checked by the inscription (I.L.S. 18).

B. Schweitzer, *Der Paris des Polygnot*. Argues that the description of the attitude of Paris in the picture by Polygnotus which Pausanias gives (10. 31. 8) is inconsistent with the style of the fifth century. Attributes the mistake to a hellenistic guide-book to Delphi used by Pausanias. The usual explanation of the pose of Paris is that he is dancing the ὄκλισμα, the 'Persian' or 'Assyrian' dance.

E. Burck, *Staat, Volk, und Dichtung im republikanischen Rom*. Discusses the relation of the three from the time of Livius Andronicus to that of Virgil, in relation to 'Excudent alii, etc.'

F. Zimmermann, *Die "Απιστα des Antonios Diogenes im Lichte des neuen Fundes*. Uses the fragment P.S.I. 1177 to illustrate the artistic methods of Antonius.

A. Thierfelder, *Die Motive der griechischen Komödie im Bewusstsein ihrer Dichter*. Discusses Comic types of character and 'motives' especially in the New Comedy, and the attitude taken by the authors to them.

R. Herzog, *Catulliana*. Comments on various passages and ends with reflections on the poet's character and poetic career.

E. Bethe, *Leto auf Delos*. Discusses the literary evidence, especially the Homeric Hymn, for the cult of Leto and relates it to the results of the French excavations.

W. Schadewaldt, *Zu Sappho*. Discusses the Berlin Sappho fragment (96 D; E, 3. L) and suggests a new interpretation of the general situation of the poem.

MISZELLEN.—H. Dahlmann, *Zu Senecas Trostschrift an Polybios*. Suggests that in *Cons. ad Polyb.* 14, 2-16, 3 Seneca is imitating the style of Claudius and supports the thesis by quotations from the Lyons *Oratio Claudii*: K. Schütze, *Zum Ruderringen in der Aeneis*. Maintains that the boat-race round a mark was impossible in antiquity. Virgil had never seen or heard of one, and took his details from the chariot races in the circus—hence the four ships.

#### Heft 4.

G. Bornkamm, *Ὁμολογία, zur Geschichte eines politischen Begriffs*. Discusses the meaning of the term (a) in the Socratic-Platonic dialogues, (b) in Aristotle, (c) among the Stoics, and traces its development.

J. Geffcken, *Der Rhesos*. Argues in detail for a non-Euripidean origin and fourth-century date.

K. Büchner, *Die Trennung von Adjektiv und Substantiv durch die Versgrenze in Horazens Satiren*. Suggests that the extent to which this is done can be used as a test of the tone of the various parts of the Satires and so aid in their understanding.

K. Ziegler, *Der Tod des Lucretius*. Produces a mass of evidence *a silentio*, especially from Lactantius, to prove that Jerome's account is not from Suetonius, and is presumably a fourth-century fiction.

R. Rühling, *Der junge Demosthenes als Verfasser der Rede gegen Spudias*. Examines the speech statistically in style and language, and concludes that the proportions are strongly in favour of D's authorship.

MISZELLEN.—A. v. Blumenthal, *Beobachtungen zu griechischen Texten* (cf. *Hermes* 69, p. 454 f.). Discusses passages in Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Thucydides, Callimachus: F. Dornseiff, *Die römischen Dichter heillos interpoliert?* Illustrates from passages in Propertius and Horace the difficulties of answering this question in the affirmative: R. Keydell, *Πάτρια Ἑρμοῦπόλεως*. Discusses the epic fragment describing the foundation of a city, published by Reitzenstein (*Zwei religionsgeschichtliche Fragen*). Shows that the city must be Hermoupolis in Egypt, and that most of the material in the poem is Egyptian in origin: W. Müri, *Περὶ ἀρχαίας ἡγερικῆς* Kap. 9. Defends the MS *αἰσθησιν* against Deichgräber's *διάθεσιν* (*Hermes* 68, p. 356 f.) and explains the medical meaning of the term: R. Laqueur, *Σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν*. Discusses a newly-found treaty between Asarhadon of Assyria and the King of Tyre giving protection to shipwrecked sailors, etc. Compares this with Aristotle's statement about the Carthaginian-Etruscan treaty (*Pol.* 128A) and examines the attitude of the Greeks in the matter: E. Diehl, *Kallimachos Fr. 317*. Finds the original of the unmetrical quotation in a papyrus edited by Vitelli and discusses it: H. Langerbeck, *Zu Alexander von Aphrodisias' De Fato c.x.* Corrects and explains the text: D. Müller, *Eidechsen bei Theokrit und Vergil*. Maintains that the reading *ἐν αἰμασιῶσι* in Theoc. 7, 22 is correct by showing that Virgil read this, and that the fact (that the sun may be too hot for lizards) is correct: J. E. Powell, *Nochmals zu Herodot. 2. 8. 3* repunctuates the passage to avoid the locution *ἐστὶ . . . εἶσα* (= *διατελέει . . . εἶσα*).

#### 72, 1937. Heft. 1.

F. Hampl, *Die Lakedämonischen Periöken*. Discusses the legal relation of these to the Spartan State and to the Spartiates.

A. Körte, *Menanders Fabula Incerta*. Prints the text and discusses the contents of the fragment of the fifth comedy preserved in the great Cairo Menander papyrus. Cannot assign it to any known play of M., and argues against the association with it of *P. Oxy.* 429 or *P.S.I.* 1176.

R. Helm, *Ein Epilog zur Cirisfrage*. Maintains that the *Ciris* is later than *Bucolics*, *Georgics*, and some books of the *Aeneid*; not dedicated to Messalla Corvinus



but to a younger member of that family, and written by a young man. Hence Virgilian authorship impossible.

W. Büchner, *Probleme der Homerischen Nekyia*. Argues that the Nekyia is a single work of art, not a mere compilation; seeks to explain the difficulties which have given rise to the latter view.

MISZELLEN.—A. Lesky, *Die Θεοφορούμενη und die Bühne Menanders*. Argues that the fragment shows that the orchestra is still used in the time of Menander for at least parts of the action of the play: F. E. Kind, *Zu Plutarch*. Emends the passage in *De Sera Num. Vind.* 567F in which Nero's ψυχὴ is provided with Πινδαρικὴς ἐχίδνης εἶδος to Τινδαρικῆς . . . and justifies it by a reference to Orestes-Klytemnestra-Agammemnon = Nero-Agrippina-Claudius.

### Heft 2.

W. Porzig, *Die Rezensionen der Etymologiae des Isidorus von Sevilla*. Discusses the text of Is. Shows that Lindsay's account of the MSS relationships is inadequate and his apparatus defective and inaccurate. Makes some progress towards a new arrangement of the MSS, demonstrating the existence of a previously unrecognized family (ξ).

J. Th. Kakrides, 'Εκτόρεια. Having discovered in Iliad IX remains of a *Meleagris* (*Philologus* 90 (1935) p. 12 f.), K. finds in Iliad VI frequent use of motives from it, suitable to the original, less so in their present place. This illustrates the 'Neo-Analyse' as a result of which Analysers and Unitarians have ceased from their irreconcilable strife.

E. Bethe, *Das archaische Delos und sein Letoon*. Discusses the bearing of the discovery of the Letoon and Artemision at Delos on the interpretation of the literary texts, and suggests directions for further excavations.

K. Vretska, *Der Aufbau des Bellum Catilinae*. Analysis of the literary and artistic structure of Sallust's work.

MISZELLEN.—W. Kranz, *Vorsokratisches IV* (cf. *Hermes* 70 (1935) p. 111 f.). Discusses the 'Διοσοὶ λόγοι' and shows that the text has been excessively normalized by Wilamowitz and Diels: W. Peck, *Verbesserungen zu boiotischen Epigrammen*. Emends *I.G.* vii. 581, 1670, 1818, 1886, 2470, 2533-4, 2538, 2540-1, 2544, 3434; *B.C.H.* 24 (1900) 70, 530; 50 (1926) 444: H. Lucas, *Der Prolog der Antigone des Euripides*. Argues that the two lines quoted in Aristop. *Frogs* 1182, 1187 are consecutive, by reference to Favorinus *Περὶ φωνῆς* (Norsa and Vitelli; *Il Papiro Vaticano Greco II* (1931)). E. Bethe, *Zu Pollux*. Now accepts the MS text of the beginning of V where he previously (1900) marked a lacuna.

### Heft 3.

W. Kolbe, *Diodors Wert für die Geschichte der Pentekontaetie*. Shows by detailed discussion of various incidents with epigraphic help the worthlessness of D.'s chronology.

J. Heinz, *Zur Datierung der Trachinierinnen*. Argues from style and technique that the play is before O.T., after *Antigone*: considers its relation to plays of Euripides, and concludes that it is before *Medea*, after *Alkestis*: both arguments lead to a date c. 438-431 B.C.

H. Dahlmann, *Studien zur Senecas Consolatio ad Polybium*. Discusses various problems of text and content: argues that Seneca's remarks about Claudius form a parallel to those of Curtius Rufus, and support the view which places the latter rather under Claudius than Vespasian.

O. Schissel, *Neue Zeugnisse für die ὀκταετηρίς*. Discusses the late use of this cycle in the Church, after its defence by Dionysius of Alexandria (248-264/5) on the

evidence of Epiphanius, Georgius Presbyter, and an anonymous text in a Vatican MS. of xiv/xv century.

K. Büchner, *Über das Sechste Proömium des Lukrez*. Provides an explanation of the repetition of ll. 56/7 in ll. 90/1, shows that they are original in the latter passage, the beginning of a later insertion (by Lucretius) in the former. Considers conclusions as to L.'s method of composition, etc., to be drawn from this.

MISZELLEN.—C. Wendel, *Späne II*. (cf. *Hermes* 69 (1934), 343 f.): 15. The Carian Thalassocracy: 16. The Thracian Bosphorus: 17. Apoll. Rhod. I, 1161-3: 18. Neoptolemus of Parion: 19. Ancient Libraries: 20. Libraries in Rome: 21. Jerome, *Epist.* 5. 2. 2-4: 22. Oros the Grammarian: F. Dornseiff, *Odysseus' letzte Fahrt*. Discusses the artistic value of the references to this in the Odyssey: F. Taeger, *Isokrates und die Anfänge des hellenistischen Herrscherkultes*. Discusses Isoc. *Epist.* 3. 5; and *Euagoras* 72: H. Bischoff, *Drei Aufbauprinzipien des Theogonioproöimions*. Seeks to prove the authenticity and unity of the Prooemium by the establishment of three principles of its composition: F. E. Kind, *Zu Erotian und Hippokrates*. Discusses conjectures by Danielsson and Wellmann in the text of Erotian.

#### Heft 4.

U. Kahrestedt, *Zu den delphischen Soterienurkunden*. Shows that the problem of the arrangement of the lists is simplified by the proof that all the names are names of leaders of separate groups, not members of the same group. Argues that the Delphian Soteria ceased with the beginning of the Aetolian domination and were renewed when the Aetolian power fell. Later celebrated in Olympian year till after 212 B.C., in Pythian year before 194 B.C. Discusses the dates of the surviving lists of the two sections.

H. Raeder, *Platons mütterliches Geschlecht*. Examines the references in the Dialogues to various members of P.'s family, and shows that they cannot be reconciled with each other or with the statements of Diogenes and Proclus.

R. Keydell, *Oppians Gedicht von der Fischerei und Aelians Tiergeschichte*. Considers whether A. used O. or both a common source. Concludes that A. used both O. and O.'s source, Leonidas of Byzantium (c. A.D. 150).

P. W. Harsh, *Repetition of Lines in Euripides*. Argues that, though some are corrupt, many repetitions are intentionally used for dramatic effect: editors have been too ready to reject them.

F. Lammert, *Kritische Untersuchung zu Ptolemaios Περὶ κριτηρίων καὶ ἡγεμονικῶν*. Discusses passages which cannot be corrected by mere recension, and which need interpretation.

MISZELLEN.—H. Kloesel, *Zum Niobe-Papyrus des Aischylos*. In l. 7 reads ἐρωάζοντα for ἐροίμωζοντα and seeks to justify it: O. Regenbogen, *Eine Polemik Theophrasts gegen Aristoteles*. Discusses the relation of Th. *Caus. plant.* 2. 17 with Arist. *Gen. anim.* 1. 1 ad. fin.: A. von Blumenthal, *Zur Miltiadesüberlieferung*. Corrects text of epigram in Paus. 6. 19. 16, and discusses the trial of M. for treason.

#### 73, 1938. Heft 1.

W. Nestle, *Hippocratica*. Examines various aspects of the *Corpus Hippocraticum*: (1) the meaning of θεῖον and δαιμόνιον; (2) the meaning of φύσις; (3) the fundamental principle of Hippocratic medicine; (4) relations with contemporary literature; (5) conclusions; (6) philosophy and science.

H. Drexler, *Terentiana*. Discusses (1) *Andria* I, 1-3; (2) *Andria*: Charinus and Byrria; (3) *Andria*: the character-drawing; (4) *Hautontimorumenos* I. 1. 161-74; (5) *Eunuchus*: examines Jachmann's treatment (NGG. 1921, 69 f.).

W. Kranz, *Gleichnis und Vergleich in der frühgriechischen Philosophie*. Seeks by

a study of these two literary devices to trace the development of the original thought even in passages of late writers where the form of expression has been changed.

MISZELLEN.—A. Körte, *Bruchstücke einer didaskalischen Inschrift*. Examines the fragments from the Agora published by Meritt (*Hesperia* 7. (1938) 1 p. 116 f.): corrects  $\mu\sigma\alpha[\alpha\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omicron\iota\varsigma$  to  $\phi\iota\lambda\alpha[\alpha\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omicron\iota\varsigma$ , and discusses the content of the inscription: A. Krüger, *Zur orphischen Dodekaeteris*. Discusses the general titles suggested for the astrological poems which pass under the name of Orpheus: E. Wekén, *Τυρρηνοὶ bei Herod.* 1. 57. Shows that the emendations  $\text{Κρότωνα}$  and  $\text{Κροτωνιῆται}$  for  $\text{Κρηστῶνα}$  and  $\text{Κρηστωνιῆται}$  are unsound, and that Herodotus speaks both of *Τυρρηνοί* (inhabitants of the town of Tirsai) in Thrace and, in other passages, of the *Τυρρηνοί* of Italy: W. Schmid, *De Epicuri Fragmento* 567. Interprets the fragment 'quaestum faciet, sed a sola scientia propiciensens.'

#### Heft 2.

A. Heuss, *Antigonos Monophthalmos und die griechischen Städte*. Discusses the relations of Alexander and the Diadochi with the Greek cities: (1) the position in the last years of Alexander; (2) Polyperchon; (3) Antigonos; (4) the Peace of 311 B.C.; (5) the Corinthian League; (6) Peace-Association and Alliance in the policy of Antigonos.

R. Böhme, *Aischylos und der Anagnorismus*. Gives historical reasons for thinking that the plays of A. were revised and modernized in the period before the decree of Lycurgus (c. 330 B.C.) which established an official text. Shows that this is the case with the Anagnorismus scene in the Choephoroi which by consideration of references in Euripides (*Electra*), Aristophanes (*Clouds*), and Sophocles (*Electra*) is seen not to be Aeschylean.

C. M. Bowra, *The Daughters of Asopus*. Discusses the list of the daughters in Corinna (*Berliner Klassikertexte* V. 2. 49-52). Shows that the list is partly Boeotian, partly Peloponnesian; attributes original list to Eumelus of Corinth.

F. Dornseiff, *Lukios' und Apuleius' Metamorphosen*. Discusses the relation of the two works and their place in the literature of the time.

MISZELLEN.—K. Reinhardt, *Zum Epigramm auf die Gefallenen von Koroneia*. Discusses and emends the Epigram (*Ath. Mitth.* 57 (1932) p. 142 f.: 59 (1934) p. 252 f.: B. Snell, *Die 16. Epode von Horaz und Vergils 4. Ekloge*. Argues, against Drexler in *Studi Italiani di fil. cl.* N.S. 12 (1935) p. 132 f., for the priority of Virgil's work: E. Rupprecht, *Zur Euripides' Bakchen*. Discusses ll. 13-23, argues that l. 20 pairs with l. 23 and should be excised. The  $\delta\epsilon$  of l. 23 is an example of its survival from a paratactic form in a hypotactic sentence such as is common in Homer and not unparalleled in later Greek: W. Hoffmann, *Das Todesjahr des Philopoimen*. Examines the relevant evidence and argues that it is conclusive for 182 B.C., perhaps in June.

#### Heft 3.

W. Kolbe, *Die Anfänge der attischen Arché*. Argues that the change from League to Arché does not occur in the second decade of the League but later; dates the Erythrae decree 450, Colophon 448/7 or 447/6, the Arthmios decree 457-450. Dates the change to the time of the Peace with Persia.

W. Theiler, *Zum Gefüge einiger plautinischer Komödien*. Discusses the structure of *Bacchides*, *Pseudolus*, and *Poenulus*.

W. Schubart, *Bemerkungen zu Sappho*. Transcribes and reconstructs the recent Sappho ostrakon (*Annali della Scuola Sup. di Pisa*, Serie II, vol. vi. (1937) fasc. I-II, 8 f.); comments on Diehl, *Anth. Lyr. Graec.* 1<sup>3</sup> nos. 25 and 27a.

K. Hubert, *Zur indirekten Überlieferung der Tischgespräche Plutarchs*. Examines the relation of the Plutarch text with parallel passages in Macrobius, Gellius,

Psellus, and Eustathius. Shows that our text is not an epitome and that c. 400 A.D. a tradition existed very like ours, though in part better preserved.

J. Keil, *Die Schlacht bei Salamis*. Argues in favour of a Persian line facing south from Munychia on the east to near the coast of Salamis north of Argo Georgios on the west; no squadron place between Salamis and the Megarid.

MISZELLEN.—H. Dahlmann, *Caesars Rede für die Bithynier*. Discusses the short fragment preserved by Gellius and Rufinianus: concludes that it was a speech against Juncus before the *quaestio de repetundis*: W. Riemschneider, *Eine verkannte Zwischenszene in Aischylos' Persern*. Discusses *Persae* 140 f.; concludes that the scene takes place at the tomb of Darius, and is intended to prepare an impressive entrance for the Queen: A. Krüger, *Die orphische Κάθοδος τῆς Κόρης*. Discusses the content of the papyrus (Orphic. Frag. 49 Kern): K. Schütze, *Warum kannten die Griechen keine Schwimmwettkämpfe?* Shows that recent writers are wrong in supposing such a contest at Hermione (Paus. 2. 35. 1), and explains the absence by the lack of water at places where games were held: A. Kurfess, *Zu den Oracula Sibyllina*. Comments on 3. 248-254; 373-80; 8, 194-8; 324-8: B. Wyss, *Gregorius Nazianzenus Or. 28. 8* (P. Gr. 36, 36A Migne), reads ἀντιπαρεκταθήσεται for ἀντιπαρεθήσεται and defends it.

#### Heft 4.

F. Wurzel, *Der Ausgang der Schlacht von Aktium und die 9. Epode des Horaz*. Argues that after Antony's flight his fleet retired unbeaten into the Gulf, and surrendered next day through Octavian's propaganda. Horace's Epode reflects the situation on the night of the battle before the surrender.

R. Beutler, *Die Gorgiascholien und Olympiodor*. Discusses the relation of the various groups of scholia to the work of Olympiodorus; shows that his group R is based on Olympiodorus, while group O (in MS Clarkianus B) derives from another source.

W. H. Friedrich, *Cato, Caesar und Fortuna bei Lucan*. Seeks an answer to the question why Lucan diverges from the Epic practice in which the action of the gods is of fundamental importance.

B. Snell, *Identifikationen von Pindarbruchstücken*. Assigns various fragments of the Paean to their places within the scheme represented by the London Papyrus (P. Oxy. 841), the numbering of which he keeps, though he shows that the order of the fragments needs revision.

J. A. Davison, *Alcman's Partheneion*. Discusses the content of the poem. In l. 61 prefers the reading 'Ορθαίq, and regards the work as a hymn to Orthia: uses the archaeological and epigraphic evidence to support his conclusion.

A. Förster, *Textkritische Betrachtungen zur Aristotelischen Schrift De Sensu*. Examines a number of passages from the point of view of the MS tradition and of interpretation.

MISZELLEN.—F. Hampl, *Zu I.G. I<sup>2</sup> 40/41*. Concludes that the inscr. *ad init.* deals not with relations between cleruchs and the earlier inhabitants of Hestiaea but with land tenures under the law of Hestiaea itself.

H. Diller, *Emendation zu Syennesis von Kypros*. Argues from a comparison between Aristotle *hist. anim.* I 2. 511b 24 and Hippocrates *de oss. nat.* c. 8 (9, 174 L) that S. wrote not ὑπὸ τὸ στήθος but ὑπὸ τοῦς τιτθούς.

#### Neue Jahrbücher für Antike und deutsche Bildung. I. 2/3. 1938.

W. Schadewaldt, *Der Schild des Achilleus*. With archaeological illustrations, but chiefly concerned with literary and psychological aspects. W. Hoffman, *Die römische Plebs*. Discusses the inner character and development of the plebs.

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U. Knocke, *Der Beginn des römischen Sittenverfalls*. Mainly an estimate of the nature and range of early Roman conceptions of virtue. P. Hanschke, *Der Einbruch des Orientalischen in das klassische römische Schrifttum als Vorbereitung des Christentums*. Traces the gradual rise of 'gnostic' conceptions of the nature of man and the universe.

I. 4/5. 1938.

U. Knocke, *Der Beginn des römischen Sittenverfalls* (concluded from 2/3). Dates the phenomenon to the first two decades of the second century B.C. and attributes it chiefly to the effect on the nobility of contact with conquered provincials towards whom traditional morality prescribed no standards of conduct. B. Schweitzer, *Strukturforschung in Archäologie und Vorgeschichte* (with four plates). Deals with the methods of Riegl and Wölfflin and their recent extension backwards, especially by Kaschnitz-Weinberg. H. Rüdiger, *Zur Problematik des Übersetzens*. Champions, against Wilamowitz, the claims of poets to be the only fit translators of poetry. F. Egermann, *Das Geschichtswerk des Herodot. Sein Plan*. Treats the 'war-guilt' question as fundamental: the 'hereditary enmity' of the opening was a Persian camouflage for the true cause, Persian determination to conquer the world.

**Philological Quarterly (Iowa). XVI. 2. (April, 1937.)**

W. A. Oldfather defends ὁδοποιεῖν with the accusative at Xenophon, *Anab.* III 2 24 as military argot, citing οἱ ἐχθροὶ τὴν χελώνην ὁδοποιοῦντες from Anonymus Byzantinus *περὶ στρατηγικῆς* XIII. 23.

XVI. 3. (July, 1937.)

H. R. Jolliffe condemns Bentley's Horace as hasty and dishonest. H. E. Wedeck illustrates the extent to which Casimir (seventeenth century) borrowed from Horace.

**Philologus. XCII. 2 (N.F. XLVI. 2).**

R. Pfeiffer, *Vier Sappho-Strophen auf einem ptolemäischen Ostrakon*. *Annali della R. Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Serie II, vol. VI* (1937). Would read l. 5 μαλ[ι]δων] or Μαλ[ι]δων], l. 6. λιβανώσω, l. 8 μαλίνων (or -αν), l. 10 κῶμα κατέρρον, l. 12 -εννοις ἀνθεσιν, l. 15 ἐνθα (not ἐλθε). H. Bengtson, φιλόξενος ὁ Μακεδών. The Philoxeni mentioned by Arr., Plut., Polyaen. are one and the same. His titles vary according to the meaning given to Ionia: Ἰωνες to Orientals meant the Greeks, but Ἰωνία meant the satrapy. Alexander gave the cities of the coast in charge to Alcimachus, whose successor in 331 was Philoxenus. P. then probably, in 324, became satrap of Caria. H. Leisegang, *Philons Schrift über die Ewigkeit der Welt*. P.'s work is so called after its second part, now lost. The first part derives from an opponent, who uses P.'s own terminology. T. Nissen, *Diatribē und Consolatio in einer christlichen Predigt des achten Jahrhunderts*. Andreas of Crete in his sermon on human life borrowed from the Cynics and from the *Consol. ad Apollonium* as well as from other pagan literature. F. Münzer, *Die römischen Vestalinnen bis zur Kaiserzeit* (concluded). The Vestals Aemilia and Tuccia were probably attacked because of their high family. Of the other six mentioned why are the only certainly attested names (with three exceptions) those of Vestals acquitted? So as to deprive the guilty of a memorial. R. Sydow, *Kritische Beiträge zu Ciceros Reden*. Emendations of the text of *Rosc. Am.*, *Pomp.*, *Leg. Ag. II*, etc.

MISZELLEN. A. Solari, *La politica orientale del Principato Palmireno*. Discusses relations with Rome after the pact of Gallienus with Odenatus II. K. v. Fritz,



*Philipp von Opus und Philipp der Philosoph.* The author of the commentary on Heliodorus' *Αἰθιοπικά* could not have intended his work to be thought of as belonging to any period but his own. T. Nissen, *Philologisches zum Text des Hebraeer- und 2 Korintherbriefes*. Three emendations of the text.

# XCII. 3 (N.F. XLVI. 3).

H. Strohm, *Zur Meteorologie des Theophrast*. Theophr. (περὶ ἀνέμων § 19) supersedes Arist.'s explanation of wind-temperature by ξηρὰ ἀναθυμίασις, by adding the factor of the sun's warmth; cf. his explanation of local winds by theory of evaporation of moisture. In explaining wind direction T. added the factor of lightness, as is shown by the Arabic fr. He avoided the errors of Olympiodorus and Alexander, who misunderstood Arist. on ἀναθυμίασις. (To be concluded.) K. Keyssner, *Zu inschriftlichen Asklepios hymnen*. Compares the Erythrae Ascl. hymn (I.G. II and III<sup>2</sup> 4509) to the 'Macedonius hymn' = the Athenian form of it (I.G. II and III<sup>2</sup> 4473). Would read (l. 3) ἰκτῆρ<α> κλάδον ἐν παλά<μας ἄραυτες ἐλαίας>, and also emends ll. 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 20. For the prayer for Athens (19-Macedonius) cf. Soph. (I.G. II and III<sup>2</sup> 4510). Other parallels suggest that M. used the Soph. hymn. Fills up the missing hemistichs of the Epidaurian hymn (I.G. IV<sup>2</sup> 135). H. Volkmann, *Der Zweite nach dem König*. Gives instances of the phrase from the East; in Greek it varies, in Latin it is always *secundus a rege*. In Persia, Syria, etc. the δεύτερος μετὰ τὸν βασιλέα is important, though not an official title. A. Rehm, *Antike Automobile*. The automatic snail of the Greater Dionysia first used in 308 probably hid a large tread-wheel (with a windlass and steering in front) trodden by a man on its inner circumference. E. Jüngst and P. Thielscher, *Cato und die Viktoriaten*. I. Cato, *De Agr.* 15 read *maceriam* (not -as) and *longam* (not -ga) *pedes* XLV or XCV (not XIV). II. *Libellus in ped. V* is a gloss on I. P. <V>, the next words. The explanations of Saboureux and Hörle dismissed. Read in *pedes singulos* <in altitudinem et> *longitudinem*. Proportions of chalk, sand and cement for the walls are 1:2:276. A translation of ch. 145 with commentary. H. Lucas, *Die Annalen des Furius Antias*. The Furius of Cic. *Brut.* 132 is F. Antias, who is often confused with F. Bibaculus. His *Annales* may have dealt with the Istrian War (cf. perhaps Prop. III. 43-4), and recorded the Cimbrian victory of his friend Q. Lutatius Catulus. H. Färber, *Die Termini der Poetik in den Odenüberschriften der Horazoden*. Most of the titles of the Odes are terms of rhetorical theory; from poetic theory those alone are taken which had passed into rhetorical; some came *via* Rhetoric. The few not from Rhetoric are not in poetic theory either (except *παλινωδία*) but come from ordinary life.

MISZELLEN. J. P. Fink, *Die Verwendung des Artikels bei Archilochus*. (1) Demonstrative, (2) possessive. Simple use not found. F. Atenstädt, *Kaukonen und triphylisches Pylos*. Strabo is borrowing in VIII. 387 from Demetrius of Scepsis, not Apollodorus. T. Nissen, *Zum Text der Rede des Andreas von Kreta über die Vergänglichkeit*. Gives important readings from B. A. Kurfess, *Zu Horaz carm. I. 31. 17 ff. Et (17) = und zwar*. The lines translated.

# XCII. 4 (N.F. XLVI. 4).

G. Radke, *Die λευκαὶ κόραι in Delphi und ähnliche Gottheiten*. They are the protecting deities, as bringing light: λευκός connotes goodness, cp. Suidas, s.v., Serv. on V. *Ecl.* 5. 56, Paus. 8. 34. 3. Similarly the λευκοθῆαι are helpers at sea; cf. the Dioscuri as λευκιπποι. The protecting deities (οὐράνιοι) get *white* animals in sacrifice. H. Strohm, *Zur Meteorologie des Theophrast* (concluded). II. Discusses the differences in T.'s aetiology of rain and snow from Arist.'s. III. In his explanation of earthquakes T. discards A.'s ἀναθυμίασις. IV. T. accepts A.'s and others' 'pneumatic' theory of storms, but distinguishes thunder according to cloud-formation and noise, and thinks lightning is caused by friction. V. Some criticisms of Reitzen-

stein and Kazwini. Where T. differs from A. he is often using empirical reasoning. A. Solari, *Il Monumento Politico di Augusto*. An essay on Aug.'s achievements, with comments and some citations from *Mon. Anc.*, showing that its object was to prove that A. had simply completed J. Caesar's programme. H. Silomon, *Bemerkungen zu den Römeroden*. The Sixth Ode, which seems an anti-climax, if supposed to be written in 27, after Aug.'s main work was done, is to be regarded as a call from A. to Roman youth to fulfil Rome's destiny. *Beiträge aus der Thesaurus-Arbeit IV*. Gustav Meyer, *Examen*. At Plin. Val. 1, 25 read *aeraminis rubei limaturae* (= *Kupferhammerschlag*). H. Hafster, *Helion*. At Plin. Nat. Hist. 24, 51 read *quod alii helion <acten> vocant*. A. F. Wells, *Hiemo*. Seneca's quotation (Ep. 114) *hiemantibus aquis* from Sallust cannot be a *v.l.* for *hiemalibus a.* (Jug. 37, 4), since the *part.* would mean 'stormy'—the wrong sense, but must come from a lost work of Sall. Wolfgang Schmid, *Hispido*. At Sol. 46, 4 read *hispidatur* (and *gestat*), cf. Kästner's restoration of the verb in ch. 40. J. B. Hoffmann, *Impetro*. At Verecundus, *In cant.* 8, 17 read *gratiam imprecatur* (for *increpatur*).

MISZELLEN. C. Theander, *Zum neuesten Sapphofund*. ἐνθα in the last stanza = 'there', not 'thence'. l. 2 read δαῦρόν μ' ἐκ Κρήτας, where Aphrodite's garden probably was. l. 11 read ἰλλαότως, 'in friendly wise'. J. Mesk, *Herondas IV. 75 f.* θεῶν φαίνει is a ref. to a remark of Apelles' quoted in Plut. *Dem.* 22. D. Tsirimbis, *Beobachtungen zur Sprache Alkiphrons*. Echoes in A. from the Atticists Dionysius and Pausanias show that A. had their λεξικά before him.

#### Revue de Philologie. LXIII. 1. January, 1937.

J. E. Harry, *La porte à la chambre de la reine*, argues that Soph. O.T. 1244 is to be taken as ὅπως εἰσῆλθ' ἔσω, πόλας ἐπιπράξασα κάλει (imperf.), and explains 1261 to mean that Oedipus bent (κοῖλα) the bar closing the doors, so that it came out of its sockets. L. Gernet, *Paricidas*, criticizes on semantic grounds Wackernagel, according to whom *paricida* <\**pariscida* = ἀνδρόφονος. In support of the old view that *paricida* is the earlier form, with a first element cognate with πῆος, he examines the Homeric usage of that word and finds that the primary meaning is 'cognate relative,' not 'relation by marriage'; θ 582-4 are an awkward interpolation. The 'lex regia' *si qui hominem liberum dolo sciens morti duit, paricidas esto* means 'deliberate murder of a free man is to be punished by the state as the gens punishes murder within itself.' J. de Decker, *Horace et Tibulle*, provides a réchauffé of facts and speculations. S. Schiffer, *La perle dans l'antiquité: margarita* <Iran. marwārida (= sea-rose)> Sanskrit mañjari, 'bouquet, pearl.' Thinks it became known to Greeks through Alexander's conquests. F. Thomas, (1) *Faire que sage*: this archaic phrase (= *facere quod sapiens*) is paralleled in Roman comedy, e.g. *Trin.* 123 *quid feci? :: quod homo nequam*. (2) Terence, *Phormio*, 22-3: the second line has an intentional ambiguity—'cease of his own accord from his impertinences,' and 'cease making errors of his own'. Notes et Discussions: E. Bikerman on Sachsenweger's *De Demosthenis epistulis* argues that I-V are earlier than 250 B.C., and I-IV can only have been written, if not by D. himself, by one of his associates while his reputation still hung in the balance. He notes the avoidance of ο ο ο, and gives an historical explanation of II 20 which avoids reference to D.'s death. J. Carcopino criticizes the chronology of C. Lanzani's *Lucio Cornelio Silla dittatore*.

#### LXIII. 2. April, 1937.

J. Carcopino, *Note sur la tablette de Cluj*, proposes to read in this labour contract *denariis septaginta cibariisque* (for *liberisque*), thinking that if 70 denarii were the worker's whole recompense the contract would be very inequitable. W. H. Buckler, *Les lettres impériales de Pessinonte*, argues that these letters (IGR III 228) were

addressed to a priest of Cybele and member of a rich family. G. C. Picard and H. Le Bonniec, *Du nombre et des titres des centurions légionnaires sous le Haut Empire*, think that the first cohort had only five centuries, but six centurions, two being *primipili*; the first *primipili* had the title of *princeps* or *princeps praetoris* or *princeps legionis*, and is to be distinguished from the *princeps prior* and *princeps posterior*, who were junior officers. W. Seston, *Encore l'inscription de Nazareth*, adduces a Coan inscription (Paton-Hicks 319) to oppose the interpretation of Markowski in *Mélanges Cwiklinski*. L. Laurand, *Note sur le gouvernail antique*, desires a *corpus* of passages in ancient authors which concern ships. Notes et Discussions: A. Ernout recommends Mario Roques' *Recueil général des lexiques français du moyen âge* to latinists, and in welcoming R. P. Robinson's *Germania of Tacitus* proposes in c. 2 *qui primum Rhenum transgressi Gallos expulerint* [ac nunc Tungri] tunc Germani <uni> uocati.

### LXIII. 3. July, 1937.

P. Jouguet, *Les débuts du règne de Ptolémée Philométor et la sixième guerre syrienne, d'après un mémoire de M. Walter Otto* [Abh. Bay. Akad, 1934], discusses the motives and diplomacy of Egypt and Syria; there are also sections on the date of Philometor's birth, the justification of Roman policy in intent and achievement, and the nature of the ἐκκλησία at Alexandria. A. Minard, *Deux relatifs homériques* (1st article)—namely, ὅς τις and ὅς τε. ὅς τις is indifferent to personality. It may have a plural or singular reference: 'all who' or 'if someone,' so also post-Homeric ἐλ τις. It may be iterative, usually of an indefinite number, but not always (long discussion of Od. ix. 94). A. Graur, *Les noms latins en -us, -oris*: classification of nouns in -us, -eris, and -us, -oris shows that the more recent the formation the more likely is the latter declension; much of the evidence for earlier forms in -eris is unreliable; the predominance among -oris-nouns of stems containing e or i is surprising; nouns in -oris survived better in Romance tongues than those in -eris; it is significant too that in Italy and Roumania nouns in -us, -i and -us developed plurals in -ora, due to a desire to transfer inanimate objects to the neuter gender. T. W. Allen, *Adversaria IV*. 1. Theognis 289 'they govern the people with extraordinary laws.' Exx. of postponed δε from Comedy. 2. Notes on *Hymn to Hermes* 482-9. 3. ὁμαλός = ὁμοιος. 4. πρόβατον from \*προβ- not vice versa. 5. The idiom e.g. εἰ μὲν τι δώσεις· εἰ δὲ μὴ οὐχ ἐστρήξομεν is common in Ionic prose. 6. καθὼ καθότι = where (more exx.). 7. Exx. of tmesis. 8. Theognis 805, θεωρῶν is partitive gen. 9. *ibid.* 1222, read πείσματα. 10. Diod. Sic. xiv 13. 8, ? πολιτικῶς for πολυτελῶς.

### LXIII. 4. October, 1937.

J. Vanseveren, *Inscriptions d'Amorgos et de Chios* (3 from A., 7 from Ch.): No. 2 illustrates Harpocraton ζ.ν. ἀποτιμηταί, 6 is a list of πρόξενοι, 10 deals with arbitration between Lampsacus and Parion. All are new. A. Minard, *Deux relatifs homériques* (contd.), continues (with many examples) to classify uses of ὅς τις. This instalment deals with cases where there is a singular reference: (1) the person is undetermined, but some characteristic determined, (2) ὅς τις = 'whoever it may be, whence the use in interrogatives and to mark real or feigned ignorance. G. B. A. Fletcher, *Stylistic borrowings and parallels in Ammianus Marcellinus*, gives a list of phrases found in Ammianus and some earlier author; few consist of more than two words, e.g. *periculosum exemplum*. A. E. Giffard, *Mancipium*, argues that the word originally means the process of transfer; *res Mancipi* were those articles which were joint property of the family and could only be transferred in this solemn way; *mancipium* meaning *power* over a free person (never a thing) is probably not earlier than the end of the 4th cent. B.C. P. Couissin, *Interprétation d'un passage du "de Oratore"* (III, 18, 67), finds it necessary to tell some compatriots that *contra* here is the pre-

position. W. H. Buckler *Epistula Traiani*, brings a correction to his article in LXIII. 2.

LXIV. 1. January, 1938.

J. E. Harry, *Ajax l'Aigle* [Soph. *Aj.* 169], thinking it impossible that Ajax should be compared to a vulture, would read μεγάλας γυνῶν, ὑποδείσαντες. P. Guillon, *La stèle d'Homère à Delphes* [Pausanias X. 24. 2]: What is meant is an inscribed slab with a bronze relief attached to its face. A. Minard, *Deux relatifs homériques* (concluded), thinks the central force of ὅς τε resides in lack of temporal determination. He discusses the supplanting of ὅς τε by ὅς τις in later Greek, and institutes a comparison between the two relatives. Notes et Discussions: G. Mathieu (1) criticizes H. Berve's *Miltiades* on details and for showing an exaggerated idea of the possible power of a 'nobleman' in the early 5th cent.; he also argues that Herodotus' account of the positions of Miltiades and Callimachus is more nearly true than is now usually believed; (2) gives an account of K. I. Gelzer's *Die Schrift vom Staate der Athener*.

LXIV. 2. April, 1938.

J. Bayet, *Tite-Live et la précolonisation romaine*, reviews the evidence for informal colonization in Italy, the main methods of which were (1) by secession, sometimes with capture of foreign women, (2) by penetration, (3) by interchange of population; he defends Livy I. 27. 9 *magna pars Fidenatum ut qui coloni Romanis additi essent latine sciebant*, supposing a case of Etruscan penetration. A. Bourgery, *Tite-Live et le passage des Alpes par Hannibal*, argues that in XXI. 31-2 Livy has stitched together three different accounts of the same events. L. Laurand, *L'accent grec et latin*, gives a bibliography and concludes that *adhuc sub iudice lis est*. G. Daux, *Notes d'épigraphie étrusque et delphique*, suggests several rectifications of R. Flacelière's *Les Aitolians à Delphes* and gives a collection of brief notes on the restoration of various proper names in a number of inscriptions. A. Juret, *Réflexions sur le style indirect libre*, criticizes an article by J. Bayet (*Rev. Phil.* 1931), and in particular his contention that in Latin, as in French, the imperfect indicative can be used to indicate reported speech.

LXIV. 3. July, 1938.

E. de Saint-Denis, *La théorie cicéronienne de la participation aux affaires publiques*, concludes that the views on this subject expressed in *De Officiis* and the preface to *De Republica* are not due to any 'source,' but are Cicero's own, the result of his experiences and hopes. L. Gernet, *Les dix archontes de 581*, exposes the difficulties of Aristotle's tale of 10 archons, 5 being *Eupatrids*, 3 *agroikoi*, 2 *demiourgoi*, and suggests that he was taken in by a projection into the past of a Utopian constitution which combined warriors, farmers, and craftsmen, as did Hippodamus' Republic (*Pol.* 1267 b 30; cf. also Plato *Critias* 110 c): the sentence εἰς τὸ ἐδοξε . . . ἐνέλαυνον interrupts the narrative and may be an afterthought. J. Collart, *Paléon et L'Ars Grammatica*, supports Milne's attribution of the fragment published in *Cat. Lit. Pap. B.M.* to Palaemon's *Ars Grammatica*; the fragment proves the guess that P. derives from Dionysius Thrax, and was used by Diomedes and Charisius; the contrast between his lasting influence and rare mention in i-ii A.D. is to be explained by the fact that his grammar was better than his morals.

LXIV. 4. October, 1938.

P. J. Enk, *Quelques observations sur la manière dont Plaute s'est comporté envers ses originaux*, thinks that there are three clear cases where a single scene has been taken from a play other than that translated: *Stichus V*, *Pseudolus I iii*, *Miles III iii*. He



concludes with a warning against inventing faults in Plautus to support theories about his methods of composition. E. Bickerman, *ΔΙΑΓΡΑΜΜΑ*, gives a well-documented study of the meaning of this Hellenistic administrative term, and concludes that it was an edict, usually of an omnibus nature, promulgated at its author's residence and transmitted by officials to the authorities concerned, who published the parts relevant to themselves. In Egypt it was always connected with the annual fiscal scheme, and with this may be compared the 4th-cent. Athenian use to mean the (list of) contributions payable under the symmory-system. The cause of its unrestricted use in the Macedonian sphere is unknown. G. Dumézil, *Latin crêdo, arménien ari't'*; *mots et légendes*, traces phonetic and semantic connections. A. Boutemy, *Les fragments de Corsendonck*, has found and describes two more leaves of the xith cent. Virgil (with Servius) of which he published one leaf in *Latomus* I. J. Aymard, *A propos de Grattius*, noting the references in Horace to hunting, thinks the sport was encouraged by Augustus as good training for war. Grattius, who has many military metaphors and a denunciation of luxury, is to be counted an Augustan propagandist. P. Nordmann, *Note sur le gouvernail antique*, in convicting Laurand of a mistake in interpreting Lucian *Navigium* 6 (*Rév. Phil.* 1937), warns us to take Lucian's ship with a grain of salt. N. is making a collection of ancient texts concerning seafaring. H. Lucas, *Lalage dans Horace*: Did Lalage marry Sabinus (*Epist.* I. 5. 27)? One of Livia's freedwomen of that name did marry a Sabinus (*C.I.L.* VI. ii. 3940).

#### Rivista di Filologia. N.S. XVI (1938), 1.

M. A. Levi, *I principii dell' impero di Vespasiano*, discusses the famous *lex* and shows its relevance: Vespasian, possessing neither dynastic claims nor *auctoritas*, wished to establish his power in a strongly-defined legal fashion. U. E. Paoli, *Ancora sull' età del 'Satyricon'*, reiterates against his critics (Funaioli and Marmorale) his conviction that the novelist is not the same person as the Petronius mentioned by Tacitus, and invokes a number of rather tenuous arguments. F. Della Corte, *Le OMHPKAI MEAETAI di Plutarco e la ricomposizione del Pap. Lond. 734*, shows how this papyrus can be supplemented by reference to Pseudo-Plutarch, *Vita Homeri*. M. Guarducci, *Una nuova confederazione cretese. Gli Orioï*. These people, mentioned by Polybius 4, 53, 6, are shown by inscr. (soon to be published in *Inscr. Cret.* II) concluding treaties with the Gortynians and with Magas, King of Cyrene. Their centre and sanctuary was at Lisos. *Miscellanea*: I—L. Vassili, *Il dux Vincenzo e l' incursione gotica in Italia nell' anno 473*. An elucidation of *Chron. Gall.*, 653. II—S. Ferri, *Il Diogenianon di Afrodizia*. This is perhaps the building recently discovered by the Italian excavators. The remarkable sculptures may belong c. A.D. 100, for there was a restoration then (*CIG* 2782). *Recensioni. Note bibliografiche. Pubblicazioni ricevute.*

#### N.S. XVI (1938), 2.

M. A. Levi, *La grande iscrizione di Ottaviano trovata a Rose*, pursues Roussel's elucidation of this document (*Syria*, 1934, 33 ff.), discusses the absence of the term 'triumvir' from Octavian's titulature, and investigates the precise benefits conferred upon the admiral Seleucus and his family. A. Degraffi, *Problemi cronologici delle colonie di Luceria, Aquileia, Teanum Sidicinum*, argues that Luceria (cf. the inscr. *L'ann. ép.*, 1937, 64) is an Augustan colony. Aquileia was probably raised to the rank of a colony by Claudius or Nero, Teanum perhaps in A.D. 46 (cf. the evidence of the *Fasti* from Teanum). V. Ehrenberg, *Ofella di Cirene*, discusses the career of Ophellas, who was sent by Ptolemy to Cyrene in 322 B.C.: not to be identified with the man from Olynthus (Pseudo-Aristotle, *Oeconomica* II, 1353a, 5 ff.). G. Alessio, *Zoonymata*. Etymologies—*salpuga* (Pliny, *NH* 29, 12), \**pustellio*, *camura*. S. Ferri,



*Signa quadrata*, examines Pliny (NH 34, 56; 34, 65) on the statues made by Polyclethus and Lysippus: 'quadratus' = τετράκωλος. *Miscellanea*: I—S. Accame, *L'epigrafe di Bybon*. In *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 1071, for 'Οφω[ν]α read ὁ φωκω[ν]α[s]. II—A. W. Gomme; G. De Sanctis, *Una replica e una controreplica*. Polemics about population, arising from the review in *Rivista*, 1937, 288 ff. *Recensioni. Note bibliografiche. Pubblicazioni ricevute.*

## N.S. XVI (1938), 3.

S. Accame, *Il Senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus*, argues that the surviving text is not the S.C. itself, but the letter despatched by the consuls to the *socii*. R. Philippson, *Diogene di Enoanda e Aristotele*. The disquieting and radical scepticism attributed to Aristotle by Diogenes (fr. 4, 1, 13) is neither genuine nor his own invention, but perhaps derives from Favorinus. M. Segre, *Due lettere di Silla*, publishes for the first time two inscriptions from Cos recording concessions made by Sulla to the society of Dionysiac artists. M. Guarducci, *Intorno alle vicende e all'età della grande iscrizione di Gortina*, firmly criticizes the theories of E. Kirsten (*Die Insel Kreta*, 1936, 37 ff.), discusses the original situation of the inscription and argues that it belongs to the first half of the fifth century B.C. E. Hoenigswald, *Problemi di linguistica umbra. A proposito delle Tabulae Iguvinae editae a Jacobo Devoto*. A detailed discussion of these texts in the light of the latest publication: also a valuable list of the proper names there occurring. *Miscellanea*: A. Rostagni, *Qualche osservazione sopra un papiro estetico-letterario attribuito ad Aristotele*. This is *Pap. Graec. Vindob.* 26008 + 29329, recently revised by Oellacher. Hardly Aristotle himself, but rather a work of the Peripatetic School. *Recensioni. Note bibliografiche. Cronache e commenti. Pubblicazioni ricevute.*

## N.S. XVI (1938), 4.

M. Lenchantin, *Augusto e Tacito*. An eloquent elucidation of the opening chapters of *Annals* I, without startling novelties. S. Accame, *La battaglia presso il Pireo del 403 a. C.*, is valuable for discussion of the topography of the Piraeus. G. M. Bersanetti, *Sulla guerra fra Settimio Severo e Pescennio Nigro*, demonstrates the inadequacy of Herodian's account of this war: the sluggish incompetence of Pescennius is pure rhetorical invention. G. Barbieri, *L'amministrazione delle provincie Ponto-Bitinia e Licia-Pamfilia nel II sec. d. Cr.* Hadrian, towards the end of his reign, took Bithynia and gave up instead Lycia-Pamphylia to the Senate. The change was reversed by Pius. M. Aurelius in his early years made Bithynia an imperial province (which it afterwards remained), keeping, however, Lycia-Pamphylia (which did not become senatorial till c. 180). N. Alfieri, *Traiano in Ancona*, examines the evidence for Trajan's harbour works and emphasizes the importance of Ancona for his Dacian Wars. G. Alessio, *Phytonymata*. A detailed study of ancient plant and vegetable names, beginning with cucumbers. *Recensioni. Note bibliografiche. Pubblicazioni ricevute.*

**Wiener Studien.** LIV. 1936 (published December, 1936).

(Most of the contributions are dedicated to Julius Jüthner on the occasion of his seventieth birthday.)

ABHANDLUNGEN: J. Mewaldt considers the effect on Greek civilization of a heroic conception of the universe. L. Radermacher discusses the identity of Maison and Susarion. A. Lesky argues against Otto that Heraclitus fr. 15 is no proof that Dionysus was a chthonic deity. H. Gomperz considers Plato *Gorgias* 416 a-b, 523 e-f, *Theaet.* 172 c-175 d, and Max. Tyr. *Or.* III conclusive evidence for the view that Socrates did not speak in his defence when on trial. K. Jax traces certain τόποι

dealing with personal beauty. J. Mesk suggests, without claiming to prove, that the inconsistencies in the plot of the *Poenulus* arise from imitation of the *Καρχηδόνιος*. G. Jelenko explains the difficulties of Lucretius V. 1091-1104 and 1105-1160 on the ground that the poet died before he had time to combine elements that sprang from different sides of his poetic genius. K. Mras argues that Horace was of oriental descent and thus accounts for some features of his poetry. K. Prinz discusses Propertius I. 1. 24-5; 33; 9. 4; 12; 22 f.; 34; 14. 5; 17. 11 f. I. Zechner argues against R. Reitzenstein that Tacitus did not alter his political convictions. M. Schuster defends the authenticity of Lactantius' *De ave Phoenix*. L. Bieler discusses the text of some passages of Boethius, *De philosophiae consolatione*.

MISZELLEN: J. Jüthner analyses the meaning of Pindar's *σκιᾶς ὄντα ἄνθρωπος*, which he compares, to its disadvantage, with Soph. *Ajax* 125. E. Diehl thinks that there is in Callimachus an element of fairy story which did not require learning in contemporaries. E. Kalinka emends NATA to ENATA in Tituli Asiae min. II 1, assuming that the cutter omitted E after the preceding Σ. J. Zingerle emends some passages in Philostratus *Gymn.* L. Radermacher argues that Cincilius, not Caecilius (*Philol.* 91. 89), provided Quintilian (VIII, 3. 35) with the quotation from Sisenna. E. Hauler restores Fronto pp. 201. 2 ff. and 203. 7 ff. (Naber) with the help of the Ambrosian palimpsest. M. Schuster defends *ferro* at Rutilius Namat. I. 366. F. Alexander illustrates the use made of Ovid by Prudentius, whose debt is inadequately represented by Bergmann's index. J. Brück discusses philologically the name *Plautus* and the German word *Pfote*. V. Bulhart discusses the development of the use of *habere* with the infinitive. R. Egger describes a monument found at Aquincum (nr. 363 in the German guide). A. Betz describes a soldier's gravestone from Carnuntum. E. Groag refers C.I.L. XI. 6163 to the rising of Camillus Scribonianus (42 A.D.) and C.I.G. 3990 to Ti. Julius Frugi (c. 114 A.D.).

LV. 1937 (published October, 1937).

(Festschrift for Ludwig Radermacher on the occasion of his seventieth birthday.)

ABHANDLUNGEN: J. Mewaldt argues that the heroic conception of the universe had to struggle with the cosmological, anthropocentric, and religious conceptions. The last, in the form of Christianity, won the day in antiquity. A. Lesky illustrates from Hesiod, *Works and Days* 60-105, Apollodorus III. 164-7, and Petronius 63 the way in which well-worn motifs are combined. E. Loew analyses the conflict among the pre-Socratics. An examination of Empedocles will be followed by examinations of Anaxagoras and Democritus. J. Mesk defends the traditional order of lines in Eurip. *Suppl.* 650-667. J. Pavlu shows that the pseudo-Platonic *Epinomis* which attacks Aristotle cannot be earlier than the last quarter of the fourth century. H. Oellacher transcribes and expounds a fragment of a rhetorical handbook (Pap. Graec. Vind. 754). K. Mras illustrates the ironical use of the patronymic and defends Nicomachides in Lysias in *Nicomachum* 11. E. Kalinka gives reasons for wishing for a new treatment of Greek syntax. H. Gerstinger transcribes and comments on fragments of a 'school' text of Cicero's first speech against Catiline with a parallel Greek translation (Pap. Graec. Vind. 30885 a and e). R. Hanslik in a discussion of the problems of Horace *Sat.* I 1 argues that the first twelve lines were added on publication to what was one of the earliest satires. M. Schuster comments on the influence of popular beliefs on Tibullus II 1 (to be continued). H. Lackenbacher discusses the relation of Persius to medical writers. K. Prinz interprets some passages in the preface to Tacitus, *Agricola*. J. Sofer argues that St. Jerome's statement that the Galatae spoke, as well as Greek, a language akin to that of the Celtic Treveri was based on personal observation. V. Bulhart proposes emendations in the Latin versions of Dioscurides and Chiron. W. Kroll associates the origin of belief in the werewolf with primitive Arcadian rites. G. Herzog-Hauser examines the

relation between the three Roman festivals in honour of the dead and concludes that the *Lemuria* was the oldest.

MISZELLEN: W. Krause argues that *Iliad* II. 339-41 proves that the author was familiar with written documents. H. Kenner discusses, with drawings, the type of cup described at *Iliad* XI. 632 ff. L. Bieler returns to the distinction between *δύναμις* and *ἐξουσία* in religious books (cf. *θεῖος ἀνὴρ* I. 80 ff.). E. Vetter recommends punctuating Cato, *De re Rust.* 135. 1 *Suessae et in Lucanis plostra; Treblae Albae, Romae dolia, labra*. F. Walter proposes emendations, mostly supplements, in Pliny, *N.H.*, Pliny, *Epp.*, and Tacitus, *Agricola* 28. E. Hauler argues that Fronto p. 127. 3 ff. (Naber) quotes a remark of Cornelius Nepos on the younger Scipio's Numantine war. A. Savić Rebac considers that Eros is primarily to be connected with 'Light,' hence some of his names—e.g., Kallistos, Phanes.